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This dissertation investigates the hypothesis that participation can overcome trade-
offs in equity and efficiency. Literature within the field of economics and sociology 
has argued for tradeoffs in outcomes of allocative efficiency and equity and 
institutional efficiency and equity, respectively.  Community-based participatory 
institutions are expected to overcome this tension by introducing institutional 
accountability and local-level decision making, which serve to enhance technical and 
allocative efficiency while retaining mechanisms for equitable a location and 
empowerment.  This research draws on fieldwork from a community-managed water 
supply program in rural Bahia, Brazil to examine whether outcomes of fficiency and 
equity are mutually compatible.  Findings from the field research indicate that explicit 
and implicit subsidies to the water supply systems led to outcomes f allocative 
equity in the sites visited, but that these generated tradeoffs with allocative efficiency.  
Findings from the research also indicated that the community organizations were 
relatively efficient in their administrative practices, but that this efficiency came at a 
cost to equality of membership and voice in the community organization.  This 
suggests that participatory water supply programs generate certain and specific costs, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Recent perceptions of water as a scarce resource have brought a renewed 
focus on the dual goals of efficiency and equity and the need for appropriate 
institutions to achieve these goals (ODI 2002).  The emphasis on outcomes of 
efficiency and equity as critical objectives culminated in widespr ad support for the 
internationally recognized Dublin Principles1 of 1991 that not only highlighted the 
need to re-conceptualize water as an economic good to maximize effici ncy, but 
recognized the need for equitable allocation and the stronger role of women in access 
and distribution (Global Water Partnership, 2003).  Since then, the focus in water 
resources management has shifted attention to developing institutional configurations 
that could achieve outcomes of both economic efficiency and distributional equity.   
The need for water management institutions to improve both efficiency a d 
equity is particularly important for the lesser developed countries. Efficient2 
management of water resources limits water losses, which is especially important in 
areas of frequent drought or other types of water poverty and is critical to incomes 
and livelihoods of the global poor.  However, the equitable3 distribution of water 
resources, likewise, remains an important priority; access to clean drinking water 
prevents waterborne diseases, water is critical to food production, as well as 
numerous other industries and is essential for human and other life.  In lesser 
                                                
1 The Dublin Principles are a set of four principles that relate to the definition and use of water as an 
economic good but also a critical right for humans. These four principles were adopted after the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland that took place 
between 26 and 31 January 1992.   
2 Defined as maximizing outputs with a given set of inputs, the typical usage with respect to water 
resources focuses on limiting water losses, and alloc ting water to the most productive uses.  
3 Defined as the allocation of water resources that is considered to be fair by all users, this can include 





developed countries, the challenge to develop institutions for both efficient and 
equitable distribution of water resources remains a challenge.   
This challenge is perhaps best seen in the following two figures that show the 
importance of institutions in managing water resources both efficiently and fairly.  
The first figure shows water scarcity, which is a purely phsical measure that looks at 
the availability of water on a per capita basis. Differences in water scarcity here can 
be attributed to population density and availability of water resources; for example, 
China has less water than Canada and forty times as many inhabita ts, and India 
sustains 20 percent of the earth’s population on four percent of global water resources 
(Specter 2006).  Thus, areas of high population density and low water stocksare at 
greatest risk of facing future shortages4.  As seen by the highlighted areas in the 
figure below, many of the areas under water stress are located in middle or lower 
income countries (such as India, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, parts of China), but also in 
higher income countries of the United States and parts of Australia. 
                                                
4 While some debate continues over the role of technology in providing freshwater resources in the 
future, growing populations, especially in areas of relative water scarcity, indicate futures of rising 




Figure 1:  Water Stress Indicator5 
 
Source: World Water Council 
 
 However, the figure below measures water poverty, that adds additional 
dimensions of water scarcity, including access and availabiltiy.  Here, low-income 
countries feature heavily among nations considered to be water poor: of 147 countries 
included in the Water Poverty Index6, most of the countries experiencing higher rates 
of water poverty are either developing or middle income countries7 (Lawrence, 
Meigh, and Sullivan, 2002). Figure 2 shows national level representation of water 
poor countries: 
                                                
5 The Water Stress Indicator shows the balance between ater use and water resources. As such, it 
“measures the proportion of water withdrawal with respect to total renewable resources. It is a 
criticality ratio, which implies that water stress depends on the variability of resources. Water stres  
causes deterioration of fresh water resources in terms of quantity (aquifer over-exploitation, dry rivers, 
etc.) and quality (eutrophication, organic matter pollution, saline intrusion, etc.)” (World Water 
Council) 
6 The Water Poverty Index is defined as “The idea… to combine measures of water availability and 
access with measures of people’s capacity to access water. People can be ‘water poor’ in the sense of 
not having sufficient water for their basic needs because it is not available. They may have to walk a 
long way to get it or even if they have access to water nearby, supplies may be limited for various 
reasons. People can also be ‘water poor’ because they are ‘income poor’; although water is available, 
they cannot afford to pay for it.
7 For example, the top ten countries facing the least w ter poverty are (in descending order) Finland, 
Canada, Iceland, Norway, Guyana, Suriname, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.  The ten countries facing the highest water poverty are (in ascending order) Haiti, Niger, 




Figure 2:  Water Poverty Index 
 
 
Source: Oxford Centre for Water Research 
 
These two figures highlight the importance of institutions in mediating access 
and distribution of water resources.  Many countries, most notably in Africa, actually 
have abundant physical resources, but exhibit high water poverty because of how 
water is distributed.  This observation was the focus on the UN’s 2006 Human 
Development Report (HDR) that argued that water shortages were driven primarily 
by management of available resources.  Addressing water management, then, was the 
key to improved provision of water supply services that were critical not only to 
human life, but also to reducing waterborne diseases and, in some areas, potential 
conflicts (HDR 2006).   
Challenges to the state’s monopoly over water management institutons has 
led to increased focus on the variation in nature and form that watermanagement 
institutions could take to optimize the distribution of water resources.  Historical 




distribution largely where the resource best furthered state policy r objectives8. 
However, the state’s track record, particularly in developing countries of inefficient 
and unequal distribution (De Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira and Walton 2004) created an 
opportunity for alternative institutional configurations to emerge.  The Washington 
Consensus9 first challenged this perception of resources as within the state’s domain 
to distribute, arguing that market mechanisms and private enterprises are more 
efficient in their distribution.  More recent popular opposition to privatization of 
water services has given rise to a “third way” in public servic  delivery broadly: the 
participatory approach.   
The participatory approach is wide-ranging and takes many forms, but is 
fundamentally premised on the notion that local level management of res urces can 
improve both efficiency and equity in service delivery.  The approach has been used 
across a variety of public services, including budgeting, water supply, electricity 
provision, and housing, with varying degrees of success. But, where it has been 
effective, the particular institutional configuration, whereby users engage in local-
level decision-making to allocate and distribute services, has delivered promising 
results, bypassing cumbersome bureaucratic management for more locally sensitive 
and accountable public service delivery.   
                                                
8 Even in societies of the ancient Mediterranean and Near and Far East, elaborate irrigation and water 
supply systems with dams and aqueducts, administration of water was highly centralized and water 
was the property of the state.  The role of water in i r gation and industrial production was critical to 
state power, and this legacy continued into the medieval and industrial eras (Getzler 2004).  
9 The term Washington Consensus, first coined by John Williamson in 1990, is typically used to 
encompass a set of policies that promoted, amongst other things, fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, 
tax reform, privatization, and redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both 
high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, 
primary education, and infrastructure. (Center for International Development, Harvard University, 




Decentralization and local level participation united anti-bureaucratic 
sentiment across the political spectrum and has been promoted enthusiastically for its 
ability to achieve outcomes of both efficiency and equity simultaneously.  Support for 
the participatory approach to achieve outcomes of both efficiency a d equity draws 
on two different sets of literature.  First, the claim that increased participation leads to 
enhanced technical and allocative efficiency draws on studies developed within new 
institutional economics and game theory (Ostrom 1990, Seabright 1993, Bardhan nd 
Ray 2008) that argue that where individuals can act as market regulators10, the 
outcomes will be more efficient than under state management. Participation allows 
for preference revelation, and reduces informational asymmetries and corruption 
through greater accountability that lead to improved allocative and technical 
efficiencies (Osmani 2007)  Greater efficiency in resource allocation will lead to less 
water wasted, enhanced productivity, increased incomes and consumption, and 
greater well-being.   
Second, strategies of user participation appeal to a theoretical base th t 
advocates for empowerment and enhanced equity, with little said about market 
efficiency.  Participation creates opportunities for the poor and otherwise 
marginalized to be heard thereby creating opportunities for empowerment.  In 
addition, when people are able to participate, then those who were previously 
marginalized will be able to exercise their voice in favor of m re equitable allocation 
of the resources.  This work draws on theories of empowerment of the poor and 
                                                
10 This is conceptualized as the rational economic indiv dual that maximizes self-interest. Historically, 
state management of common pool resources was justified based on failures of collective action 
(Hardin 1968, Olson 1965). However, new institutional economics and game theory argue that 
individuals can enter into repeated interlocking games in collective institutions, since these provide a 




marginalized as key to social change (Alinsky 1969, Freire 1973, Rappaport 1985).  
Inequities result from a set of power relations that continue to marginalize sections of 
the population, and a shift in these relations will increase equity by creating 
opportunities for voice and accountability.  Thus, participation not only achieves 
greater equity by extending the vote (and hence voice) to all users, but in doing so, 
the outcomes achieved through consensus will likely be less discriminatory, or, more 
equitable.   
Critiques of the participatory approach have typically been organized around 
two points.  First, some critics point to the fundamental incompatibility of 
participation as a process of awakening, and participation within broader state 
structures.  These authors have pointed to the ‘radical’ roots of partici tion (Mohan 
and Stokke 2000), arguing that development programs have co-opted and 
depoliticized the participatory process. The theoretical origins of participation 
advocate for transformative social change (Alinksy 1969; Rappaport 1985) that 
ultimately leads to a shift in power relations (Arnstein 1969; Freire 1970, 1973). 
Promoting active participation allows for the otherwise marginalized to voice their 
preferences leading to improved institutional accountability and greater quity in the 
allocation of resources (Osmani 2007).  A second set of critiques has focused on how 
the participatory approach has been implemented, indicating that these 
implementations have largely ignored local cultural values and understandings.  
Scholars in this vein have criticized development programs for ignoring complex 
social realities (Mosse 2006; Scott 1998; Guijit & Shah, 1998; Meinzen-Dick & 




Brent 2004) and static (Waddock 1991), discounting power relations within 
communities (Cleaver 1999; 2000) and overlooking the knowledge or training needed 
to participate (Depoe et. al. 2004).   
However, few critiques have focused on the claim that participatory 
institutions can bridge these differences to achieve outcomes of both efficiency and 
equity.  The compatibility between outcomes of efficiency and equity is often 
contested.  Literature from the field of economics has argued that the market, as an 
allocating mechanism, is wholly efficient, but unequal.  The state, on the other hand, 
can ensure equitable allocation, but this comes at a cost to efficiency.  This 
relationship was most famously articulated by Arthur Okun (1967) who argued that 
state regulation of market allocation served to ensure equity, but that his came at a 
cost to efficiency analogous to a “leaky bucket”.  Thus, allocating goods and services 
equitably would create a tradeoff with efficient allocation.   
Within the field of sociology, the administrative process within local level 
organizations also exhibit incompatibilities between efficiency and equity. Max 
Weber (1921/1978), for example, argues that local level institutions created expressly 
to preserve equity would tend to be undermined by the complexity of technical tasks, 
or adopt patterns of participation that favored elites.  These institutions, he argued, 
were fundamentally unstable, and ultimately goals of efficiency would come at a cost 
to equity. Thus, the classical sociological literature also argues for the fundamental 
incompatibility between outcomes of efficiency and equity within organizations.   
This research investigated the hypothesis that outcomes of efficiency and 




manage water resources.  To investigate this claim, this research drew on field work 
in Bahia, Brazil.  Brazil provides a good backdrop to assess the compatibility of 
efficiency and equity for a few reasons.  First, while the country has some of the 
largest freshwater reserves on the planet, they are unevenly distributed, and areas of 
the northeast—that already face high rates of poverty and economic stagnation—are 
also at risk for severe and frequent droughts.  Second, Brazil’s constitution of 1988 
laid the groundwork for pro-equity policies and environmental rights that were 
pursued in subsequent administrations (De Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira and Walton 
2004), and some of these sought to elicit greater participation of the historically 
marginalized populations.  Indeed, as Jacobs (2002) notes, the environmental 
movements have played a key role in bringing about democratization in transitional 
economies, and the broader legislative framework for water resource places 
management at the lowest possible level, and advocates for strong participation on the 
part of water users.  Finally, Bahia’s semi-arid region, a longhistory of drought and 
outmigration, as well as the need to improve water supply to rural are s has meant 
that community-based water programs have been active in the region for quite some 
time.  One such program, the Central program, is often cited as a best practice 
example (UN 2002), and with over ten years of experience in providing water supply 
services to over 45 local municipalities in Bahia’s semi-arid region, the program 
provides a compelling case study wherein to investigate outcomes f both efficiency 
and equity within participatory organizations.11   
                                                
11 The communities supplied under the Central program are otherwise ineligible for state provision of 
water supply and sanitation; given their small size and relative remoteness, the state water company 




Research was conducted in the form of individual and focus group interviews 
in six communities that are part of the Central program and that exhibited varying 
levels of participation (high, medium and low), as well as with key informants at the 
local, state, and national levels in Brazil.  The goal of the resea ch was to measure 
outcomes of both allocative efficiency and equity as well as organizational efficiency 
and equity within each of the community water management organizatio s.  These 
outcomes were then compared to assess whether (i) efficiency and equity were 
compatible processes, or whether they generated tradeoffs; and (ii) what the role of 
participation was in overcoming tensions between efficiency and equity.  
Findings from the field research indicated partial support for the hypothesis 
that efficiency and equity could coexist.  Specifically, the research found that explicit 
and implicit subsidies to the water supply systems led to outcomes f allocative 
equity in the sites visited, but that these generated tradeoffs with allocative efficiency.  
However, the research also showed that community organizations exhibited signs of 
efficiency in their administrative practices, although this effici ncy came at a cost to 
equality of membership and voice in the community organization.  Thus, while both 
types of efficiency and equity generated tradeoffs, the end result was hat the systems 
exhibited allocative equity that was compatible with organizational efficincy. 
Findings from the research were less clear on the question of the role that 
participation played in overcoming incompatibilities between effici ncy and equity.  
First, the research hoped to capture variations in efficiency and equity that was linked 
to patterns of participation on the community level.  Unfortunately, only municipal 




nk any variation with differences in participation. And while community-level data 
were available for organizational efficiency and equity, there was no clear pattern 
linking variations in participation with outcomes of efficiency and equity.  Second, 
the research attempted to link participation with evidence of intermediate mechanisms 
that led to outcomes of efficiency and equity, especially on accountability.  Here there 
was also no clear pattern linking variations in levels of participation with consistent 
variations in accountability, or other intermediate mechanisms.  Part of this is likely 
due to the small sample of communities visited; with only six communities it was 
difficult to ascertain patterns in participation that were not immediately attributed to 
local level characteristics or specific histories of the community for broader 
applicability. Thus, the hypothesis that mechanisms of accountability introduced 
through participation were critical to outcomes of both efficiency and equity was not 
found to be substantiated.   
 The implications of this research are threefold.  First, this research indicated 
that for the communities investigated, outcomes of allocative efficiency and equity 
were not compatible, but rather favored outcomes of equality of access.  While this is 
a critical priority, and one that is generally politically popular, the dependence of the 
Central program on state subsidies can also compromise the scope that participation is 
able to take within the program.  Scholars critical of how participation has been co-
opted within development argue that the dependence on state financing shapes the 
role of participants to be little more than the implementers of a state-driven program 
(Mohan and Stokke 2003) or the consumers of a state service (Darcy 1993).  In 




unclear that the program can be expanded beyond its current stage to include more 
communities without access to water resources because of funding issues.  This 
brings up broader issues of equity and sustainability beyond the current scope of the 
program.  Second, the role of participation within the community organizations did 
not seem to have any effect in curbing elite capture.  At times this could benefit the 
community, and at times it did not.  Finally, the nature of participation varied in scope 
and importance from community to community, although on a broad level it was not 
critical to the survival of the community organization or to the continued delivery of 
water services.  However, this research indicated preliminarily that the participatory 
community-based institution could provide some counterbalance to broader system  
of the politicization of water resources.   
 
This dissertation is organized in the following way.  Chapter 2 discusses the 
origins of the participatory approach in water management.  It first provides an 
historical overview of the evolution of water management policies, and then discusses 
the emergence of the participatory approach and community management as an 
alternative provider of water supply services.  This section also highlights the 
changing emphasis in water management to include the primary objectives of both 
efficiency and equity as critical to resource sustainability.  The chapter then turns to 
the three theoretical paradigms that allow me to address the debates on the 
compatibility of goals of efficiency and equity in participatory water management.  
Chapter 3 describes the emergence of participatory water management in Brazil’s 




management policies in Brazil at large, and then a history of drought, water, and 
politics in the state of Bahia.  It then turns to the emergence of alternative service 
provision of water supply services in the western semi-arid region of the state, and 
specifically the program that was investigated as a part of this dissertation.  Finally, it 
provides a detailed overview of the Central program in the district of Seabra.  Chapter 
4 outlines the general methodology used in the study, and the data collection 
methods.  It then goes on to describe the communities visited and provides som  
general information of the respondents, including socio-demographic data. It hen 
provides a description of the research design, with the specific measurements used for 
participation, efficiency and equity, and describes how I went about collecting 
information on each of these concepts.  Chapter 5 presents the findings of the 
research beginning with a presentation of concepts of allocative eff ci ncy and equity, 
and followed by organizational efficiency and equity.  The chapter then goes on to 
discuss the development model and presents findings from the research on the extent 
to which the development model was reflected on the ground.  Finally, Chapter 6 





Chapter 2: Literatures of Interest 
 The participatory approach to water management lies at the in ersection of 
literature on the administration of natural resources and ideas of decentralization and 
community management.  How society conceptualizes and relates to water has 
implications for the administrative structure over the environment; major shifts in 
how water is perceived, from embedded to separate from social life nd from being 
an infinite to a finite resource, has driven decisions over allocation nd distribution of 
water (Khanal 2003).  During periods of modernization and industrialization, 
societies viewed the natural environment as an unlimited resource bas to be 
exploited for maximum gain, and the administrative structure best suited to its 
efficient exploitation was a large public agency.  More recent p rceptions of water as 
a finite resource have shifted the emphasis in water management towards resource 
sustainability, efficient water use, and equitable access and distribution.  
 Participatory water management also draws on ideas of decentralization and 
local participation.  Strong anti-bureaucratic sentiments from across the political 
spectrum have challenged large public agencies and state management of public 
resources, arguing that the top-down managerial approach resulted in practical 
inefficiencies and inequalities in service delivery, as well as degradation of the 
environmental commons and interference with rural livelihoods (Saito-Jensen 
unpublished).  In addition, the practical recognition of the state’s inability to extend 
and enforce regulations, and the frequent and serious conflicts over acc ss to 
resources (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Arnold 2001) were critical to the emerg nce 




Most importantly, the participatory approach promised to achieve outcomes f 
both efficiency and equity in water management.  The growing concern ov r resource 
scarcity highlighted the need for both efficient water provision, on the one hand, as 
well as continued emphasis on equity in distribution.  Where literatur from the 
disciplines of economics and sociology has pointed to tensions between th se
outcomes, the introduction of participatory mechanisms seemed to be able to 
overcome these tradeoffs.  This dissertation aims to critically assess this claim.  
 
 This chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section presents the 
overlapping literatures in which the participatory approach to water management is 
grounded.  A background of water management policies and administration types is 
followed by an overview of the broader trend of decentralization and participation in 
public service delivery.  The second section of this chapter then outlines the 
theoretical frameworks used to examine the compatibility of outcomes of efficiency 
and equity in participatory institutions.  The ‘development model’12 presents these 
outcomes as compatible, since mechanisms of accountability result in improved 
efficiency and equity.  Insights from both Okun and Weber, on the other hand, argue 
for the fundamental incompatibility of these goals.   
A. Background of Water Management Policies 
Throughout history, water management institutions have taken on a variety of 
forms, from large-scale bureaucracies to local level councils that have defined rules 
over access, rights, and ownership (Getzler 2004).  Much of the variation in how 
                                                




water was administered has been driven, in part, by the characteristi s of the water 
resource- such as whether it was groundwater or surface water, the volume and flow 
of water, the frequency of droughts or other seasonal issues- as well as by what the 
water was used for and the cultural perceptions of water.  Different periods saw 
greater intensity of use for navigation, irrigation, water supply, hydropower or 
industry, and each of these saw diverse ways that access and usage rights were 
defined and enforced (Teclaff 1972, Getzler 2004).  The history of water resources 
management is extensive, and much of it lies outside the scope of this dissertation.  
Instead, this research argues that the starting point for discussions of participation in 
water management as it is conceptualized today begins with two marked shift in the 
perceptions of water: (i) the separation of the natural environment from humanity; 
and (ii) the recognition that resources are finite. 
The following section presents these two critical shifts within water 
management that occurred to shape the debate on participatory water resou ces 
management today.  The first section looks at how modernity introduced a 
conceptualization of water as separate from the human condition (Kapoor 2001).  As 
such, the efficient extraction and exploitation of water became a critical priority, and 
large public bureaucracies decided questions of allocation and distribution.  The 
section then presents the second major shift in water management wh re evidence of 
resource depletion introduced notions of water stocks as finite (ibid).  Limited 
resources and issues of scarcity necessitate decisions of allocation and distribution to 




opportunity for alternative provision and management of water resources, most 
notably through participatory locally based institutions.  
Water Management in the Modern Era: efficiency and bureaucratization 
The role of water in social life is complex and variant.  Large public 
bureaucracies directed water use as early as Antiquity and society viewed water as an 
input to production that benefited the state, such as through large irrigation schemes 
(see, for example, Getzler 2004). But the cultural significance ad meaning of water 
goes far beyond production inputs or unit of consumption, and many people 
understood water to be mystical and holy source or a gift from god, among others13.  
In addition, the intricate water is often part of complex cleansing rituals and viewed 
as sacred to human life.  
Modernity marked a decisive shift in the perceptions of and relationships to 
water where it was no longer viewed as embedded within cultural practices, but 
viewed, rather, as a resource that was separate from the human condition.  This 
allowed for a broad conceptualization of water as a pure input towards achieving 
higher levels of socio-economic growth and development (Kapoor 2001). This shift 
was grounded in the ideology of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason that 
ushered in beliefs of scientific progress and technological capabilities to achieve 
higher standards of living.  Mystical understandings of water were d cried as 
                                                
13 For example, several scholars have pointed to how cultural understandings of water in the Muslim 
world draw on key texts in the Qu’ran that emphasize the social nature of water, and emphasize issues 
of equity in distribution (Faruqi 2001).  In addition, water plays a critical role in faith, in practices of 
abolution and cleansing (De Chatel 2002).  This creates a fundamental divide between a prevalent view 
in the Western world (and, by extension, underpinning many international development institutions) 
that water can be privately owned and managed, becaus  of the critical role it plays in social life 




backwards, and future progress could be improved with the raw potential of w ter as 
an input to hydropower, and mechanized agriculture, among others.   
The implications of this on water management are threefold.  First, modernity 
served to separate humans from their natural environments and re-conc ptualized 
nature as a resource to be exploited without limit for human gain (K poor 2001; Scott 
1998).  Second, the exploitation of these resources was presumed to be best done 
through state management, given the cost-intensive infrastructure that technologically 
driven solutions to water management necessitated (Meinzen-Dick 1997).  And 
finally, the administrative structure best suited to exploit water resources with the 
greatest efficiency14 for the state was a bureaucracy.    
(a) Rationalization of nature 
The growing prominence of science and reason, coupled with a permeation of 
means-end rationality in all spheres of social life resulted in attempts to discern and 
understand the social world, including nature, according to scientific and r tional 
orderings.  This drew on tenets from the Enlightenment and the Age of R ason that 
emphasized scientific objectivity and reason above mystical beliefs, and was 
accompanied by the specific historical religious traditions of the Protestant sects in 
Western Europe that saw the advancement of means-end rationality (zweckrational) 
above other forms15  (Weber 1921/1978).  While rationalization of social life had 
                                                
14 Here the efficiency refers to the ability of the administrative structure to complete tasks efficiently, 
making bureaucracies the preferred administrative sructure used to manage public resources  
15 The other types of rationality include value-oriented rationality, where actions are rooted in a value 
or ethical system but means to achieving them are rational, affective rationality, where actions are 
driven by emotions, and traditional rationality, where actions are rooted in customs or traditions. 
Modernity, Weber argued, places increasing emphasis on means-end rationality, where both the goal 




generated scientific and technical progress that had the possibility to achieve 
expanded production and the growing satisfaction of human needs, it also resulted in 
attempts to master nature (including human nature) and to “design …social order 
commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws” (Scott 1998: 4).   
Rationalization of social life changed the way that nature was viewed, 
administered and even organized as modern nation states attempted to order the 
natural world to better oversee its exploitation.  Scott (1998) argues that with 
modernity, nature as a habitat disappeared to be replaced by the view that nature 
offered a resource to maximize state taxes, revenues and profits. This shift is perhaps 
best revealed through a change from the “term ‘nature’ [to]... the term ‘natural 
resources,’ [which focuses]… on those aspects of nature that can be appropriated for 
human use” (Scott 1998: 13).  This served to permanently separate nature from the 
human experience to be viewed as a limitless resource and to be exploited without 
consequence for socio-economic growth (Kapoor 2001).  
(b) State Management of Water Resources 
The emphasis on science, reason and technology to propel societies into a 
modern, and hence better, era, necessitated the strong lead of states for investment 
and oversight.  Water resources were conceptualized as an input to industrial growth 
and expansion of services that were believed to signify progress (Scott 1998). States 
were responsible for decisions over allocation and distribution.  This was justified 
based on (i) the historical precedents in Europe that viewed water as a common good; 




infrastructures; and (iii) the need for state management of common pool resources to 
counter failures of collective action. 
 The early modern nation state in Europe based its administrative rights over 
surface water on historical precedents such as the Roman Code and the Code 
Napoleon that defined water as a public resource with specific usage rights (Teclaff 
1972).16  This precedent carried into the modern era, although modern nation states
tended to favor usage rights that involved state-led industrializaton projects.  These 
programs attempted to engineer social progress (Scott 1998) through investments in 
large-scale infrastructure such as the construction of dams, diversion technology and 
large canal systems, as well as comprehensive urban water supply chemes.  Not only 
was this infrastructure often too large and costly to be maintained by small collectives 
(Johnson III, Svendson and Gonzalez 2004), but state control of natural resources was 
justified on the following grounds: (i) water management often has been viewed as a 
public trust, where the state is responsible for a common resource; (ii) infrastructure 
facilities necessitate initial investment costs that are believed to create a natural 
monopoly; (iii) the water supply has a strategic importance for fo d security (Meizen-
Dick 1997).   
State management of water resources was further justified on the i ability of 
individuals to act collectively.  Interdependent societies were associated with the 
feudal era and with greater inequality, poverty, backwardness and communal 
                                                
16 Under the Roman Code, water was defined as a public resource, and rights to usage had to be 
authorized.  Under the Code Napoleon, water was also considered to be a public resource, although 
ownership of waters on private land were granted rights of use, provided they did not interfere with 




obligation17.  Modern nation states, on the other hand, were associated with progress 
and scientific objectivity and could usher in a new era of well being.  The individual 
in modernity was seen as inherently free, and whose association with others in society 
was rational, specific, limited and voluntary18, and free from communal 
responsibility.  This logic was the foundation for later works to sh w that without 
individual incentives collective action would fail (Olson 1965), and that te scope for 
collective action in communal resources, without oversight or incentives, would lead 
to their degradation (Hardin 1968)19.  This dichotomy also meant that objections or 
resistance to modernity and subsequent modernization projects was seen as impeding 
progress. Where water sources had been managed communally, modernist ideology 
argued that state intervention was justified both because the natural l w of man 
negated the possibility for communal relationships to survive in the modern era, and 
because the state would be instrumental in attaining greater efficiency in resource 
extraction through large-scale investments in dams, canals, and water supply systems 
(Meinzen-Dick 1997).    
(c) Maximizing Efficiency in Administration: the Bureaucracy 
Greater focus on nature as an input to higher growth levels necessitat d an 
administrative structure that allowed for an efficient ordering of the natural world.  As 
                                                
17 Rousseau, for example argued “From the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of 
another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for 
two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and…slavery and 
misery were soon seen to germinate and grow…” (Rousseau, 1913: 214).   
18 As Nisbet (1966:49) notes, the Enlightenment philosophers promoted a new social order that “must 
rest on man not as guildsman, churchman, or peasant, but as natural man, and it must be conceived as 
a tissue of specific and willed relationships which men freely and rationally enter into with one 
another”.    
19 Hardin (1968) advocated for greater privatization of communal resources to avoid a tragedy of the 
commons scenario, although his argument was also used as further justification for state regulation of 




means-end rationality permeated authority structures, Western European states saw a 
shift away from traditional and charismatic authority types to an impersonal form of 
authority that Weber called ‘rational-legal’20 (Weber 1978).  The hallmark of this new 
authority, the bureaucracy, represented the most efficient means of administration; he 
bureaucracy is the typical expression of rationally regulated association within a 
structure of domination, that  
is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this 
sense formally the most rational known means of exercising 
authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in 
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its 
reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of 
calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those 
acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive 
efficiency and in the scope of its operations and is formally capable 
of application to all kinds of administrative tasks (1978: 223). 
 
Bureaucracies were particularly well-suited to the efficient administration of water, 
since this was a resource considered to be publicly owned, and thus in the sta e’s 
administrative domain.  
The technical superiority of the bureaucratic structure allowed for optimum 
levels of “precision, speed, unambiguity… reductions of friction and of material and 
personal costs” (Weber 1978: 973) making it particularly well suited to the early 
modern nation state’s desire to maximize revenue through enhanced legibility and 
extraction (Scott 1998).  While bureaucracies as an administrative structure have 
always existed,21 their growing predominance in all aspects of social life relected, 
                                                
20 The others:  traditionally prescribed social action is typically represented by patriarchalism; 
charismatic structure of domination rests upon individual authority which is based neither upon 
rational rules nor upon tradition (Weber, 1978: 954) 
21 Weber points to a number of historical examples of bureaucratic administrations, most notably in the 




Weber argued, the increasing ubiquity of means-end rationality that was particularly 
prominent in scientific reasoning.  The permeation of means-end rationali y above 
other forms would, however, eventually have detrimental effects for individual 
freedom; means-end rationality focuses on achieving goals (whatever those goals 
might be) in the most efficient manner possible, as opposed to other forms f 
rationality where value-based judgments of the goals were still present.   
This had several effects on social life.  First, the bureaucracy did not take 
values into account when weighing goals, instead focused on the most efficient means
of achieving those goals, whatever those goals might be.22  This had a particular 
“dehumanizing” effect, where the more perfectly a bureaucracy executes its efficient 
attainment of goals, the “more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements 
which escape calculation” (Weber 1978: 975).  Second, bureaucracies would come 
into inevitable tension with democracy over time; as power and authority becomes 
concentrated within the bureaucracy.  This undermines democracy23 and the goals of 
equality associated with it24, the bureaucracy eventually comes to undermine the same 
                                                                                                                                          
bureaucratic state administration, it was the technical necessity of a public regulation of the water 
economy for the whole country and from the top which created the apparatus of scribes and 
officials….” (Weber 1921: 971-972). Other examples of bureaucracies appeared in Germany’s Hansa 
League, and the Holy Roman Empire 
22 One notable example of this is in Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust, where Bauman argues 
that the bureaucratic structure was harnessed to seek th  most efficient methods to annihilating 
populations since that was the stated goal of Germany’s National Socialist regime. 
23 Defined by Weber as a political concept “deduced from the ‘equal rights’ of the governed, [and] 
includes … (1) prevention of the development of a closed status group of officials in the interest of a
universal accessibility of office, and (2) minimization of the authority of officialdom in the interest of 
expanding the sphere of influence of ‘public opinion; as far as practicable” (Weber 1978: 985) 
24 The bureaucracy and the rational-legal authorities w re in opposition of the inequalities found in 
charismatic or traditional authority types that used a rule by notables based on personal relationships 
(Weber 1978: 984). Rational-legal authorities in geeral, and bureaucracies in particular, initially 




democracy that developed alongside it.  Thus, “democracy inevitably comes into 
conflict with bureaucratic tendencies… in so far as [democratization].. is understood 
to mean the minimization of the civil servants’ power in favor of the greatest possible 
‘direct’ rule of the demos…” (Weber 1978: 985).  The concentration of power and 
awarding status and privilege to positions were inimical to the principles of equality 
enshrined with democracy. 
The process of bureaucratization had two consequences for water manage e t.  
First, the designation of oversight and management to public agencies focused the 
administration of water on goals of maximizing efficiency in extraction to achieve 
economic growth and progress.  This created greater oversight and efficiency over 
water resources, as well as the financial ability to invest in large-scale infrastructure 
projects.  However, this meant that goals of efficiency, particularly technical 
efficiency, were pursued, arguable at a cost to other goals (Kapoor 2001).  
In addition, the construction of water scarcity was seen to be an entirely a-
political process, based on scientific evidence rather than a product f political 
negotiations.  The bureaucracy, as an impersonal structure was assumed to reside 
outside of political negotiation, and so best able to make decisions over allocation and 
distribution based on scientific rationality rather than personal preferences.  However, 
even in conceptualizing scarcity and administration from a technical perspective, the 
access to and rights over water sources were narrowly defined by the state (Tavolaro 
2008).  
                                                                                                                                          
the law to all, but this tendency was later undermined with the concentration of power, and the 




(d) Modernization Projects: Engineering Modernity 
By the twentieth century, the rapid progress achieved in the West served as a 
model for emerging industrial states in the world that were looking for development 
examples to promote their economy and to achieve political independence through 
emulation of Western nation-states in industrialization and modernization (Peet 
1999). Modernization theory argued that investments in large-scale infrastructure 
would help the process of a nation-state’s development from a relatively simple 
traditional or agrarian society towards a modern and industrialized economy (So 
1990). Throughout the developing world large public agencies were created to 
operate and maintain water resources infrastructure that promised to bring higher 
levels of efficiency and growth and to propel the world’s poor into higher standards 
of living25.  The dominant view of water was that it remained a public trust, best 
managed and distributed by the government, and large subsidies to public agencies 
were justified on the basis of achieving modernity. The strong role of the state in 
managing large-scale water infrastructure virtually eliminated users from 
management (Johnson et. al. 2004) 
In Latin America, modernization projects served as a model to expand 
infrastructure, and other, services that would serve as a catalyst for development.  The 
discussion on development was framed in the context of a modern that was defined 
much in opposition to but also drawing on notions of the traditional (Canclini 1995).  
In Brazil, this debate linked notions of modernity with Westernization and attempted 
                                                
25 Throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s, modernization projects were typified by a “’blue-print’ 
approach…, characterized by external technologies and n tional level policies” (Ellis and Biggs 2001: 
443), that attempted to bring ‘lazy peasants’ out of ‘backward’ agricultural practices into the modern 




to implement a top-down modernization program to propel Brazil into the “creative 
centers of the West” (Tavolaro 2008). This program was driven by political elites 
whose dominance over public administration structures gave them the opportunity to 
expand services and to engineer social progress. But the specific historical 
development of capitalism in Brazil created institutions that lacked the impartiality of 
Western bureaucracies and “rather than playing the role of modernizers, local power 
holders (the “caudilhos”) tended to reproduce that centralizing and suffocating form 
of sociability within their zones of influence, thus obstructing even further the 
development of the nation” (Tavolaro 2008: 115). 
In addition, the inevitable tension between democracy and bureaucratization 
emerged in Brazil through the institutionalization of patterns of inequality.  The end 
of Brazil’s military rule culminated in a transition to democratic rule and a new 
constitution in 1988 that conferred greater social and environmental rights to its 
citizens.  However, this transition did little to remove the political institutions 
established during military rule that had consolidated power within the hands of a 
few.  Given Brazil’s history of inequality, political institutions and their associated 
administrative structures served to institutionalize inequality within administrative 
structures, since bureaucrats were mostly drawn from social and political elites 
(Tavolaro 2008), thereby further concentrating power among elites.   
This was particularly true for the Northeast region of Brazil, where the legacy of 
landownership, slavery and agricultural production concentrated political power 
within the hands of a few elite families.  Power is closely rated to land ownership, 




usage rights of land holders.  This legacy continues into the twentieth century, where 
a small number of elites and their families remain the dominant political force in the 
state of Bahia, and government seats and privileges are allegedly distributed 
according to political loyalties (Arons 2002). This legacy has resulted in some of the 
highest rates of poverty and inequality in Brazil.  The poverty rates in Bahia are also 
closely linked to access to water resources, both for irrigation purposes, and water 
supply.  Lack of reliable irrigation water means that many subsitence farmers face 
risks of drought and crop losses, which severely impacts their liv lihood strategies.  
In addition, lack of water supply is linked with higher incidence of waterborne 
diseases, and poverty (World Bank, 2005). 
(e) Challenges to Modernization 
By the late 1980s, three challenges to this modernist picture emergd.  First, 
growing concerns over climate change and population growth contested the notion of 
the environment as a limitless resource.  As states worked to devise fficient 
technologies to attain higher levels of growth, a “bias towards capital-intensive, and 
hence energy and resource-intensive, industrialization” emerged (Kapoor 2000: 270).  
It was becoming more apparent that this strategy had obvious and irreversible effects 
on the environment, and water stocks were rapidly depleting.26 Large-scale 
modernization projects were increasingly linked to growing impoverishment of the 
rural poor in developing countries, whose socio-economic activities depen on access 
to land, water and forests (Kapoor 2001).  These environments were now at risk; the 
                                                
26 Most notable among the global examples of this is the rapid degradation of the Aral Sea through 
expanded cotton production. The Aral Sea shrunk by half between 1960 and 1980, and is, today, 




large-scale investments in modern infrastructure, such as dams and ro ds, had, at 
times, degraded the natural surroundings that were not only important for socio-
economic survival, but also integral to cultural and religious worldviews (ibid).  This 
contested the view that nature was separate from the human environment.  
Second, state management of water resources was called into question since, 
particularly in Latin America, it was characterized by inefficient and unequal 
provision of services that was of poor quality (De Ferranti et. al. 2004).  This was 
fueled by systems of political patronage, where politicians retained control over the 
public sector through political bargaining, that provided public agencies with 
subsidies, kept tariffs low, and ensured supporters would occupy managerial positions 
(ibid).  For many Latin American countries, concerns over the environment coincided 
with the debt crisis that brought periods of fiscal uncertainty and high inflation. In 
Brazil, inflation rates were particularly severe, 2,398% in 1990 (Little, Cooper, 
Corden and Rajapatirana 1993).  The crises over balance of payments and increased 
awareness of environmental problems highlighted the need for greater sus ainability 
in resource development as well as the pressing need to revaluat the financial 
viability of public agencies (ibid).   
Finally, bureaucratic public agencies were criticized for cumbersome top-down 
management styles that reflected little of local needs.  Scott (1998) argues that top-
down implementation of dams, canals and other diversion technologies attempted to 
create rationalized units of analysis, such as square plots and str ight canal systems 
that made it easier for the state to account water volume, measure distribution, and 




informal rules and institutions had adapted to the realities of their particular 
environments (Mosse 2003; Scott 1998).  In Latin America, public agencies were 
long sites of clientalistic behavior that operated in a wider political atmosphere of 
patronage (De Ferranti et. al. 2004). The debt crisis of the 1980s called into question 
public enterprises that were “characterized by low productivity, bloated payrolls, and 
the rising drain on government budgets” De Ferranti et al. 2004: 206).    
(f) Alternatives to State Management: Privatization 
Brazil’s government responded to the fiscal crisis of the 1980s with widespread 
reforms to the institutional administration of public services.  Most notably, water 
provision was decentralized to the state and municipal levels, attempts were made to 
“corporatize” national utilities in the public sector, and to privatize other national 
utilities.  While the underlying goals of expanding service provisi n lingered from 
modernization projects, it was becoming clear that state management alone would 
likely not achieve this result, particularly with limited budgets.  Thus, calls to engage 
the private sector in the water management (primarily water supply and sanitation) 
intended to correct for inefficiencies, inequalities in access and provision, and for 
poor quality. However, while private provision of public infrastructure did increase, 
this expansion did not compensate for the overall declines in public provision that 




Privatization was often accompanied with tariff hikes, a move that was 
particularly contested among the poor27 and remained a politically unpopular 
alternative to state management.  Public opinion surveys, such as the 
Latinobarometro, have shown consistent negative opinions of privatization  that have 
grown throughout the 1990s as perceived negative effects from privatization 
continued to occur (De Ferranti et. al. 2004).  Much of the discourse around the 
perceived negative effects resulted over issues of equity; where subsidies were 
eliminated and tariff hikes ensued, the poor faced difficulties in making payments, 
and risked being cut off from water provision.  This issue of access and equity was 
reflected in much of the emerging livelihoods and sustainability literature that argued 
for water as a basic right, rather than as a commodity (Filmer-Wilson 2005; ODI 
2004).28  
(g) Alternatives to State Management: the ‘Third Way' 
The shift in focus away from the state as leading development opened the door for 
the locus of change to shift to other realms of social life, including the market and the 
local level.  Ellis and Biggs (2001) argue that grassroots initiatives would not have 
gained the significant momentum that they enjoyed without structural adjustment and 
other market liberalization policies that effectively removed the state from its role as 
service provider.  This shifted the focus away from top-down, blueprint approaches to 
development (or “supply-driven” approaches) to bottom-up grass-roots initiatives 
                                                
27 Bolivia’s experience with water privatization highlights some of these issues. In 2001, Bolivian 
citizens took to the streets in protest over rate increases of up to 200 percent. Similar privatization 
programs elicited largely negative responses from citizens.   
28 The Rights Based Approach (RBA) “presents a framework for the pursuit of human development 
with human rights standards and principles guiding that process, and international human rights 




(“demand-driven” approaches).  Several trends, most notable in rural development, 
reflect this shift.  These included: (i) growing acknowledgement of indigenous 
technologies; (ii) the advent of ‘actor-oriented’ approaches that emphasized the role 
of the poor in determining development outcomes; (iii) disenchantment with 
government provision of services; and (iv) the rejection of over-arching theories and 
truths, which drew, in part, on post-modern challenges to meta-narratives (Ellis and 
Biggs 2001: 443).   
Parallel discussions among environmentalists challenged both the state and the 
market as allocators of natural resources.  The legacy of state-led modernization had 
seen the overuse and depletion of water stocks, and environmentalists grew concerned 
over questions of overuse and expansion. Concerns over water stocks and future 
shortages were backed up by alarming statistics.  The UN estimates that by 2025, 25 
percent of the world’s population will begin to feel the results of water shortages.  In 
addition, the world’s current freshwater resources are unevenly located across the 
globe29, and many arid and semi-arid regions facing water shortages today are located 
in the global south. This places a disproportionate and immediate pressure on 
governments of the south to put into place allocative mechanisms to preserve the 
long-term sustainability of their water resources.  Many of these governments, 
however, face limited capacity to operate and maintain critical water delivery 
infrastructure.  This creates a vicious circle, whereby water delivery is unreliable and 
wasteful, and users are less likely to pay for services, further decreasing the revenue 
base needed for costly maintenance.  Continued mismanagement of these resources 
                                                
29  If water was evenly distributed everywhere, or distributed according to population density, then it could suffice 
for all.  For example, China has less water than Caad  and forty times as many inhabitants, and India sustains 20 




could lead to rapid depletion resulting in increased conflict, migration, health 
problems and climate change.30  
The Participatory Approach to Water Management 
The participatory approach grew out of backlash towards both state provision of 
public services as well as the debates over private provision.  This, combined with 
growing concerns over resource sustainability paved the way for a “third way” to 
management of public resources: community management.  Community management 
made use of participatory ideals, whereby users with a stakein a common resource 
would decide jointly over allocation and distribution.  The precise form and content 
of this participation varied greatly by location and task at hand, but essentially 
constituted a range of activities that more actively engaged citizens in the decision-
making process.  This could include setting policy goals, making collective decisions 
over allocation of public resources, sharing information, generating systems of 
accountability, among others.  Within water management institutions, greater input 
and decision-making on the part of users typically ranged from partial to full 
decision-making over the allocation of water, input to full decision-making on pricing 
systems, budgeting for operation and maintenance activities, etc.  The act of 
participating was expected to elicit both improved efficiency of service, as well as 
improved equity in allocation.   
The participatory approach draws on two distinct bodies of literature that link 
to outcomes of efficiency on the one hand, and outcomes of equity on the other. As 
                                                
30 For example, cotton production in the then Soviet Rpublic of Uzbekistan used significant amounts of water at 
subsidized rates from the Aral Sea, which shrank by more than two-thirds during the 1980s and 1990s.  This had 




such, it bridges anti-bureaucratic sentiments in both the neo-liberal and the soft left 
communitarian literature (Darcy 1993) that advocate for local management of public 
services to improve quality and performance.   
(a) Participation and the rise of community management 
By the 1970s, a new policy paradigm was emerging in the provision of social 
services, most notably in public housing projects in Britain (Darcy 1999).  This policy 
approach called for the direct involvement of users within a “community” to manage 
the allocation and distribution of services, thereby ensuring greater flexibility and 
responsiveness to needs on the local level.  This approach brought together several 
strands of anti-bureaucratic sentiments, from both the rising wave of n o-liberalism 
on the right, and from “soft left communitarians” (Darcy 1993).  These se ming 
opposed camps were united in their distaste for cumbersome top-down management 
and argued for improved efficiency of services, on the one hand, and greater equity in 
distribution, on the other. 
Participation was perceived as critical to this policy for two reasons.  For neo-
liberals, individuals were rational actors within the broader market place, and their 
participation in decisions of allocation and distribution would better signal consumer 
preferences. This would better allow the market forces to distribute and allocate 
goods and services, thereby maximizing efficiency.  For the “soft le  
communitarians”, participation harkened back to the radical roots of social activism, 
whereby individuals awakened to their positions of injustice and would become 




(b) Participation and the market: improving efficiency 
The discussion of improved efficiency in water management is couched in the 
broader context of the market and market interactions that was solidified with the end 
of the Cold War, eliminating ideological alternatives to liberal c pitalism (Thomas 
2000).  The emergent liberalism, or neo-liberalism, is complex and variant, but in 
general, tends to see market expansion and the logic of the market as the root of all 
human interaction.  As such, it goes beyond a set of economic policies, and “involves 
extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, even 
as the market itself remains a distinctive player” (italics original, Brown 2003:3).  
Neo-liberalism draws on theories from classical economics that argues for limited 
state intervention for the rational allocation of goods through self-regulating markets, 
and essentially aims to replace more revisionist forms of liberalism (specifically 
Keynsian notions of ‘embedded liberalism’ that advocated for state intervention and 
regulation to allocate more equitably) to return to classical liberal roots of market 
efficiency.  Neo-liberalism proposes that “human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free 
trade” (Harvey 2005:2).  As such, the role of the state should be to enforc  the proper 
functioning of markets where they exist, and to create markets where they do not 
exist31 (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social seurity, or 
environmental pollution) (ibid).   
                                                
31 Classical liberalism was primarily concerned with the protection of political liberty, but this liberty 
provided the foundation for the economist’s focus on market transactions.  However, under classical 




Yet there is some recognition even among the neo-liberal programs that pure 
market self-regulation for water management will not always be possible, at least 
immediately.  In these cases, there could be a role for user involvement, particularly 
in areas where commercial and competitive behavior is constrained. The area of water 
management provides precisely such an arena; despite neo-liberal beliefs about the 
universal applicability of commercial and market principles, there is some recognition 
that water does not operate as a pure commodity.  Thus, it does not sigal price 
changes in the market as efficiently as market commodities, and costs of production 
are not reflected in the costs of consumption (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1997).  Given 
this, the participation of users is theorized to more closely align with market interests 
than state regulation would; state intervention impedes market efficiency through 
distortions, subsidies and allocative inefficiencies where smaller us  groups would 
better maximize these shortfalls.  User participation, then, is seen as the initial step in 
freeing water management from state intervention, even while wat r markets remain 
in their nascent stages.   
As this market develops in areas where they have historically been undermined 
through state intervention, the institutional frameworks that promote us r 
participation is the most appropriate to promote market interests.  State intervention 
“must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the sta e cannot 
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (price ) and 
because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions 
(particularly in democracies) for their own benefit” (Harvey 2005:2). Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                                          
law enforcement (Thorson and Lie 2006).  Water, as a non-excludable good, had tended to be defined 




emergence of market-driven water management institutions serves to best advance 
human well-being.   
Neo-liberalism was a strong undercurrent to structural adjustment programs in 
development throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While concerns over the environment 
remained a small part of the broader goals to improve terms of trade, fiscal prudence 
and create economic stabilization packages, it affected large public agencies, 
including those that oversaw water management.  The strategy most often promoted 
was to privatize these agencies not only to improve government balance sheets, but 
also to bring the management of scarce resources more in line with market principles.  
Disseminating these principles to the government of water was the optimal solution 
for enhancing well being through both improving service and reliability but also in 
better pricing the value of water in line with its true cost.  While the debate over 
pricing and pricing mechanisms remains outside the scope of this research, suffice it 
to say that greater user involvement in the decisions over allocation nd distribution 
of water was theorized to bring about greater efficiency becaus individuals were 
seen as rational actors that promoted self-interest. This, in turn, was seen to minimize 
system losses and allocative distortions associated with government managemet.   
(c) The ‘radical’ origins of Participation: improving equity  
The concept of “participation” also draws on tenets of social activism that sought 
to introduce mechanisms whereby individuals would awaken to broader structures of 
inequality and oppression to advocate for social change.  The theoretical origins of 
public participation are rooted in the pioneering work of Arnstein (1969), who




equated real citizen involvement in decision-making with a redistribution of power, 
which allows certain ‘have-not’ citizens to join in the decision-making process.  
Implicit in Arnstein’s work is the notion that “effective” participation entails a shift in 
power relations “from hierarchical to vertical” (Chambers 1988).  
This overlaps with literature on the process of empowerment.  The main
intellectual and practical foundation for the development of the concept of 
empowerment is through the works of Alinsky (1971) and Freire (1970, 1973). The 
thread that ties their views together is the emphasis on a process of personal 
development that includes increased involvement in decision-making and enhanced 
consciousness as well as social action. The goal of Alinsky’s (1971) approach was to 
facilitate a process whereby people unite around a shared interest or concern to 
collectively identify targets, gather resources, mobilize, and ultimately act to realign 
power within the community.   
In his theory of critical consciousness, Paulo Freire (1970), working from a 
Brazilian context, described man as an incomplete being whose vocation is to become 
fully human, by (a) critically reflecting on an objective reality, and (b) taking action 
based on that reflection in order to transform this reality. He drew a fundamental 
distinction between those who were ‘oppressed’ and those who were the ‘opprssors’ 
in society. The dialogical method upon which onscientization, or education of 
critical consciousness is based, involves oppressed groups of individuals in a process 
of (i) reflecting upon their reality; (ii) looking at the root causes of the problem; (iii) 
examining the implications and consequences of these problems; (iv) developing a 




(d) The state’s ‘anti-state’ solution 
What is, perhaps, most ironic, is that by the 1970s, the participatory pproach 
began to make inroads within public policy as an option for the state to deliver public 
services.  Despite its strong anti-state rhetoric, community management of services 
promised to address issues of inequality and inefficiency in service provision. This 
was driven, in part, by three discussions in public policy: (i) ‘democratization’, as 
defined by the reversal of inequalities and asymmetries in rights; (ii) 
‘commodification’, as defined by the principles of economic production and
consumption permeating all social realms; and (iii) ‘technolization’, or the growing 
role that technology plays in addressing specific discourses (Fairclough, 1992: 201-
216 as quoted in Darcy 1993).  These first two discussions, in particular, advocated 
for improving the equality and efficiency of public services, and the participatory 
approach provided a unique avenue that promised to deliver both of these goals.   
The adoption of participation into mainstream public policy discourses in the 
1970s elicited enthusiasm from the left because it provided an avenue for d aling 
with different needs of heterogeneous users.  Many of those who were traditionally 
disadvantaged within the larger and more impersonal bureaucracy could once again 
find their voice and advocate for greater equality.  Some even went so far as to say 
that participation and greater local control over public resources act d s a countering 
effect to “the alienating forces of global capitalism, and ideological site, and a 





What is noticeably absent from the discourse of participation in the public policy 
realm is the discussion of power relations that formed the foundation for much of the 
discussions with equity.  This has led to critiques the adoption of partici tion within 
public policy discourse served to remove it from it’s more radical origins since the 
state could not support a process that would lead to the dismantling of itself (Hickey 
and Mohan 2003).  Despite these critiques, the enthusiasm for the participatory 
approach was gaining significant traction as a public policy option also for the 
developing world.  
(e) Participatory Water Management as a development strategy 
By the mid-1990s, international development organizations, most notably the 
World Bank, adopted the “participatory approach” as strategies in development 
programs. The discovery and adoption of the approach promised to bypass inefficient 
and unequal state structures to deliver more accountability and sensitivity to local 
conditions.  Within water supply programs, the ideals of community managed 
programs in both urban and rural areas emerged as an alternative to state 
management.  This was a particularly appealing approach in areas of the world where 
state provision fell short, and where privatization of services was politically 
unpopular.   
Water resources management projects in developing countries drew on successf l 
cases of decentralization in budgeting (for example, in Porto Alegre, Brazil) or public 
services (for example in Andra Pradesh, India) to show that opportunities for 
participation generated citizen engagement and improved the sustainability nd 




from problems of sustainability, brought about primarily by negligence i  operation 
and maintenance of critical infrastructure. Large scale investments in water 
infrastructure in, for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and elsewhere 
weren’t adequately maintained by state governments and water agencies, leading to 
disrepair and renewed problems in water delivery.  The decentraliza ion of operation 
and maintenance responsibilities to the lowest possible level and the participation of 
users in deceisions over allocation and distribution were expected to impr ve both the 
efficiency and equity of service, and, by extension, lead to improved investment 
sustainability. 
The popularity of the participatory approach in water management also drew on 
debates within natural and common pool resource scholars of collective aon nd 
resource sustainability.  Renewed scholarship of the commons emerged around the 
seminal work of Ostrom (1990) who drew on economic principles within game theory 
to show that collective action on the local level could emerge under sp cific 
preconditions32 and through a series of consecutive interlocking interactions.  Her 
work provided a theoretical alternative to collective action literature that had been 
characterized by a dominant view of individuals acting according to pure self-interest 
that precluded the provision of public and common goods (Olson 1965; Hardin 
                                                
32 Ostrom’s (1990) seminal piece showed, for example, that local level institutions could persist, given 
the following eight institutional principles: (1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; (3) collective choice arrangements allowing for 
the participation of the appropriators in the decision-making process; (4) effective monitoring by 
monitors who are part of or accountable to the appro riators; (5) graduated sanctions for appropriators 
who do not respect community rules; (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and of easy 
access; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g. by the government); (8) in the case of larger 
common pool resources, organizations in the form of ultiple layers of nested enterprises, with small, 




1968)33. Ostrom (1990) showed that self-regulating institutions could be crafted nd 
maintained under specific circumstances to collectively manage common pool 
resources effectively. 
The revival of liberalism had advocated for the application and extension of 
market logics to water management, but initial programs to privatize public services 
were met with widespread resistance, especially in the developing world34.  The 
participatory approach offered neo-liberals a management that mirrored 
decentralization and removed inefficient bureaucracies. On the other hand, local 
participation offered the left assurances that resources critical to human life, such as 
water, would not be allocated solely on the basis of profits and bottom lines. 
The participatory approach was solidified into the water resources management 
strategy in the form of the Integrated Water Resources Management approach 
(IWRM). This approach sought to address how best to create decision-maki g 
mechanisms that would help in the allocation of water amongst competing uses (such 
as food production, human consumption, industry, etc.).  The approach draws on the 
Dublin Principles of 1991 that (i) defines water as a finite resource; (ii) argues that 
water development and management should be based on a participatory apprach, 
involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels; (iii) recognized that women 
play a central role in the provision, management, and safeguarding of water; and (iv) 
defines water as having economic value in all its competing uses, and should be 
                                                
33 Public goods are defined as being non-rivalrous (consumption of the good does not take away from 
others), and non-excludable (it is not possible to xclude others from using the good). Production of 
public goods is assumed to lead to market failures.  Commons are a subset of public goods and are 
defined as any set of resources that is accessible to all members of a community, such as cultural or 
natural resources.   
34 Most notable among these were the widespread protests in Cochamba, Bolivia, where thousands of 
protesters marched on government buildings to contest th  privatization of water supply services in a 




recognized as an economic good (Global Water Partnership, 2003).  The IWRM 
approach, then, is defined as “a process which promotes the coordinated development 
and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the 
resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising 
the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (Global Water Partnership, 2003: 22).  The 
widespread adoption of the IWRM approach meant that the participatory app oach 
emerged as the new dominant paradigm for water management.  
(f) Critiques of the Participatory Approach 
The growing preeminence of the participatory approach in international 
development, broadly, and water management, specifically, has created a critical 
following of scholars who argue that participation has become a “tyr nny” (Cooke 
and Kathari 2001), paying little attention the role of participation in reversing unequal 
power relations.  Instead, these critics argue that participatory pproaches too often 
focus on users as implementors to programs, rather than as participants in 
transformative social change.  A second set of criticisms focus on the 
oversimplification of the word “community” and the virtual ignoring of existing 
power dynamics and social relationships on the ground. 
As the participatory approach gained momentum within development 
programs, critiques emerged that it ignored important power dynamics in local 
settings that were replicated within participatory institutions (Cooke and Kathari 
2002).  These critiques pointed to idealizing local knowledge as paramount t  
development agendas as an inherently flawed process. This local knowledge is often 




people’. These organizations are, however, often subject to elite capture, leading to a 
problem of agency for the most vulnerable and undermining the precise goals of 
participation to begin with.  This form of participation, critics argued, had been 
rearticulated from its radical roots (Mohan and Stokke 2000) and depoliticized (White 
1991).  In its original conceptualization, participation was closely linked to notions of 
empowerment and political resistance that had all but been forgotten within 
development programs.   
The “depoliticization” of participation means that the term is used in a variety 
of development contexts.  Khanal (2003), for example, outlines different roles of 
participation in various development ‘contexts’ to be (i) economic developmnt and 
modernization; (ii) joint planning and problem solving; (iii) inclusion, equity and 
reduced vulnerability.  Participatory forms of organization can further each of these 
agendas, but in a different way. Under the first agenda, participation is a means to 
economic development and modernization. Devolvement of management directly to 
the users creates the proper incentives for farmers to use thes resources more 
efficiently. In this model of economic development, the state is viewed as interfering 
with the market and perverting incentives through subsidies and ineffic ent 
management.  
In the second development context, participation is a tool for joint planing 
and problem solving. Participants engage in a process by which they jointl induce 
change through a combined effort. Under this model, knowledge is key to change; the 
focus is on access to knowledge that would help all participants in self-det rmination 




limited to serving donors’ interests of sustainability in the long-run, by including the 
voices of a variety of different stakeholders. Sometimes participants in the 
organizations are able to voice real concerns about the goals and implementation of 
the program or project, but their impact on major decisions is usually rather weak. 
In the final context of development, participation is seen as a vehicle for social
inclusion, improved equity, and reduced vulnerability (Khanal, 2003). Reducing 
barriers to participation ensures the inclusion of the poor, who are generally excluded 
and vulnerable. In this way, participation results in improved equity; actors in the 
process become empowered, and are then able to execute beneficial change. The 
focus in this model is on transferring capacity to participants so that they are able to 
contribute effectively; and this transfer leads, or should lead to, their empowerment. 
This model is transformative in nature (White, 1996) and aims at the empowerment 
of the poor and excluded, but this is seen as benefiting the entire society. In this way, 
participation is a means of empowerment and an end in itself (ibid). It is a continuous 
and dynamic process.   
Unfortunately, as Khanal (2003) notes, transformative participation has all but 
taken a back seat to goals of efficiency and economic development.  Insead, 
participation replicated top-down development programs35, and participation was 
analogous to little more than the perception of participants as implementers of pre-
determined goals and programs, rather than leading to truly transfo mative change.  
                                                
35 Early examples of systematic approaches to community development came out of British and 
American urban reform movements and rural organizations of the late nineteenth century (Mayo 1975, 
Petersen 1994), and the term ‘community development’ was adopted by British, French and Belgian 
colonial administrations in Africa and Asia, especially after World War II, as a social and political as
much as an economic strategy for rural areas. Hence community development remained essentially an 
aspect of top-down government policies, and limited nvolvement from community-based 




Where the participatory rhetoric advocated for community development programs 
with “bottom-up” change, the goal of these programs was to create a competent 
community to manage pre-determined goals.  Bracht and Tsouros (1990), for 
example, define the community organization as “a planned process to activate a 
community to use its own social structures and any available resources (internal or 
external) to accomplish community goals, decided primarily by community 
representatives and consistent with local values” (Bracht and Tsouros 1990).  
Purposive social change interventions, they argue, are organized from within the 
community by individuals, groups or organizations with the primary aim of attaining 
and then sustaining changes within the community. However, critics have argued that 
the goals cannot deviate far from state policies to receive stat funding, and thereby 
lose some of the scope for action. 
 A second set of criticisms focus on the oversimplification of notio s of 
community and community action.  This view of participation does not see 
community institutions as self-regulating, but rather argues that individuals are 
embedded within broader social structures that shape notions of reciprocation and 
obligation (Polanyi 1954; Scott 1998; Mosse 2003), as well as power and authority 
(Cleaver, 1999, 2000, 2003; Gujit and Shah 1998; Bardhan and Ray 2008).  
Participation must be understood in the specific contexts within which people operate, 
which is complex and variant.  Thus, social partnerships must, first and foremost, be 
understood to be shaped by their environments, including norms, class, politics 
(Waddock 1991), the scope of the problem being addressed (Lyons et al. 2000) as 




social networks and “communities” that people actually belong to (Guijit & Shah, 
1998).  Cleaver (1999) argues that ignoring this has created what she terms, ‘myths of 
community’, where the community is “often conceptualized as some kind of atural, 
desirable social entity, imbued with all sorts of desirable values and the simple 
manifestation of this in organization form” (Cleaver, 1999: 603). Finally, Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen (1998) point out that needs and priorities with regards to 
resource use differs according to gender, thereby critiquing the view that all 
community members necessarily are the same in their interests and motivations. 
One underlying tension in the literature can be found in the conceptualizations of 
collective action.  Where goals of efficiency draw on principles of market 
liberalization, the assumption tends to be that the basis for collective action on the 
local level lies in the inherent rational nature of the actor.  Thus, collective action, as 
portrayed by Ostrom (1990) and others, was viewed as a rational decision that looked 
to the costs and benefits to participation for the individual, rather than rough 
systems of obligation (see also Seabright 1993; and, for a critique, Cleaver 2003).  
However, many of the critiques above point to the inherent embededness of social 
actions that place collective action decisions in systems of obligations or social 
responses to others (Mosse 2003; Bardhan and Ray 2008; Cleaver 2001, 2003, 
2005).36 
 
                                                
36 This tension harks back to the Enlightenment’s view of a new social order that emphasized the 
individual as naturally free who rationally enters into specific and limited associations on a voluntary 
(Nisbit, 1966). Classical sociologists, notably Durkheim, Weber, Comte and Marx, took issue with this 
view, arguing that individuals were socially embedd, as evidenced by the despair and alienation that 
individuals suffered when separated from communal rel tionships (for example, Durkheim’s Suicide, 
Comte’s Systeme de politique positive, and Tönnies’ Community and Society all point to the embedded 




 This section has summarized the emergence of efficiency and equity as twin 
goals within water management and presented the emergence of the par icipatory 
approach in water management as way to achieve these two goals simultaneously.  
This assumption refutes literature in the field of economics and sociology that argue 
for a fundamental incompatibility between outcomes of efficiency and equity.  In the 
following section, I will lay out the theoretical framework used to examine the role of 
efficiency and equity within participatory institutions.  Specifically, I will examine 
the model used within development programs that promote efficiency and equity as 
compatible processes within participatory water management institutions.  I will then 
turn to two separate models that argue that efficiency and equity come as tradeoffs to 




B.  Theoretical Framework 
Much of the debate surrounding the participatory approach focuses on the 
effectiveness of participation, or argues for outcomes of effici ncy, on the one hand, 
or equity on the other.  The claim that locally based, participatory institutions can 
achieve outcomes of efficiency and equity simultaneously refutes much of the 
literature on the subject that points to numerous tradeoffs between diff rent types of 
efficiency and equity.  Specifically, participation in water management is expected to 
result in outcomes of greater allocative, technical and administrative efficiency, with 
little or no loss to allocative and administrative equities (Global W ter Partnership 
2003; Osmani 2007).   
The claim that participation is expected to eliminate tradeoffs in efficiency 
and equity refutes much of the literature arguing for a tension between the two.  
Within the field of economics, for example, Okun (1975) argued for a tradeoff 
between allocative efficiency and equity, since any move to redistibute in the interest 
of fairness would generate losses in efficiency.  Within the field of sociology, Weber 
(1978) argued for a fundamental incompatibility between equality and efficiency 
within locally based organizations, since broader trends in and concerns ovr efficient 
administration would come at a cost to equality of membership.   
This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection presents 
definitions of the concepts of participation, efficiency and equity. The second 
subsection presents the framework that describes the relationship between 




of efficiency-equity tradeoffs (allocative and organizational) are presented in the last 
two subsections.   
Defining Participation, Efficiency, and Equity 
As the previous section has shown, the meanings and use of the terms 
participation, efficiency and equity are widespread and varied.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, each of these concepts will be defined based on their usage and 
understanding within the broader frameworks of public service delivery and 
community management, since these are the usages and meanings that are most 
directly relevant to the questions of participation in water supply systems.  The 
following section outlines the definitions for the concepts of participation, efficiency 
and equity.   
(a) Participation 
Participation within the context of community managed services is define  as the 
contributions in time, energy, and experience that consumers and interested local 
people provide to organizations in which they have a direct stake (Darcy 1993).  This 
definition is similar to the World Bank’s definition of participation as a “process 
through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, 
decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1996).  It is seen as a 
primary input to making administrative structures and the process of governing local 
resources more efficient and democratic. This definition does not preclude processes 
of empowerment and redistribution visible in the theoretical origins of its usage 




community management and with the adoption of participation in public policy, the 
more ‘radical’ origins of participation that advocated for shifting power relations has 
been lost.  Instead, the measures of successful participation often have little to do with 
individual awakenings or power redistribution, and more with the successful 
management of local level services.  Within this framing, local groups enter into 
specific arrangements to manage and oversee water supply services, sometimes on 
concession arrangements from the state, and the measures of success fo us on service 
targets, accountability arrangements, outcome and performance.   
 Individual participation in this vein draws on Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty (1970), whereby individuals express their preferences either in one of three 
ways.  First, in discovering that goods or services have declined, consumers can 
“exit”, or move elsewhere to purchase or consume that good.  This option is 
particularly relevant for the economic sphere, where a number of firms offer similar 
goods or services.  In the political sphere, however, lack of options may make the 
option of “voice” more relevant. In this, consumers voice their discontent with the 
failing quality of goods or services through protest or other means of communicating 
discontent.37  One final strategy for consumers exists in the form of loyalty, where the 
declining level of services is accepted (i.e. brand-loyalty for c nsumers in the 
marketplace, or patriotism in the political sphere).38  Community-based organizations 
offer options of exit and loyalty viewed from the perspective of improvement of 
                                                
37 Consumers can also voice discontent over the falling quality of goods in the marketplace through 
contacting firms and voicing their discontent.  In addition, citizens can also use exit in the political 
realm, through emigration. However, both of these options are considered more costly and to take 
more time, and Hirschman argued that the exit strategy prevailed in the marketplace whereas voice 
prevailed in the political sphere.  
38 As a caveat, Hirschman noted that strategies of mental “exiting” could be mistaken for loyalty.  In 
countries where dissent is not tolerated and there are no formal exit strategies (through limits on 




services.  Community organizations offer competition in facilitating he “exit” option 
for consumers unhappy with the level of services (either back to state provision, or 
other options, if available).  Second, community provision of water supply services 
provides consumers with an avenue for “voice” where dissatisfaction on the part of 
the consumer is close to decision-making and water management, creating an avenue 
for more effective and quality service. 
 Local level participatory management is expected to lead to improved 
outcomes of both efficiency and equity vis-à-vis state management.  In fact, as Darcy 
(1993) notes “community is posed as a counterpoint to the bureaucratic organizin  
principles of specialization and impersonality” (Darcy 1993: 36).  Devolving 
decision-making to the local level is also supposed to reduce administrat ve costs, and 
improve flexibility and response to consumer demands. Equity is expected to r sult 
from improved inclusion of disadvantaged groups that may have been overlooked by 
bureaucratic management.   
(b) Efficiency 
Efficiency is broadly defined as maximizing outputs with a given set of 
inputs.  The issue of efficiency in the provision of water services s generally 
measured along dimensions of technical and allocative efficiencies, where technical 
efficiency refers to the “efficiency with which resources are used for a given end” 
(Osmani 2007) and allocative efficiency refers to the best allocation of resources 
according to consumer preferences (ibid), including quantity and price.  Th se two 
dimensions are not necessarily compatible processes; a system that is highly 




technology used to achieve technical efficiency may require high levels of initial 
capital investments that are difficult to recoup through pricing mechanisms in line 
with consumer preferences.  However, the two may not necessitat a tradeoff, and 
optimal levels of technical efficiency could be achieved where allocative efficiency is 
maximized. 
A water system that is technically efficient is one where water losses are kept 
to a minimum. This is dependent on both the quality of construction, and the 
continued operation and maintenance of the system that, if done well, will cont nue to 
keep water losses relatively low.  A water system that is llocatively efficient is one 
where each user is charged for the costs they generate.  In an ide l situation, 
information about the costs that users generate is available, although in practice, this 
is relatively difficult to ascertain.  Thus, typically a water system that is allocatively 
efficient is one where each unit of water is priced at the long term marginal cost of 
production.  
(c) Equity 
Equity39 tends to be a subjective measure of how goods should be distributed 
within a particular society.  On a theoretical level, there are four general views of 
equity: (i) egalitarian, where all members of society are alloc ted equal amounts of a 
good; (ii) Rawlsian, where the utility of the person least well off is maximized; (iii) 
utilitarian, where the total utility of all members in society is maximized; and (iv) 
                                                
39 Equity is a distinctly different term from equality, where the former entails a subjective measure of 
what is equitable in society. Thus, what can appear to be unequal in one society, could be viewed as 




market-oriented, where the market allocates the most equitably (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1997).   
On a practical level, however, the market is rarely viewed as equitable. This is 
especially true for public goods, such as water, where market allocation would 
effectively exclude those unable to pay for services, thereby cutting off a resource 
vital to human existence40 While many societies are able to endure some level of 
inequality (and still consider this arrangement to be fair), it is rarely the case that this 
perception of equity includes market mechanisms for allocation (Pidyck and 
Rubinfeld 1997).  Water systems that are considered equitable may ensure equal 
access for all users (where users could opt out of services, if they choose). Notions of 
fairness may even include cutting off water services for several months of non-
payment.  All of these arrangements may not be perfectly equal, but they are 
considered fair in the context of resource constraints. 
Achieving Equity and Efficiency through Participation: the “Development Model” 
Within the development literature, scholars argue that the decentralization of 
water management to the local level, and the introduction of partici tory 
mechanisms serve to enhance both technical and allocative efficiency (Osmani 2007).  
When water users participate, their preferences are revealed thereby reducing 
informational asymmetries and enhancing accountability for greater technical 
efficiency.  In addition, participatory mechanisms mean that resou ces are allocated 
                                                
40 This strain of thinking is perhaps most visible in the rights based approach that argues for water and 
other critical resources to be defined as basic human rights. Thus, allocation should focus on goals of 




according to user preferences, thereby eliminating waste and enhanci g allocative 
efficiency. 
Participatory mechanisms also serve to enhance equity through by including 
the poor and marginalized in the decision-making process and through achieving a 
solution that is perceived to be equitable by the users.  In emphasizing participation, 
the voices of the poor and otherwise marginalized users are included which serves to 
enhance institutional accountability.  The ability to hold local level institutions 
accountable will limit discriminatory practices and policies. Thus, participation not 
only achieves greater equity by extending the vote (and hence voice)to all users, but 
in doing so, the outcomes achieved through consensus will likely be less 




Figure 3: The “development model”41 
 
Source: Author's illustration, based on Osmani (2007)  
 
As is seen in Figure 3 above, the same mechanism of accountability is 
expected to lead to improved outcomes of efficiency and equity.  In this way, the 
“development model” promotes the compatibility of both of these goals, arguing that 
efficiency and equity can be achieved simultaneously.  This discovery runs counter to 
literature in the field of economics and sociology that have long argued for a tradeoff 
between the two. 
                                                
41 This model is termed the “development model” because of it’s widespread use within the 
development literature and practice.  The illustration linking the process of participation to outcomes 
of efficiency and equity was done by the author but based on Osmani’s (2007) framework that outlined 




Equity and Efficiency as a tradeoffs 
Much literature has been devoted to the inherent tensions between notions of 
efficiency and equity.  The most relevant to this research focus n the tradeoffs in 
efficient and equitable resource allocation, and the inherent tensions in equality and 
efficiency within administrative organizations.  On the allocative side, much of the 
tensions between the distribution and allocation of resources are visible in debates 
over prices and cost recovery that are particularly relevant to the independence and 
sustainability of non-state water suppliers in developing countries.  On the 
organizational side, Weber has noted that equity within an organization is ach eved 
primarily at the cost to certain types of administrative effici ncy.  The following 
section outlines these two tradeoffs. 
(a) The Allocative Tradeoff 
The allocative tradeoff was first articulated by Arthur Okun in his 1975 book 
entitled Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.  In this, Okun argues that 
efficiency and equality are mutually exclusive, where improved effici ncy comes at a 
cost to equality and vice versa.  Okun’s work is perhaps best known for the a gument 
that, within the marketplace, redistribution has negative overall effects.  He uses the 
parable of a “leaky bucket” to point out that redistributive policies r sult in wasted 
income, similar to transferring water in a leaky bucket; each dollar transferred from 
the rich result in a less than one dollar increase in income for the poor. This decrease 
results from certain costs associated with transfers (administrative or tax collection 




 What is, perhaps, less often discussed is Okun’s earlier chapters of his book, 
where he discusses different “spheres” of life, including social life, political life, and 
the market.  In capitalist democracies, the first two give priority to equality over 
efficiency, whereas in the market place, efficiency is prioritized and inequality is 
accepted, creating a double standard in American society.  The market, Okun argues, 
has an extraordinary ability to allocate goods efficiently.  Certain social goods, 
however, should remain outside of the market (“extra-market goods”)42, uch as 
freedom of speech, police protection, or public goods (such as education, etc.).43  
Okun’s major contribution was on sketching the virtual incompatibility of equality 
and efficiency44 and the double standard present within capitalist democracies.   
Many of the debates surrounding efficiency and equity for water supply 
mirror some of the themes present in Okun’s work. Where expanded publicrov sion 
of water was considered a certain measure of progress in the 1950s and 1960s, neo-
liberal thought of the 1980s and 1990s began to highlight the high levels of 
inefficiency that public utilities exhibited in the name of broad coverage.  Thus, 
where historically public utilities and water supply and sanitation services were 
considered “extra-market” goods, the last twenty years has seen these services 
relegated to market mechanisms for distribution and allocation.  This has not come 
without significant debate over the feasibility and viability forpublic services to be 
                                                
42 Extra-market goods are defined by Okun as those which (i) are acquired and exercised without 
monetary charge; (ii) have no comparative advantage and specialization; (iii) are not distributed as 
incentives, rewards and penalties; and (iv) give priority to equality over equity and freedom.   
43 The justification for this draws on humanist writings of moral obligations and fundamental rights, as 
well as on libertarian writings that argue for limited intervention of the government in the markets 
(only where necessary). 
44 Okun’s third chapter of his book does look at cases where equality and efficiency could be 
compatible.  For instance, Okun argues that if equality were defined by opportunity, rather than 




provided for by the market, given the inherent inequality that ensues from goals of 
efficient service provision (Khanal 2003).   
The definition of water as an economic good45 subjects it to debates over the 
role of pricing in allocating and distributing water.  The assumption is that, if water 
acts as an economic good, then the demand for water is a function of its price and 
other economic have noted, water is not only a commodity, but it is also a natural 
resource, and is perceived to be a human right (ibid)46.  This realization has not 
undermined the economic value of water, and most pricing debates focus on how to
assign tariffs that would include alternate meanings of water, while still using market 
mechanisms to allocate efficiently. 
Historically, tariffs were set to provide broad coverage, and did so by ensuring 
affordability for consumers through subsidized prices.  Thus, the primary goals for 
water supply were technical efficiency and affordability that w s made possible by 
government subsidies to fill financing gaps; affordable tariffs inevitably led to 
revenue shortfalls that, if left unfilled, would compromise the quality of service 
provision. Here, efficiency and equity were compatible only through dependence on 
subsidies and external financing.   
With neo-liberal development policies came a renewed focus on the market as 
the most efficient allocator of goods and services, and public utility companies that 
                                                
45 The Dublin Statement of 1990 argued that, among other guiding principles, “water has an economic 
value in all its competing uses, and should be recognized as an economic good”.  The statement then 
goes on to say that “within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings 
to have access to clean water and sanitation at an ffordable price. Past failure to recognize the 
economic value of water has led to wasteful and enviro mentally damaging uses of the resource. 
Managing water as an economic good is an important w y of achieving efficient and equitable use, and 
of encouraging conservation and protection of water resources” (GDRC at 
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html).   
46 Some scholars would argue that according water an co omic characteristic robs it of its other 




could not demonstrate financial sustainability came under increasing attack, 
especially in developing countries, like Brazil, where budget shortfalls were blamed 
for financial crises and high inflation.  Since then, the tension between universal 
coverage (equity) and financial sustainability (efficiency) has resulted in attempts to 
develop tariff systems that provide both equitable and efficient services.  Those who 
argue for goals of efficient allocation argue that subsidized water service does not 
allocate charges to those who generate the highest cost. However, thos  who argue in 
the interest of equity argue that raising tariffs (in addition to of en being politically 
unpopular) would price the poorest and most vulnerable out of water supply services.   
While the discussion of the appropriateness of different tariff stuctures are 
beyond the scope of this research, suffice it to say that the debate brings up an 
interesting conundrum for water supply companies that must attempt to achieve 
seemingly incompatible goals.  Each of these goals are, in their own right, critical to 
the continued sustainability of quality water services.  Overuse of r s urces, or poor 
operation and maintenance because of budget shortfalls could threaten the future 
provision of quality water services.  However, perhaps more importantly, underlying 
this debate is Okun’s age-old dilemma of the efficiency losses that ensue from 
emphasizing equality.  In a fully efficient system, water would be priced at the full 
cost of production47.  In a fully equitable system, water would be affordable for all 
users.  The pricing debate attempts to address both of these issues by creating 
                                                
47 There is considerable debate as to what constitutes he full cost of water. At the very least, the costs 
typically associated with water supply are (i) operation and maintenance costs; (ii) capital costs; and 
(iii) the cost of servicing debt (OECD 2010).  However, the full economic costs of water also include 
opportunity costs of water and economic externalities. Other authors argue that the full costs of water 
should also reflect the administrative and governance costs to sustain services (Cardone and Fonseca 
2003) as well as the environmental and water resources costs (Rees, Winpenny, and Hall 2008).  For 
the purposes of this dissertation, I will be examining the argument of pricing water at its full cost, 




differential pricing structures for users, or different fees for periods of use that reflect 
attempts to maintain a certain level of equality (as understood by affordability, and, 
hence, access) while balancing issues of efficiency (both technical and allocative 
efficiency).  As Okun (1975) noted, however, balancing these objectives could ome 
at an overall negative cost to society; administrative costs in, for example, targeting 
the poorest users, or the costs of installing hydrometers to measure u e could 
outweigh the financial gains made from targeting non-poor users or flat block tariffs.   
The tension between affordability and financial sustainability of utility 
companies has typically been addressed through government subsidy programs.  One 
study indicated that 65% of water supply companies worldwide continue to receive 
financial support (either implicit or explicit) from governments48.  Where this 
arrangement may work well in developed countries, the introduction of community-
based management arrangements in developing countries were often seen as a “third 
way”, offering a non-state and non-private solution to water provision: “ n the new 
discourse, community-based organizations (CBOs) or water user associations 
(WUAs) are understood to replace state agencies in governing their own resources” 
(Mehta et al., 2007: 25).  Thus, the issues of financial sustainability, fa rness and 
equity of access (including affordability), efficient service provision, and resource 
sustainability must all be balanced in developing country contexts where the ability to 
pay is often very low.  Without sustainable revenue streams, however, these 
community based solutions stand to be short-lived solutions to water service 
provision.   
                                                
48 While this is assumed to lower efficiency in the interest of equity, one study showed that privately 





(b) The Organizational Tradeoff 
While Max Weber’s writings on power, authority and domination 
(Herrschaft) are well known, much less attention has been paid to his, albeit bri f, 
writings on direct democracy.  These are particularly pertinent to the discussions of 
participatory water management, since it is here that Weber outlines a type of 
administration that calls for the direct and immediate involvement of all members that 
would focus on equality rather than efficiency.  For Weber, widespread 
rationalization in Europe had resulted in the emergence of large bureaucracies that 
employed means-end rationality and emphasized efficient administration.  This 
efficiency came at a cost to other social goals, most notably equality. In his work 
Economy and Society, Weber briefly noted one type of administration that was 
effectively able to counter broader trends of rationalization: the direct involvement 
and emphasis on equality that Weber found in Swiss cantons and North American 
townships made these places true “direct democracy” (“unmittelbar demokratischer 
Verwaltung”).49  
“Direct democracy” is defined by Weber as a certain type of organization that 
“may attempt to reduce … [imperative powers] as far as possible. This means that 
persons in authority are held obligated to act solely in accordance with the will of the 
members and in their service by virtue of the authority given by them” (Weber 1978: 
289).  Weber’s concept of direct democracy lies at the intersection of ideas of 
equality and minimization. Thus, it is based on the notion that “all are equally 
qualified to occupy any position of civic responsibility” and that “’minimization’ both 
                                                
49 Weber noted that the direct democracy was inherently rational in its form of administration, making 
it inherently different from more “primitive” patriarchal forms of administration that based its 




entails that the powers of the incumbent of any office will be strictly limited… and 
that the numbers of offices will be strictly curtailed” (Thomas 1984: 225).  In 
addition, Thomas (1984) notes that Weber conceived of direct democracy as a 
rational form of government that embodied a certain sophistication and complexity to 
execute: the “rationality of direct democracy lies in its precis  articulation of a set of 
political and administrative norms and in its awareness of (undesirable) alternative 
dominatory modes of administration” (Thomas 1984:226).   
Weber’s examples of direct democracy, Thomas (1984) points out (e.g. the 
Swiss cantons or the North American townships), have explicitly noted their attempts 
to limit power and domination through precise and regulated administrative measures 
that responded to broader historical trends of rationalization (ibid).  These cases 
indicate common set of pre-conditions that, Weber argues, are necessary for a direct 
democracy to exist:    
(a) Short terms of office, if possible only running between two 
general meetings of the members; (b) Liability recall at any time; 
(c) The principle of rotation or of selection by lot in filling 
offices so that every member takes a turn at some time. This 
makes it possible to avoid the position of power of technically 
trained persons or of those with long experience and command of 
official secrets; (d) A strictly defined mandate for the conduct of 
office laid down by the assembly of members. The sphere of 
competence is thus concretely defined and not of a general 
character; (e) A strict obligation to render and accounting to the 
general assembly; (f) The obligation to subject every unusual 
question which as not been foreseen to the assembly of members 
or to a committee representing them; (g) The distribution of 
powers between a large number of offices each with its own 
particular function; (h) The treatment of office as an avocation 





These conditions of a direct democracy are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for the continued equality of members.  Indeed, Weber (1978) argues that 
this form of administration is easily undermined in one of two ways.  (i) the equality 
of members is undermined with forms of elite capture; and (ii) the technical tasks at 
hand require specific knowledge that creates an imbalance in how voices are 
weighted.   
Since a direct democracy requires of its members to devote tim o 
community service, it creates a propensity for the wealthy and those with more time 
available to dominate administrative positions.  Second, the call to service is 
particularly unsuited to industrial societies, where it is less possible to abandon work.  
This critical question of the availability of time that will tend to favor the wealthy or 
others with prestige will result in the degeneration of direct democracy into a “rule by 
‘honoratores’ (notables)”.  These are defined by Weber as persons 
(1) whose economic position permits them to hold continuous 
policy-making and administrative positions in an organization 
without (more than nominal) remuneration; (2) who enjoy social 
prestige of whatever derivation is such a manner that they are 
likely to hold office by virtue of the member’s confidence, which 
at first is freely given and then traditionally accorded (Weber 
1978: 290).   
 
As Weber (1978: 291) notes, “every type of immediate democracy has a 
tendency to shift to a form of government by notables” in part becaus  this 
administration is cost-effective, and because “honoratores” may be particularly 




A second mechanism that undermines direct democracy is the natureof th  
task to be administered that could give rise to technical expertise.50  The emphasis on 
technical qualifications will exclude others because of their lack of technical 
knowledge, thereby creating a hierarchical form of administration.  Thus, as Weber 
remarks, 
 
Both immediate democracy and government by notables are 
technically inadequate, on the one hand in organizations beyond 
a certain limit of size constituting more than a few thousand full-
fledged members, or on the other hand, where functions are 
involved which require technical training or continuity of policy. 
If, in such a case, permanent technical officials are appointed 
alongside of shifting heads, actual power will normally tend to 
fall into the hands of the former, who do the real work, while the 
latter remain essentially dilettantes (Weber 1978: 291)  
 
The extent to which technical knowledge will come to dominate 
administrative functions will depend on the demands of the tasks that require 
administration. However, as Thomas (1984) notes, as the demands for technical skills 
to administer complex tasks grows, so too does the threat to direct emocracy.  The 
attempt to incorporate technical advisers alongside democratic representatives does 
little more than to shift the power in the direction of technical experts and technical 
knowledge.  The ultimate demise of direct democracy comes, according to Weber 
(1978: 292) with the emergence of parties, since these put into place a structure of 
domination that undermines the very egalitarian nature of democracy. 
Three features Weber’s discussion of direct democracy are relevant to the 
question of participatory water management.  First, is in the type of organization and 
                                                
50 According to Thomas (1984), the stress that Weber places on this aspect mirrors the stress that he 
“placed on the way in which legal forms of domination are grounded in technical expertise and 




the broader relationship to forms of “domination”.  Where in the English versions of 
his text in Economy and Society the term “direct democracy” is used, the German 
version of his work calls this form of governance the “minimisierung der Herrschaft” 
or, minimizing domination or authority (Weber 1922)51. This touches on widely noted 
issues of translating the meaning of “Herrschaft”, but also indicates that Weber’s text 
called for a form of governance where Herrschaft was minimized (not eradicated). 
Here it is useful to summarize briefly the history of the word Herrschaft and to 
review Weber’s use of the word in Economy and Society (1922) to better understand 
what Weber meant by how this relationship could be “minimized”. 
The most comprehensive text on the history of the word Herrschaft is given 
by the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (1972), which provides an overview of the 
history of the term, followed by a discussion of Weber’s usage and how the term has 
been applied and used conceptually within disciplines in the social sciences.  While 
Herrschaft has come to be treated as the equivalent of Latin terms such as imperium, 
domunium, and auctoritas, and English terms of “authority”, and “domination”, the 
term historically referred to a specific and willed unequal relationship.  The root of 
the German word, Herr-, is the same as the word for God, or Lord, and referred to 
types of relationships where there was a willing subjugation to one with higher 
power.  In exchange, the Herr, carried the specific responsibility to care for subjects 
(Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 1972; Richter 1995).  This described sp cific types of 
                                                
51 The text calls the broader form of administration mi isierung der Herrschaft, but later argues that,  
this is the form of administration that most closely resembles a “unmittelbare Demokratie” (direct 
democracy). Of issue here is not the translation of the text used, but rather the subtle differences that 




relationships prevalent in the feudal era, between lords and serfs, btween masters 
and servants, and between mortals and God.   
With the Enlightenment, the emphasis shifted to freeing people from 
oppressive relationships, especially those that enshrined personal dominati n on the 
basis of property rights (Richter 1995).  The goal of history was now emancipation, 
and the term Herrschaft, and any form of “domination” over others was viewed as 
something predominantly negative.  Those ruled were no longer considered subjects 
(or, in a position of Knechtschaft) but rather as citizens ruling themselves, as 
emancipated individuals.  What the authors of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe note is 
that the term Herrschaft was redefined during this time period, where “the notion of 
ruling became transferred to abstract entities, and away from previous usages 
associated with the rights of individual lords over servants. The ‘reign of reason’ 
(vernünftige Herrschaft) was one example of such new usage” (Richter, 1995: 65, 
italics original).   
What remained within the term “Herrschaft” was the underlying notion of a 
relationship between those ruling and those ruled. Where it had moved away from 
specific relationships between people or positions within society, the relationship of 
“domination” was replicated within state structures and its citizens.  This relationship 
was seen as free of the Herrschaft of man over man, and replaced by a more objective 
and virtuous relationship that was part of the natural order.  By the nineteenth 
century, fear of anarchy and revolution led to the assumption in much of German-
speaking Europe that “order is so much a prerequisite of the public good that any 




obedience” relationship, the authors of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe argue, is the 
centerpiece of Weber’s political sociology (ibid).  
While Weber’s use of the word Herrschaft reflected the concept of a willed 
relationship, albeit between citizens and the state, his usage of th  word reflects an 
attempt to further neutralize the word that stemmed, in part, from the legal positivism 
dominant at the time (Richter 1995).  However, the relational aspect of the term 
remains, even in Weber’s definition: Weber defined Herrschaft “in terms of power to 
exact and receive power as the distinguishing aspect of politics… [and] he saw the 
struggle for power as one of the few redeeming possibilities for action in a routinized 
and bureaucratic society” (Richter, 1995: 69)52. 
While the authors of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe do not address Weber’s 
ideas on “direct democracy” directly, the origin of the word and the analysis of 
Weber’s usage of the term provide an illuminating overview of the social 
relationships that existed within German-speaking Europe.53 This is particularly 
important, given that the German term that Weber used for “direct democracy” was 
not demokratie (democracy) but rather Minimisierung der Herrschaft (minimizing 
Herrschaft). In addition, Weber does not term this form of administration 
“Herrschaft-free” (Herrschaftsfrei). Thus it seems that Weber always assumed that 
this broader relationship between the state and its citizens to be inevitable, but that 
                                                
52 Richter (1995) notes that it is interesting that, for Weber, resistance occurred within relationships of 
Herrschaft: “It is striking that he [Weber] does not seem to have considered the possibility of 
combating the routinization of society by resistance to the state.  He had defined legitimate Herrschaft 
in such a way that resistance to constituted authority was neither a moral nor a political option” 
(Richter, 1995 69). 
53 Indeed, the authors’ treatment of Herrschaft and equality draws largely on Rousseau’s ideas of 
moral equality between people that would manifest in political life through “democracy”.  For 
German-speaking Europe, however, fears of anarchy and chaos meant that the term Herrschaft (albeit 
changed in usage) was considered to be an acceptabl facet of political life, since it would ensure a 




within these structures, smaller pockets of areas where the negative aspects of the 
Herrschaft relationship that emerge as a part of broader patterns of rati nalization 
could be minimized. 
Weber’s interest in minimisierung der Herrschaft (“direct democracy”) was 
not in it, as such, but rather as an comparison to legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
Herrschaft (“domination”)54: “It is … an investigation which points up, as it were 
from beneath, the central features of Weber’s argument about domination: its 
universality, its stability, its profound significance for the establishment of an ordered 
condition” (Thomas 1984: 225).  In other words, Weber’s interest in exploring “d rect 
democracy” stemmed from his desire to contrast forms of administration where 
Herrschaft is minimized with an administration where it is not.   
Second, the careful balance of equality and efficiency through discussions of 
elite capture (either by people or by knowledge) lend important insight into the 
sustainability debates of participatory organizations.  Weber is quick to note that 
direct democracies tend to be short-lived; the processes that emerge to produce 
democracy tend to quickly produce a plebiscitary leadership that is equivalent to 
modern party leadership.  The basis for legitimacy then moves to a rational-legal 
authority structure.  Weber’s view that direct democracy is a fundamentally unstable 
highlights a fundamental problem discussed in the literature on partici tory water 
management: the disintegration of the associations once project funding is withdrawn 
(Samad and Vermillion 1999).  While this is a clear and obvious link to the failure of 
direct democracy to survive, Weber’s insights could expand the notion of “failed 
                                                
54 Herrschaft has numerous English translations, depending on the author’s interpretation.  Where 




democracies” to include the routinization of democracy and the emergnce of 
authority structures.  Thus, while some associations founded with partici tory 
principles in mind could continue to exist as assembly points, the emerg nce of an 
authority structure would also be, according to Weber, categorized as the 
disintegration of a direct democracy. This is linked to Weber’s defining 
characteristics of a direct democracy of the freedom of rule by man, as well as of 
equality. The violation of these principles has undermined the direct democracy, and, 
while the group may continue to meet, their democratic nature is farcical, at best.  
This discussion addresses debates within participatory water management of the true 
need for a democratic administrative structure in water management, or whether other 
types of authority structures might be just as suited (and perhaps more stable and 
predictable) for service delivery. 
Finally, Weber’s framing of forms of administration that call for direct 
involvement as anti-bureaucratic, rather than anti-state closely mirror the discussions 
in the previous section of the growing anti-bureaucratic sentiment pr valent in water 
management.  The particular anti-bureaucratic nature found in Weber’s definition of 
direct democracy emerges in much of the discussion of participatory water 
management.  The particular configuration of water management that emphasizes the 
active participation of all users in the diurnal management of water is framed in an 
anti-bureaucratic discourse.  Indeed, it is precisely this point that has tended to unite 
the right and the left in the joint promotion of decentralization and participation.  
Curtailing the role of bureaucracies is viewed, from the right, as bypassing 




address issues of scarcity.  On the left, the direct involvement of water users in the 
active decision-making over allocation and use corrects for state-generated inequities 
and marginalization of some groups at the expense of others.   
 
This section has summarized the key theoretical relationships between 
participation, equity and efficiency.  While key literature in the field of both 
economics and sociology has traditionally argued that efficiency ad equity generate 
tradeoffs, the introduction of participation is theorized to overcome these tensions.  In 
the next section, I will examine this claim empirically.  I will examine the case of 
community-based water supply systems in rural Brazil that have introduced 
participatory community management strategies. The development model w uld 
argue that the active participation of users leads to greater fficiency and equity. On 
the other hand, Weber would argue that these processes are mutually incompatible. 
The case of Bahia will illuminate whether these two processes have been able to 





Chapter 3: Decentralization and Participation in Water 
Management: The Case of Brazil 
The promises of the participatory approach elicit much enthusiasm over the 
prospect that goals of equity and efficiency are mutually compatible. This research 
aims to assess these claims.  Brazil is a good case study for this analysis, since it has 
been at the forefront of water reforms amongst middle and lower income countries, 
adopting international practices in water resources management (such as IWRM, and 
the Dublin Principles) as early as 1997.  In addition, the transition from a military rule 
to a democracy ushered in social and environmental rights enshrined in the 1988 
Constitution, and a series of reforms to better align institutions with these new rights.  
These reforms have taken place in a broader context of inequality, where the most 
water poor areas (e.g. Bahia’s semi-arid region) also suffer from some of the 
country’s highest levels of poverty.  The combination of resource scarcity and 
poverty necessitate both efficient and equitable water provision that the participatory 
approach promises to deliver. 
In Bahia, one example of participatory water management dates back to 1996 
with the Central program.  This program, funded by the German Developm nt Bank 
(KfW), installed simplified water supply systems to small communities in rural 
Bahia’s semi-arid region.  Once installed, the water supply systems were turned over 
to community organizations to operate and maintain.  The program presents a case 
where local user groups have successfully operated and maintained their systems for 




boasts relatively high cost recovery, low system losses, and an inclusive decision-
making process. 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section sketches the 
emergence of participation as a key strategy in water resou ces management policies 
in Brazil.  This development occurred, however, within a broader context of how 
water was perceived, defined, and used over time.  The second section then 
juxtaposes these broader laws of water administration with the politics of water in 
Bahia, especially in the semi-arid region.  The final section describes the emergence 
of alternative service providers in Bahia, specifically the participatory water supply 
program Central.   
A. History of Water Administration in Brazil 
The administration of water in Brazil reflects broader global trends in natural 
resources management that moved from an ideology of modernization to one that 
promotes resource sustainability.  Brazil is home to the largest eserve of freshwater 
resources on the planet, with about eight percent of the world’s existing total.  Much 
of this water flows in several large river basins—such as the Amazon—although the 
country contains an abundance of groundwater resources as well (roughly 112,000 k3) 
(Benjamin, Marques, and Tinker 2005).  However, much of these freshwater 
resources are unevenly distributed within the country; the north and central-west of 
the country, for example, have the highest mean water discharge rate and the lowest 
population density (Benjamin et. al. 2005), whereas much of the northeast is 
dominated by a semi-arid climate that faces the problem of droughts and water 




Water Use in Brazil 
The administration of water is closely linked to how water is perceived, and 
three broad time period broadly define Brazil’s attitude to water use (Heller 2006).55.  
The first, which Benjamin et. al. (2005) dub the “navigability phase”, basew t r use 
on the Portuguese traditions laid down in the Ordinances of the Kingdom 
(Ordenações do Reino) that emphasized navigational use for rivers.  Brazil’s Civil 
Code of 1916 defined water as a public good (bens públicos de uso comum do povo- 
public property for the shared use of the people), but public use could not interfere 
with the broader goals of navigation (Benjamin et. al. 2005: 2190). This precedent 
gave way to what Benjamin et. al. (2005) term the “hydroelectricity phase” with the 
fall of the First Republic in 1930.  The Water Code introduced by Vargas in 1934 
broke the historical emphasis on agriculture and navigation, and adopted a distinctly 
industrial vision of water that emphasized hydroelectric production (ibid). Under the 
1934 Water Code, water resources were a distinctly public good; following the 
Roman Code, water found on private property was classified as private, although its 
use was not to interfere with flows of public waters.  Groundwater, too  was 
addressed in the Water Code of 1934, and it’s use was allowed for on private property 
provided it did not interfere with flows of common or public waters (ibid).  The use 
of water resources during this era have adopted a distinctly modernist approach; as 
Benjamin et. al. (2005) note, “the 1934 Water Code did not embrace an ecological 
                                                
55 These three periods describe Brazil’s water administration after independence in 1822.  Prior to that, 
there was no specific legal code that addressed water management in Brazil, since, as a Portuguese 
colony; Brazil’s resources were viewed as property of the Portuguese crown.  As Heller (2006) notes, 
“The colonial structure was shaped to serve … [economic policy based on foreign trade]; there were 




perspective…. Water was not seen as one of the natural resources that deserved 
conservation or sustainable use regulation” (Benjamin et. al. 2005: 2193).   
This changed, however, in the more recent “environmental phase” which was 
marked with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1981 that, for the first time, 
recognized water’s environmental value (Benjamin et. al. 2005).  A series of laws, 
such as the National Water Act (Lei da Política Nacional dos Recursos Hídricos) in 
1997 and the creation of the National Water Agency (Agência Nacional de Águas) 
signalled a “departure from the 1934 Code’s vision of water as an inexhaustible, 
power-generating resource” Benjamin et. al. 2005: 2193). Brazil’s National Water 
Act (Lei 9.433/97) drew on recommendations of major international charters, such as 
the Dublin Statement of 1991, that defined a series of priorities, such as sectoral 
integration, decentralization of water management to the river basin level, the 
participation of stakeholders, and the concept of water as an economic god while 
guaranteeing priority for human consumption.  Its three main objectives are (i) to 
preserve water quantity and quality for present and future generations, (ii) to assure 
the sustainability of water uses; and (iii) to protect human beings a d the environment 
against critical hydrological events (Benjamin et. al. 2005), thereby firmly placing 
water resources management in Brazil within the sustainability paradigm.   
Administration of Water 
Within the sustainability paradigm, Brazil’s administration of water was 
largely based on the French experience, and included: (a) the creation of r ver basins 
as the primary unit of planning and management, and (b) stakeholder committees 




a river basin in a participatory and deliberative fashion.  The lawslso foresaw 
financial autonomy for these new basin institutions through the creation of water 
management instruments, such as bulk water charges (Brannstromm 2004).  This 
approach effectively served to decentralize water management to the lowest possible 
unit, the river basin, with the concession and control of water user rights remaining 
largely within the state domain56 (Johnsson and Kemper, 2005:1).  
The establishment of river basins and stakeholder committees served to root 
water management in Brazil firmly within a participatory approach, effectively 
reversing decades of top-down and centralized decision-making (Brannstrom, 2004).  
Instead, participatory management brings together all relevant users of a particular 
hydrological area to decide jointly on the planning, management, and distribution of 
water resources.  River Basin Committees, established to create a forum for water 
management, limit the role of the government to 33 percent, and include members of 
the private sector, civil society, and other relevant water users (Garrido 2007).  These 
stakeholders must work collectively to manage water resources for sustainable and 
equitable use. This reshapes the role of state-led water management, to, at least in its 
ideal form, a deliberative and inclusive process.   
The National Water Act gave only brief guidance on the legislation of 
groundwater resources57, and, as such, the legal status of these resources remains 
                                                
56 Under the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, waters that cross state or international boundaries are in 
federal jurisdiction, while those located entirely within the territory of a single state as well 
groundwater resources are in state domain.  One major exception is also established in the 1988 
Constitution: state waters collected in or regulated by federal structures are under federal jurisdiction. 
This norm is especially relevant in the semi-arid Northeast, where the majority of reservoirs were built 
by federal agencies in charge of drought prevention policies and programs (Johnsson and Kemper, 
2005). 
57 While scholars continue to debate the ownership of gr undwater, this debate is concerned primarily 




unclear, at best.  The role of groundwater in Brazil is significant, not only for its 
supply of drinking water58, but also because of the critical link between groundwater 
and surface waters59.  The following figure outlines this relationship: 
 
 
Source: US Geological society: http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercyclegwdischarge.html 
 
The predominant perception of groundwater in Brazil is that it is an 
unregulated resource that provides opportunities for expanding water provision60.  
The lack of federal regulation on groundwater resources mean that, at present, private 
wells can be dug with little attention paid to larger issues of how these water sources 
are hydrologically linked to others.  As the figure above shows, groundwater 
                                                                                                                                          
generally understood to be a public good, with permissions for use granted through a permit system 
(otourgas).   
58 For example, it is estimated that 5.5 million peopl  in São Paulo receive their drinking water totally 
or partially from groundwater sources (Benjamin et. al. 2005: 2206) 
59 Benjamin et. al. (2005) note that around 90% of the rivers, lakes and lagoons in Brazil are supplied 
by underground waters, and that the intensity of use of these resources increases especially in periods 
of drought.   
60 As such, the perception of groundwater resources se m  to lag behind surface water regulation in the 
sustainability paradigm, and resources are seen as relatively more infinite (driven, in part, by their 




resources are located underneath the ground in soil pore spaces, and arerech ged 
from surface water as it runs off into aquifers (USGS 2007).  The deeper the soil pore 
space, the longer it takes for these sources to be recharged from water runoff.  While 
single wells are not anticipated to significantly deplete these water sources, the 
widespread or intensive use of wells to supply drinking water could alter the delicate 
hydrological cycle between surface and groundwater.   
B. Water Resources in the State of Bahia: Climate and Poverty 
Bahia is the fifth largest state in Brazil, with a total area of 567,295 km2, 
corresponding to 6.6 percent of the total area of Brazil, and 36.3 percent of the total 
area of the Northeast.  The state has three geographic “zones”: th  litoral , or coastal, 
zone, the zona da mata, which is hot and humid, and home to the region’s vast sugar 
plantations, and the zona do sertão, or the drought-prone “interior”. This latter area 
covers around two-thirds (336,000 km2) of the state, and experiences droughts in 
roughly three year intervals, with serious droughts occurring every twelve years or so 
(Arons 2004).  On top of the geography of the state is a political economy of 
patronage and clientalism rooted in the history of large plantations, c centrated land 
ownership and limited access to water (Arons 2004; Kenny 2002).  Drought 
mitigation policies long favored investments in water storage facilities that required 
heavy upfront investments and typically favored larger landholders, leaving much of 
the rural population in the sertão to suffer starvation and illness during droughts.  
Recent investments in community-managed water supply systems draw on the 
region’s groundwater supplies to deliver water to rural households in an attempt to 




The map below shows the drought polygon in the northeast (highlighted area) 
that covers nine states in the region.  Bahia, the largest state in th  semi-arid region, 
sees a median annual precipitation is between 250 and 500 mm (Cirilo 2008) (as 
compared with an average 1,010 mm (40 inches) and 2,030 mm (80 inches) for the 




Figure 4: The semi-arid polygon in Brazil’s Northeast Region, 200861 
 
                                                
61 The semi-arid region is defined receiving between 250 and 500 millimetres of rain per annum, and 
where the vegetation is primarily bushes that lose their leaves in the driest months (Cirilo 2008).  The 




(a) Water, Drought, and Politics 
Bahia’s semi-arid region has long suffered from severe droughts; as recently 
as 1999, the northeastern drought polygon was affected by a severe drought that 
impacted around 10 million residents (Kenny 2002).  The persistent problem of 
drought has plagued the region for as long as there are historical records, with 
droughts appearing in accounts of the region as early as 1522 although it was the 
drought of 1877 “which caused the deaths of nearly one million people [that] alerted 
the political bosses in Brazil to the obvious fact that people lived beyond the coastal 
cities and sugar plantations” (Arons 2004: 17).   
Nineteenth century Bahia was the political, economic, cultural and religious 
capital of Brazil.  Powerful landowners oversaw great sugar plantatio s that were run 
on slave labor imported primarily from the West African coast. Most of this 
production was located in the humid regions of the zona da mata that extends behind 
the coastal region in the eastern part of the state.  By the la e nineteenth century, 
however, much of the political and economic power was shifting to the industrial 
south (most notably around Rio de Janeiro).  During the U.S. Civil War, the South 
stopped producing cotton, and foreign importers turned to Brazil, leading to a cotton 
boom in the northeastern region of the country (Arons 2004).  Cotton barons moved 
into the sertão, taking slaves, indentured servants, and sharecroppers to work the land 
(ibid).  
The drought of 1877 destroyed agriculture in the interior, slaves were shipped 
south, and of those that weren’t, many were freed because landowners couldn’t afford 




of agricultural production and the precarious and drought-prone climate continues o 
impact inequality and asymmetric power relations in Bahia’s sertão.  Limited state 
services, and unreliable access to water meant that, although freed, many former 
slaves and sharecroppers continued to rely on systems of “unequal reciprocity” 
(Neves 1998) for survival.  As anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993) notes: 
The history of the sugar plantations, slavery, peonage, 
paternalism and coronelismo can weigh heavily on the 
demeanor and behaviour of the rural workers, who throughout 
their lives put up with humiliating gestures and postures and 
with unequal exchanges that obligate them to people who 
would only take further advantage of them... A good boss is a 
rescuer and a saviour, one who will swoop down at a 
precarious moment and snatch a dependent worker and his or 
her family from the clutches of disease, penury, death, or other 
forms of destruction. For people who live their lives so close to 
the margins of survival the idea of a benefactor is soothing. To 
admit the opposite, to entertain the idea that patronage is itself 
exploitative, is to admit that there is not structured safety net at 
all and that the poor are adrift within an amoral social and 
economic system that is utterly indifferent to their well being 
and survival (108). 
 
Prior to 1877, large landholders had a virtual monopoly on water supply, 
using them for irrigating cotton fields, and, in periods of drought, rural workers could 
move to a patron’s more fertile land (Kenny 2002).  Kenney (2002) goes on to note 
that “with the distribution of land titles, expansion of agricultural t de, and the 
penetration of capitalism, much of the land that rural workers could use or occupy 
during times of scarcity became unavailable” (Kenny 2002:126) creating  culture of 
constant migration in and out of the region.  The outmigration of 100,000 people 
fleeing the drought of 1877 created widespread fear of the migrants, and raised public 




argues is the official invention of drought and drought mitigation p licy, where 
“drought mitigation [was linked] with state obligation, rather than a natural disaster 
excised from public responsibility” (126).  In other words, where droughts were 
historically viewed as disasters that were outside of the realm of control or 
responsibility of the state, the drought of 1877 brought, for the first time, the impacts 
of drought into the public consciousness necessitating state response.  Thi  was the 
first time that the state intervened to stave off the impacts of the drought and to 
mitigate future droughts, through, for example, improved water storage facilities. 
However, over the next century, policies of drought mitigation were typically large 
public works projects that favored the large landowners, not subsistence farm rs, 
further consolidating the political power of the elites. 
(b) Drought Mitigation in the Modern Era 
By the 1930s, drought mitigation programs were firmly located in the stat ’s 
domain.  The revolution of 1930 had “supposedly supplanted the clientalism that 
dominated the fiefdoms of the rural interior (Albuquerque 1995 p. 113) with modern, 
civil, democratic systems that would eliminate social, political and economic relations 
that imprisons men through ties of personal dependency, obedience and submission 
(Neves 2000)” (as quoted in Kenny 2002: 126).  Large public works programs, fixed 
prices on staples, housing cooperatives and camps for drought migrants, and labor 
programs were all meant to address the issues of drought and migration.  Large public 
agencies were created to combat drought: in 1934, the Insp toria de Obras contra as 




(Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as Secas, or DNOCS,) with the specific 
aim of dealing with the problem of droughts. 
The continued frequency and severity of droughts in the region undermined 
the existing policies of addressing migration and turned to water supply, especially 
for irrigation purposes.  The purpose of irrigation programs “was quite progressive: to 
settle agricultural populations, avoid migration, and correct the social imbalance in 
favor of small landholders and sharecroppers” (Arons 2004).  These programs were 
the brain child of Celso Furtado62, a noted Brazilian economist, whose efforts to 
develop the northeast regions culminated in the establishment of development banks 
to specifically target the underdevelopment of the region, specifically the 
Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (Superintendência do 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste SUDENE).  The establishment of the Banco Nordeste 
do Brazil and SUDENE in the 1950s laid the foundations “for new industrial 
investments and modernisation [sic]... including transport systems and
telecommunications, as well as drinking water and sewerage systems” (Hita and Hill 
2009: 8) Furtado argued that the northeast region’s underdevelopment could not be 
alleviated by market forces, but, rather, necessitated state interve ion to propel it into 
higher development.  Thus, he advocated a strong role for the state in he 
development of irrigation programs to change the economy of the sertão. 
                                                
62 As Thorburn (1999) notes, “along with Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado is seen as one of the creators of 
the highly influential structuralist school of economic development thought, which articulated the 
initial blueprint of the industrialization by invita ion development strategy followed by many if not all 
Latin American states in the 1940s and 1950s. Joseph Love’s … attributes Furtado with being the first 
to ‘specifically assert that development and underdevelopment were part of the same process of the 




The results of this are two-fold.  First, the types of projects that were favored 
under Furtado’s legacy were large dams with extensive canal systems to deliver water 
to irrigation projects.  These projects tended to favor the larger landholders, where 
economies of scale prevailed and larger production could be pursued in the name of 
development.  However, the invention of drought and the subsequent efforts to 
address it created an opportunity for some to benefit. In some cases, this meant the 
direct access to controlling water supply, and “politicians and top-down NGOs have 
replaced the rural colonel as the new super-patrons and are expected to supply 
services, protection and work in exchange for labor, votes, and loyalty” (Kenny 2002: 
128).  Thus, water became a commodity that was carefully controlled by politicians 
and others who stood to benefit from it. 
Second, building dams and other water storage facilities created a ca re of 
experts (tecnicos) who favored scientific approaches and megaprojects (Kenny 2002).  
Their approach to drought as a purely scientific phenomenon was at odds with the 
local culture of the sertanejos (residents of the sertão), whose “’fatalistic supernatural 
ideology’ (Gomes 1998, pp. 209, 210) and submissiveness in the face of problems 
and social change” (Kenny 2002: 125) characterized their attitude to rought.  Rain 
was a gift of the heavens, and lack of rain was beyond individual control (ibid).  As 
Magalhães (1993) notes 
Dependence on nature, especially on climate variations; a close relationship 
with the surrounding environment; a strong religious sentiment that makes 
him accept as given his destiny and the difficulties of life (and, in a way, the 
belief that he is not able to change things); a lack of preoccupation about the 
future making him worry only about his present-day subsistence; the courage 
to face his day-to-day difficulties, of which the fight against droughts is the 
most important; and the disposition to work and never give up- all of these are 





The figure below is an example of a dam in Bahia (the Pindobaçu d m) that 
was considered the primary strategy to combat drought in the earlier half of the 
nineteenth century.  Large dams like this increased the state’s ability to store water. 
However, this did little for residents of the rural areas, who were not connected to the 
water supply, because extending pipes was often far too costly for he remote areas.  
Aside from not extending water to rural areas, dams also fell ut of favor because of 
high levels of evapotranspiration in the region (Garrido 2007). 
 
Figure 5: Pindobacu Dam in Bahia, Brazil 
 
Source: Author 
The influx of engineers and other scientific experts to combat drought with 
large water projects shaped a suspicious ambivalence towards remote authority 
figures with utopian projects (Kenny 2002).  In turn, the culture of the sertão 
exasperated the technical elites, who blame the “backwardness” of the people for 
persistent problems of drought in the region (Arons 2004; Magalhães 1993).  




socio-political context of poverty and inequality. As Mehta, et. al. (2007) note, 
“simplistic notions of scarcity often lead to simplistic solutions which can intensify 
problems of access and exclusion” (22).  
By the early 1990s, it was clear that drought management policies that 
consisted primarily of building dams for water storage were not sufficient to mitigate 
the effects of droughts on dispersed rural populations; and many water reservoirs 
lacked canal systems to deliver the water to rural communities (Garrido 2007).  As a 
result, many dispersed rural villages lack consistent water supply both for irrigation 
purposes and supply and sanitation purposes, and their livelihoods continue to be 
affected by droughts. 
(c) Water and Poverty in Bahia’s sertão today 
Lack of access to water supply in Bahia continues to be closely linked to 
poverty in the state.  Bahia’s poverty is disproportionately located in the sertão63, 
where the majority of residents are dependent on rain-fed agricultu e and government 
transfers for subsistence.  Historically, poverty in Bahia has been closely associated 
with agriculture. In 2001, 52 percent of the extreme poor household heads cite  
agriculture as their primary form of employment (Verner 2001). Most of these 
households are located in the rural areas, with limited access to basic infrastructure 
and services.  In many areas, males migrate to urban areas in search of work, which, 
in the absence of reliable remittances, could leave the household more vulnerable to 
droughts and other water stresses.  Many of the villages are small and remote, with 
limited access to basic infrastructure. The photos below were taken during field 
                                                




research in the area, and show the typical red sand (“poeira”) th t dominates the 
landscape of the sertão: 
Figures 6 and 7: : Villages of the sertão64 
  
Source: Author 
The rural poor are primarily smallholders, sharecroppers, and informal 
wageworkers that depend on a diverse strategy of income-generating ac vities in 
which the subsistence production of corn, beans, manioc, rice, and small livestock 
predominates (Verner 2004). In the semi-arid and transition zones, rainfall is scarce 
and highly irregular, yielding crops of low quality and low income generating 
capacity. These small farmers lack modern production technology, basic 
infrastructure to store harvests to take advantage of cyclical price fluctuations, 
technical assistance to improve productivity, and organized marketing facilities. 
Family income is, therefore, highly variable and there is little opportunity for saving. 
They have very few assets, including education, and are very vulnerable (Verner 
2004).  The photos below show the impact of low rainfall on crops and livestock in 
the sertão:  
                                                
64 These are photos taken of villages during the initial s ages of field research and were not selected for 





Figures 8 and 9: Low rainfall and crops, livestock 
Source: Author 
Many of these rural poor rely on transfer programs such as Bolsa Familía and 
other federal and state programs for basic foodstuffs. In 2005, Bahia was the largest 
beneficiary of the Bolsa Familía program in Brazil, with nearly 13 percent of the 
recipient families servicing all 417 of Bahia’s municipalities.  Many of these families 
are located in the rural regions and the sertão, where income opportunities are 
limited, droughts are frequent, and social protection programs are few (Verner 2004).  
While many of the rural poor have chosen to migrate from the poorer interior zones, 
nearly 2.8 million rural citizens continue to live in poverty in Bahia.  More than 60 
percent of these household heads had incomes of less than one minimum wage 
(salario minimo)65 in the poor regions, compared to the regional average of 55 
percent, or the capital zone’s 34 percent (Verner 2004).   
While drought or limited rainfall is certainly linked to the precarious situation 
of rural residents of Bahia’s sertão, access to water is also mediated through political 
patronage structures (Zimmerman 2009).  Political campaigns in these ar as often 
                                                
65 The minimum wage in Brazil is R$465 per month (2009 value) (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, 




promise free water in exchange for votes, and either fail to make good on their 
promises, or the water system collapses soon after the election for lack of basic 
maintenance (Arons 2004; Selka 2009).  In addition, water and land ownership are 
closely linked in the state, and large-scale agricultural producers have a virtual 
monopoly over the water that flows under their lands.  Without the capital to nvest in 
pumping systems, or rain storage facilities, many rural residents continue to use open 
sources of water for consumption and small agricultural plots. The table below shows 
the percentage of Bahian households with access to basic services. 
Table 1: Access to Basic Services (% of households with service), 2003 
  Piped Water Sanitation 
Services 
Electricity 
BAHIA Rural Households 32% 57% 64% 
 Urban 
Households 
88% 95% 99% 
BRAZIL Rural Households 58% 72% 82% 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
Both the state and the national government have implemented a number of 
programs in recent years aimed at bringing water supply, sanitatio , and electricity 
services to the semi-arid region. This is, in part, because of growing concern over 
migration of the rural poor to urban areas (particularly São Paulo city and state) 
because of drought and poor living conditions.  In addition, the provision of clean
water and sanitation services is closely linked to improved health indicators, through 
the reduction of diseases associated with contaminated water sources and 
dehydration. The largest such program in the water supply sector is falls under the 




that sets out to increase investments to expand access to water supply and sanitation, 
while also taking into account local contexts.66 
Today, the State of Bahia is supplied by the private enterprise, Embasa 
(Empresa Baiana de Àguas e Saneamento), although the majority stake (98%) is held 
by the state government.  With an annual revenue (liquid operational) of R$370 
million, EMBASA services around 7.2 million people in 344 municipalities (of 417) 
in the state of Bahia.  Today it is the largest sanitation company in the northeast, the 
twenty-seventh state company in the country, and is forty-second on the list of the 
100 largest companies in the North-Northeast region (Revista Exame, 2001 as quoted 
in ANA 2006).  Embasa provides services to towns and communities in thestate of 
Bahia with more than 5,000 inhabitants.  This means that even where Embasa 
provides water to the district, communities with less than 5,000 inhabitants are not 
eligible for water provision through the state company.  District n Bahia not 
serviced by Embasa are supplied water through one of six of the other water supply 
companies in the state67.  The figure below shows the districts in Bahia that Embasa 
services:  
                                                
66 This law updated the national plan to expand water supply and sanitation services, PLANASA, that 
had operated between 1968 and 1986.  Critics of this program argued that the centralized approach to 
service expansion did not take local realities, including appropriate technologies and the ability to pay, 
into account.  The abolishment of PLANASA opened the playing field to private companies and 
alternative service providers.  The new law places renewed emphasis on universal access to services.   
67 There are a total of six water supply companies active in the state: 1. SAAE - SERVIÇO 
AUTÔNOMO DE ÀGUA E ESGOTO; 2. EMBASA -Empresa Baiana de Águas e Saneamento; 3. PM 
- Prefeitura municipal de Santa Maria da Vitória; 4. EMSAE - Empresa Municipal de Serviços de 
Água e Esgoto; 5. EMASA - Empresa Municipal de Agua e Saneamento Ambiental S/A; and 6. PMBE 
- Prefeitura Municipal de Barra da Estiva (SNIS 2008). EMBASA is the primary supplier of water, 
although they offer concessionary arrangements for water supply to companies in other districts.  Each 
of these companies has their own policies for distribu ing water supply services. The CENTRAL 




Figure 10:  Districts in the State of Bahia where Embasa supplies water68 
 
Source: Embasa 2008 
 
Small rural communities with less than 5,000 inhabitants that are not eligible for 
Embasa services tend to use open water sources (mostly rivers) when available, 
leading to greater risk of exposure to waterborne diseases.  In order to address this 
gap, the Government of Bahia has recently drawn on international experiences in 
participatory water management institutions to invest in simplified water and 
sanitation systems and then turn over the operation and management to the local 
community. Recently, the relative success of these collective management institutions 
has provided a useful starting point for examining the relationship between equity and 
efficiency in these experiences.  
                                                
68 This map shows the different districts and regions in the state supplied by Embasa. The shadings 
represent different regions within the state. What is of interest for this analysis is the fact that several 





Figures 11 and 12: Residents of a village carrying water from open rivers 
 
Source: Author 
While irrigation remains an important priority for the state of Bahia, this 
research will focus on the self-managed systems for water supply and sanitation.  The 
reasons for this are two-fold.  First, the success of irrigation and agricultural crops is 
influenced by myriad other factors, such as access to markets, world commodity 
prices, pests and other crop diseases, etc.  In this scenario, water resou ces are an 
additional input to crop outputs, and the reliable delivery of water resou ces is not the 
ultimate cause for improved crop outputs.  Thus, since this research is interested in 
the participatory administration of water resources, it will focus attention where the 
administration style can more clearly be connected to outputs of reliable water 
services.   
Second, the provision of water supply and sanitation services has typically 
been promoted as a hallmark of modernity, with responsibility for management 
historically resting with the state.  Beginning in the 1990s, however, th  Brazilian 




sanitation services to the private sector (Heller 2006).  State companies were now less 
concerned with expanding water supply services, since this would undermie 
profitability (Heller 2006). EMBASA’s decision not to supply water o communities 
with less than 5,000 residents has left the water supply sector open to addressing the 
lack of water supply in a variety of other ways, including community management.   
C. Community Level Participation in Water Management: the CENTRAL 
program 
During the 1990s, the introduction of municipal cooperatives been recognized 
as a successful strategy for water supply and sanitation services.  This approach is 
premised on the notion that smaller municipalities face challenges to ensuring 
adequate service delivery that can be overcome with a grouping of municipalities and 
the creation of a supra-municipal authority with the appropriate level of 
administrative and technical capacity.  It is primarily a self-organization of services, 
with little state and federal government participation (Heller 2006).  One of the first 
such experiments was implemented in the state of Bahia together wit  the German 
bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).  The objective of this program was to 
“supply the population in the north-west of the Brazilian state of Bahia with improved 
basic sanitation as a contribution to improving their health situation” (KfW 2000).  
The program targeted 45 municipalities with 34,000 inhabitants to receive simplified 
water supply, and, in some cases, waste water disposal systems. This program was 
implemented under the Secretariat for Urban Development (SEDUR- Secretaria de 
Desenvolvimento Urbano da Bahia, with the construction of the systems done by 
CERB- Bahia State Rural Engineering Company (Companhia Estadual de 




The program financed the installation of simplified water systems and trained 
community members in the operation and simple maintenance procedures of the 
water supply system.  The system consisted of an electric pump that pumped 
groundwater to a water storage unit where hydrochloride and sodium were added to 
purify the water.  The water is then pumped to each of the houses.  Th  program also 
financed the installation of meters at each of the entry points to the houses to measure 
consumption.  Annex 1 provides photos and descriptions of the water supply systems.   
Originally, the program envisioned handing the operation and maintenanc  of 
these systems over to the local communities.  But by 1999, with concerns over the 
ability of the communities to effectively and sustainably maintain these systems 
(given the necessity for technological and administrative capacities), two supra-
municipal associations were founded.  These associations, called CENTRAL (Central 
de Associações Comunitárias para a Manutenção de Sistemas de Abastecimento de 
Água- Community Association Forum for Water Supply Systems Maintenance), are 
non-profit associations open to all community associations and are responsible for the 
maintenance of the water supply systems (basic operation rests with the community 
themselves).  The objectives of CENTRAL are: (i) to ensure financial viability of 
systems through collection of tariffs; (ii) to promote improvements in community 
management of water supply systems; and (iii) to represent the community 
associations and advocate for their interests (Heller 2006).  Initially, Central provided 
preventative maintenance and repair services and billing, although their activities 
have expanded to include trainings in hygiene behavior, technical assistance in 




The program selected municipalities to take part in the program based on (i) 
the community’s demonstrated willingness to take on a project in water supply; (ii) 
the commitment of the municipal government to support the project; and (iii) the 
majority vote of a community association to take part in the project.  Of the roughly 
115 communities who applied, about 40 percent were selected into the program.  The 
community associations all elected a president, a treasurer and a secretary for two 
year terms, and the associations meet on a monthly basis.  Each user pays a flat fee 
for the first 10 cubic meters (m3) that they consume, and according to consumption 
after that.  Some communities covered the cost of water and electricity, whereas in 
other communities, the municipal governments agreed to cover the cost of electricity. 
Two supra-municipal associations were established in the municipalities of Seabra 
and Jacobina. These two CENTRALs are administered by the following authorities: a 
general meeting, an executive board, a managing committee and a finance committee.  
The executive board meets quarterly, and has four representatives from community 
associations, two representatives from the mayor’s office, one repr s ntative from 
CERB, and one representative from SEDUR.   
Ten years on, the Central program continues to supply water with relatively 
high cost recovery and user satisfaction.  The United Nations highlighted the program 
as a “best practice” award in 2006 for its quality of service, and for filling a key gap 
in the state’s service provision.  The table below presents somekey statistics on the 
Central program.  From this table, it is clear that water losses are relatively low, listed 
at 13 percent in 2008 (as compared to an average of 50 percent among water supply 




high proportion of the population in the communities and municipalities it services.  
Finally, the program is expanding to include more communities, bringing critical 
infrastructure to small rural communities. 
Table 2:  Indicators of the Central program, Seabra system 
Year/Indicator: 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of Associations 
affiliated 
36 37 50 53  57 
Communities covered 52 54 75 78  88 
Number of water supply 
systems 
35 36 40 42  44 
Number of sewerage 
systems 
- - - -  - 
Number of water supply 
connections 
3362 3616 5,562 6,156  7,271 
Number of sewerage 
connections 
- - - -  - 
Population served 16,200 18,080 27,810 30,780  36,355 
Consumption (# of liters 
per person per day) 
60 63 55   9669 
Losses 27% 21% 29.2%   13.1%70  
Staff 8 8 7 7  8 
Municipalities served 17 17 17 19  19 
Illnesses attributed to 
water quality 
0 0 0     
Percent of population 
covered (water) 
95% 95% 95% 95%  98% 
Percent of population 
covered (sewerage) 
- - - -  - 
Number of disconnections 63 68 56 163    
Number of visits to 
systems (technical) 
391 340 353 396    
Number of visits to 
systems (social) 
238 221 217 228    
Range of piping 
(kilometers) 
75,054 70,477 76,642 68,460    
Number of pumps replaced  17 19 16 10    
Rate of non-payment 8.50% 9,55% 10,64%   1,2% 
Number of pumps replaced 
(new) 
6 6 8 1    
Source: Central 2008 
                                                
69 This figure is based on the average liters consumed per household of the six communities surveyed, 
and is not representative of the whole system. 
70 This figure is taken from a sample of one community that Central tested in 2008 and does not 




The CENTRAL program provides a compelling case study of the ability to 
achieve outcomes of both efficiency and equity within participatory organizations.  
Given the importance of reliable service delivery, the issue of t chnical and allocative 
efficiency remains of fundamental importance to these water supply schemes.  
However, the emphasis on participation and the prominent role of community 
associations also provides a forum to address issues of equity.  An ex-post evaluation 
initiated by KfW indicated that gender equity had improved as a result of the 
program, although the primary success indicators focused on the technical a d 
allocative efficiency of the water supply systems.71  Cost recovery for the CENTRAL 
systems is estimated at 95 percent for Seabra and 90 percent for Jacobina, a key f ctor 
in the program’s success rating, and a prime driver in discussions to expand the 
program to other municipalities.  If we are to believe the development model’s 
predictions, the efficiency achievements should be accompanied by greater perceived 
equity within the community realized through high rates of participation. On the other 
hand, if we are to believe Weber’s predictions, than the efficient d livery of water 
services has been accomplished at the cost of equity within each of the communities, 
and a relative redundancy in participation.  In the next section, I utline a proposed 
research design that attempts to investigate the relationship between levels of 
participation and outcomes of efficiency and equity.   
                                                
71 These included indicators of mean water consumption, water losses, water quality, system 
malfunctions, etc.  I was not able to obtain a copy f the ex-post evaluation, so I was not able to 




Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
A. General Methodology 
This research drew on participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques to examine 
the compatibility of outcomes of efficiency and equity within participatory water 
management institutions.  The methods used included open-ended interviews, semi-
structured interviews, key informant interviews, focus group interviews, community 
mapping exercises, and participant observation.  In addition, financial dat  was 
collected for the supra-municipal water supply organization, Central.   
The PRA technique was initially developed as “an approach and range of 
techniques that enable stakeholders to analyze their problems and then plan, 
implement and evaluate agreed-upon solutions” (GTZ 2006).  The methodology 
introduced abbreviated versions of in-depth qualitative methods that would allow 
assessors to better understand the dynamics and relationships within communities, 
and to work together with communities to identify development solutions.  It was 
developed in response to top-down state-driven development solutions to develop a 
more demand-driven, or user-driven solution.   
The decision to use PRA techniques was based on two motivations.  First, the 
techniques are particularly useful to examine relationships at and institutions on the 
village level in rural areas of less developed countries.  PRA makes use of 
abbreviated qualitative methodologies that better allow for examining dynamics and 
relationships, and is particularly focused on examining social differences, which 
remains important when researching access to water supply services. Second, the 




and participation meant in the local context, and made room to explore emerging 
themes and issues within the community. 
PRA makes use of a variety of methods, depending on the information to be 
gathered.  Since this dissertation did not address the problem-solving aspect of the 
PRA methodology, the methods used were geared towards gathering information on 
descriptions of and relationships within the community at large, and also specific to 
the community organization and water supply company.  Thus, the methods that were 
used included semi-structured interviews with a random sample of community 
members, focus group interviews to observe how joint opinions were formed, and 
community mapping exercises which showed to what extent the community 
organizations replicated existing inequalities within the community.  In addition, 
participant observation of the communities was used to identify community 
conditions and relationships, as well as to map the water system.   
Finally, PRA emphasizes triangulation of data sources by relying on different 
techniques to compare answers and decipher patterns on the ground.  Perceptions 
within the community were triangulated with key informant interviws with local 
government officials, and members of the supra-municipal water supply company, 
Central, as well as with the president and operator within each community.  The 
triangulation of data allowed for an understanding of where community members 





The specific methods used are presented below72: 
METHOD DESCRIPTION APPLICATION OF 
METHODS 
1. Review of existing data Participatory methods 
demand an initial 
understanding of the likely 
issues to be addressed 
through the research.  This 
information could come from 
documents, or from local 
folklore.  Special attention 
must be paid to not over-
emphasizing previous 
analyses too much. 
Research was done through 
official and unofficial studies 
and reports on the socio-
cultural, political, ecological, 
and hydrological conditions.  
Specific information on the 
Central program was 
gathered, as well as socio-
demographic statistics.   
2. Direct observation This helps identify the local 
conditions, can provide 
topics or areas for discussion, 
and help assess the 
differences between reported 
and real conditions. These 
are assumed to be a starting 
point 
Direct observation of the 
communities to be studied 
provided an understanding of 
how remote the communities 
were, the ecological climate 
(semi-arid), and an initial 
understanding of the local 
resources (i.e. school, clinic, 
etc.) 
3. Transect walks and guided 
field walks 
The researcher and key 
informants conduct a walking 
tour through areas of interest 
Guided walks provided an 
overview of the location and 
relative condition of the 
pump, as well as the 
knowledge of the operator in 
the location of hydrometers 
and relevant local issues 
4. Informal interviews Perhaps the most widespread 
method of PRA, requiring a 
balance between open-
endedness and directed 
enquiry 
Informal interviews were 
used in the initial stages of 
the research to feel out 
whether an enquiry into 
efficiency and equity would 
be relevant for the local 
context.  Results from the 
informal interviews revealed 
this to be a relevant testing 
ground for more structured 
questions 
5. Group meetings Group meetings provide an 
insight into community 
dynamics, specifically in how 
communities share 
Community association 
meetings were attended to 
observe community 
dynamics and participation, 
                                                
72 Adapted from GTZ 2006.  The methods and descriptions were presented in GTZ 2006.  The 
application describes how these research methods were us d during the research time period for this 
dissertation.  This is not an exhaustive list of PRA methods, but rather a list adapted to present the 




information, discuss issues of 
relevance, and gain 
consensus on issues.   
and to understand which 
issues were of local 
importance 
6. Focus group interviews Established groups or people 
using the same resource are 
interviewed together 
Focus group interviews were 
conducted with community 
members who were part of 
the water supply system to 
observe how communities 
discussed and reconciled 
differences of opinions, and 




Predetermined questions and 
topics are used, but the 
method allows for new topics 
to be pursued as the 
interview develops.  The 
interviews are informal and 
conversational but carefully 
controlled. 
Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted on the 
themes of efficiency, equity 
and participation. The focus 
of the interview questions 
allowed for a greater number 
of respondents to be 
interviewed.  
8. Key probes A question addressing a key 
issue is asked of different 
informants and answers are 
compared 
Key questions on efficiency, 
equity, and participation were 
asked of all respondents to 
compare differences and 
emergent themes in the 
answers 
9. Community mapping Respondents provide their 
input (either alone or in a 
group) as to the relationships 
between decision-makers in 
the community, the 
community organization, and 
water resources. 
Community mapping 
provided a clear picture of 
which groups of people were 
more or less active in the 
community organization and 
allowed for mapping of 
groups along a continuum of 
participation 
10.  Field Report writing Key findings are recorded 
before leaving the village. 
Brief summaries are made of 
diagrams, as well as the 
processes 
Field notes were kept for all 
the communities visited to 
record the days events 
 
B. Research procedures and data 
The starting criterion for this research was to do an in-depth study of a water 
supply program that relied on participation of users to ensure sustainability.  




they reflected the compatibility of outcomes of efficiency and equity.  Brazil was 
chosen as a research site because of widespread legislative upport for participatory 
initiatives, including one of the most widely cited cases of successful participation, 
the case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre.   
The state of Bahia was determined because it provided an interesting case 
within Brazil.  The northeast is poorer than the south, with more limited resources and 
a relatively weaker civil society.  On the other hand, the large semi-arid triangle, 
located in the northeast, has received political attention because of outmigration and 
relatively low living standards.  Thus, water provision to these areas has been a 
political priority for a while, both on the national and the state level, b cause of 
expanding water services and improving development, but also to stem wider social 
issues of poverty and migration.  Given the relatively weak civil society and the 
history of patronage in Bahia, the semi-arid region seemed to pose an interesting 
challenge for bringing in autonomous water supply programs throug development 
financing.   
Initial conversations with development specialists revealed that the Central 
program, located across two districts in Bahia, provided a good case study of 
successful autonomous water supply and sanitation provision that relied on 
participatory user organizations for sustainability.  These simplif ed systems were 
operated at the community level, and had been highlighted by the Unit d Nations as a 
best practice in the provision of community-based water supply systems.   
Water supply systems were chosen over irrigation systems for two easons.  




efficiency and equity.  As such, water supply institutions provided a clearer indication 
of the relationship between each of these, since the delivery of water (and the extent 
to which this is efficient and/or equitable) is the end goal of the institution.  Water 
management institutions for irrigation intend to use the allocation of water as an input 
to maximize crop yields, or otherwise produce foodstuffs, meaning that the 
relationship between participation and water delivery is affected by many other 
factors.  Second, the expansion of water supply and sanitation is an important 
political priority for Brazil in general, and Bahia in particular.   
Once the program to be researched had been established, the next stp was to 
determine the appropriate communities that would provide some variability on 
participation.  Initially, participation was determined simply by the percentage of the 
community that belonged to the community organization73 and how often the 
community organization met.  This indicator is problematic to assess the more 
nuanced issue of quality of participation, but it provided a sample list of 23 
communities that presented some variability.  These 23 communities were provided 
by Central and based on the criterion of percentage of people who belonged to the 
community organization. 
This full list of communities was then presented to state level officials at 
CERB, and to staff at Central to determine a more refined list of communities that 
would fulfill the objectives of variability in participation, but would also be feasible 
to study over a three week period.  The list was refined first based on feasibility and 
                                                
73 This indicator is problematic in this context because affiliation with a community organization is a 
pre-requisite to qualify for government benefits.  Thus, the indicator of membership was refined to get 
a sense of how many people really “actively” participated and how often the community association 
met.  While this relies on impressions of Central st ff, the total list of communities provided gave a 




access.  Next, a number of communities were visited together with Central staff as 
they made rounds.  This provided an overview not only of the work of the 
maintenance organization, but also of the distance and types of communities that 
were part of Central (in terms of size and resources).  Informal interviews were 
conducted with residents of the communities to explore the relevance of th mes of 
efficiency and equity as outcomes and their relationship to participation.  Questions 
asked in the informal interviews were designed to test the semi-structured interviews 
and to make modifications.  Around 25 informal interviews were conducted, lasting 
between 60-120 minutes, with an average of about 70 minutes each.  The results from 
these interviews formed the basis for the more semi-structured interviews.   
Sampling 
Once the questions were piloted, the list of sites to be visited was fin lized.  
Discussions with Central staff indicated that there might be sev ral factors affecting 
active participation within communities.  These included: 
1. Local Government Support:  The support of the local government in 
sustaining, and not undermining, the Central program was determined as 
being important to the survival of the community organization.  Some 
municipal governments hoped to undermine Central by offering free water, or 
by diverting the water fees to their administrations. This typically occurred 
during elections, and soon after elections, water was no longer provided.   
2. The cost of electricity:  The costs of electricity could, depending on the 
location of the pump, double the cost of water to the average household.  




resulting in lower average bills for the community members that those who 
had to pay for the cost of electricity themselves.   
3. Integrated Systems:  Even for those communities who had to pay the cost of 
electricity, the actual cost assessed per household depended on the rate, and 
also the location of the pump and the communities involved.  One major 
problem cited with the program in Jacobina was that the systems were 
“integrated”, meaning that one, or even several, pumps covered several 
communities over long distances, thus, effectively, raising the price of 
electricity.  
4. Funding Source:  The supra-municipal organization was initially set up with 
financing provided by the German Development Bank (KfW), to provide 
maintenance services to communities that had received water supply 
infrastructure funded under their program.  Other funding sources have also 
financed water supply infrastructure, including the World Bank (under the 
federal program PROAGUA/SEMI-ARIDO), and municipal financing 
(through state grants).  Any community can apply to be a part of Central, 
irrespective of the origin of the funding for the infrastructure, and the Central 
program ensures that water supply is metered and that similar operating 
procedures are in place.  However, communities were selected with a variety 
of funding sources to control for any potential sampling biases between the 
communities. 
5. Size of the community:  The size of a community has been cited as potentially 




1990), specifically, as the community grows in size, the ability to provide peer 
monitoring is limited. Thus, sites were selected that were diff rent sizes, both 
in the number of households and population, as well as of the breadth of 
coverage of the water supply system. 
6. Community Association:  Part of the requirement to join the Central program 
is to have a community association that will be responsible for the 
administration of the water system on the community level.  Some 
communities had associations that pre-existed the program, whereas other  
were founded as part of the requirement to affiliate with Central.  A variation 
was sought here, both in the length of time that the organization had been in 
existence, as well as how long before, if at all, the community organization 
pre-existed the Central program. 
 
The research sites were sampled to provide some variation in some of th  
factors that could be associated with differences in participation.  However, several 
key similarities remained that could be used as points of comparison.  First, the 
communities were all affiliated with the Central program, and were between 30 
households and 5,000 inhabitants.  This meant that all communities had simplified 
water supply systems installed, hired an operator from the community trained in the 
daily maintenance of the system, all consumption was metered by hydrometers, and 
rates for the water were set by the supra-municipal maintena ce organization, 
Central.  Second, the communities were similar in climate and location; the 




have few local resources, and are dependent on state subsidies for income.74 Finally, 
all communities were similar in the administration of water supply.  All communities 
had a community association with two year term limits for the positions of president, 
vice-president, treasurer and secretary.  The associations typicall  met monthly, and 
association dues were decided by the community through a majority vote.   
While the research sites selected do not necessarily provide a point to 
generalize for all of the participating communities, they provide important insights 
into how participation is linked to outcomes of efficiency and equity within these 
communities, and can provide some insights into patterns across communities.  More 
research would have to be done on a wider set of communities to investigat  whether 
the relationships found between participation, efficiency and equity would hold on a 
broader level.  
The list of research sites was finalized to provide, first and foremost, variation 
in the levels of participation, but also to provide some variation in the factors listed 
above.  The following table provides an overview of each of the sites visited:   
                                                
74 The majority (97%) of respondents reported receiving different forms of government assistance, 
which was predominantly from Bolsa Familia.  This program provides food aid (formerly under the
program Fome Zero) and cash subsidies to families with children. Theamount of the subsidy varies.  
For families that report monthly incomes of less than R$70 per month, families receive R$68, plus 
R$22 for each child up to 15 years of age, and R$33 for each child between 16 and 17 who is enrolled 
in school.  For families that report monthly incomes of between R$70 and R$140 per month, each 
family receives R$22 per child up to 15 years of age, and R$33 for each child over 15 who is enrolled 
in school (but no standard minimum benefit).  Agricultural workers who reach retirement age receive 







































Malhada/ Barreirinho 700 114 114 
Proagua/Semi 
Arido 2006 1997 Community 
Conceição Boninal Conceição/ Bateia 1,200 200 195 Central I 1996 1985 Community 
Lagoa 
Dionizio Ibitiara 
Lagoa Dionizio, Vereda, 
Gameleirinha and 
Capoeira 2,200 445 445 Municipal 2007 1992 Prefeitura 
Medium            
Pau D'Alho Iraquara Pau D’Alho 1,400 200 158 Central I 1996 1985 Community 
Lagoa Seca Seabra Lagoa Seca 1,100 220 190 
Proagua/Semi 
Arido 2005 1985 Community 
Low            






Since this research relied on gathering local understandings and perceptions of 
efficiency, equity and participation, the majority of the methods used were qualitative 
in nature.  In particular, interviews were conducted to reveal local level 
understandings of equity, but also concepts of efficiency, and partici tion.  Data 
based on interviews typically presents problems in that it is difficult to ascertain 
whether respondents are answering truthfully.  This is especially true given that I was 
an outsider to the community, as well as foreign and white.  In the initial stages of 
research, I was traveling with Central to potential sites to get an idea of the area.  At 
this point, many respondents thought that I was associated with Central, which 
created a potential bias to the question of whether respondents were happy with the 
water supply system.  
This obvious affiliation was eliminated for research in the select d sites, since 
I hired a car to travel to the sites independently.  However, as an outsider, respondents 
were still suspicious of my motivations, despite the fact that I explained to them about 
the nature of the research project, and assured them of their anonymity.  It was only 
when I stopped recording conversations, and proceeded to use codes for respondents 
rather than names that the respondents seemed less hesitant to respond. 
Methodological triangulation was used to address issues of perception-based 
data by balancing responses with data sources available.  Sources for this included 
financial data of the associations, as well as from the supra-municipal level, coverage 
rates, access and connection information, non-payment rates, and historical 




A second problem with the data was that I did not end up with a balanced 
number of sites for each of the rankings of participation.  In initial conversations with 
Central, I indicated I was looking for two communities in each category of 
participation.  However, in my notes I mis-labled one of the communities as low 
participation, and proceeded to select the community as a good exampl.  It was only 
during the course of the research that it became clear that the community association 
was clearly very active, and, in asking about the community again, it became clear 
that it was, indeed, a high participation community.  Thus, in the final s te selection, I 
have three high participation communities, two medium participation communities, 
and one low participation community.   
Description of Data 
(a) General description of the communities researched 
The communities selected were relatively typical of communities in the region 
and part of the Central program.  All of the communities selected were rural, and had 
less than 5000 inhabitants75.  The average population of the communities was 1,179. 
Within each community, snowball sampling was done to conduct semi-structured 
interviews.  An initial walk-through of the community was done, and then the 
president and operator were contacted for interviews.  After the in erview with the 
operator, the operator provided an overview of the water system, such as the location 
of the pump, the description of daily operation and maintenance, the location of the 
                                                
75 The Central program is active in communities with between 30 and 5,000 inhabitants.  The 
minimum is required for installation of a simplified water supply scheme, since the cost of the pump 
and other hardware makes financial sense only with a minimum number of consumers.  The state water 




hydrometers of some of the houses.  During this walk through of the community, I 
would meet several residents, and ask them for some of their time to talk to them in 
greater detail about the water system.  Once these interviews w re set up, I would 
conduct the interview in a private room in the person’s house.  Names wer  not 
recorded to ensure the anonymity of the respondents.   
 In each community, one group interview was also conducted to better observe 
the interaction of the community members in how they discussed the questions and 
issues pertaining to the water supply systems.  The following table provides an 
overview of the interviews conducted in each community: 
Table 4: Interviews conducted during field research 











700 1,200 2,200 1,400 1,100 475 7,075 
# of focus 
group 
discussions 
1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
# of key 
informant 
interviews 




12 13 14 18 15 12 84 
Total 16 17 16 22 18 17 106 
(b) Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents 
The majority of the respondents were active in subsistence agricultu e (83%).  
The other economic activities included retired (where the respondents id not specify 
their occupation), school teacher, shopkeeper and other.  Shopkeepers included any 
type of shop, and including a computer shop in one community.  In one community, 




involved in construction work elsewhere, such as in Salvador.  The table below shows 
the economic activity of respondents (n=84). 












Illiteracy rates in Bahia in general and in Seabra in particular have been on a 
downward trend.  However, illiteracy rates remain higher in the semi-arid region than 
elsewhere in Bahia, which still has some of the higher illiteracy rates in Brazil.  
Table 5: Illiteracy rates 
Illiteracy rate (%) 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Seabra 63.9 45.8 35.1 21.0 
Bahia    19.376 
Brazil 33.6 25.5 20.1 13.6 
Source: IGBE 
Literacy rates in the communities studied varied quite a bit.  While no precise 
literacy rates were available in each of the research sites, l eracy rates seemed to be 
high in Bebedouro (low participation community) Conceição, and Lagoa Dionizio 
(high participation communities), and very low in Beco e Sauquinho (high 
                                                




participation community), Pau D’Alho and Lagoa Seca (medium participa on 
communities).  The chart below presents the number of people who responded t  th  
question of whether or not they were literate by community: 














































# of respondents l iterate
# of respondents i l literate
 
(d) Gender 
The gender of respondents was fairly well distributed: 47 percent of the 
respondents were male and 53 were female.  This pattern is close to the gender ratio 
at large, where the district of Seabra reports a male to female ratio of 49.77 to 50.22 
percent (IGBE 2000).  The gender distribution of respondents was not always equal, 































The primary reason for this was that since many questions asked respondents 
about their community association, the knowledge and ability to answer questions in 
the interview depended on the role of the community association in the community.  
In Pau D’Alho, for example, women tended to dominate the community assocition, 
since it dealt primarily with issues pertaining to local schools and state cash transfer 
programs.  In Lagoa Seca, on the other hand, men were more active in the community 
association, since the association dealt with issues related to agriculture (i.e. seed 
provision, tractor rental, etc.). 
(e) Age 
The age range of respondents ranged from 16 to 68, with an average age of 
43.1, and a median age of 42.  The median age of respondents is higher than the 
average age that was given for most communities (closer to 3477). However, young 
people were typically not involved in the community association or with ater issues.  
Attempts to interview young people (between 18 and 25) typically reveal d that they 
                                                
77 This figure is not precise. Key informants (such as the association president, school teachers, and 




had very low knowledge of the community association, and were not interested in 
participating.  
C. Variables: 
 Many of the debates over the participatory approach make use of a wide 
variety of definitions of participation, efficiency and equity.  Many scholars ag ee that 
participation can occur on a continuum, and there is much discussion over when 
participation is meaningful.  Outcomes of efficiency are also more c mplicated than 
would seem at first.  Many different types of efficiency exist, even within debates 
over outcomes of water management.  For example, outcomes of technical, allo tive 
and administrative efficiency are all, for different reasons, considered to be important 
priorities in water management.  Similarly, a variety of types of equity exist, 
including allocation and voice.  In addition, equity, as different from outcomes of 
equality, in a contextually driven outcome, where what is considered to be “fair” 
varies based on the context and culture.  The following section lays out the definitions 
for each of the terms used in this dissertation.  
(d) Participation 
As noted in Chapter 2, participation within the context of community managed 
services is defined as the contributions in time, energy, and experience that 
consumers and interested local people provide to organizations in which they av  a 
direct stake (Darcy 1993).  In order to measure these contributions, levels of 
participation were defined based on (i) the percentage of the community that was a 




with some regularity; (iii) the perceptions of community members as to how many 
members actively participated; and (iv) the perceptions of the community members as 
to how open the participatory process was.  This definition encompassed both 
quantitative and qualitative measures, and was cross-referenced with perceptions by 
program staff of Central, as well as state government officials.  In many ways, the 
definition used relates also to Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), where 
community members could exercise voice (considered “active” partici tion through 
voicing opinions but also through contributing time, goods, or other services), or 
remain loyal (conceptualized for the purposes of this dissertation as attending 
meetings even if nothing was said).     
(e) Efficiency 
Efficiency is broadly defined as maximizing outputs with a given set of 
inputs.  As noted in Chapter 2, efficiency within the provision of water services is 
generally measured along dimensions of technical and allocative eff ciencies, where 
technical efficiency refers to the “efficiency with which resources are used for a given 
end” (Osmani 2007) and allocative efficiency refers to the best allocation of resources 
according to consumer preferences (ibid), including quantity and price.  
A water system that is technically efficient is one where water losses are kept 
to a minimum. This is dependent on both the quality of construction, and the 
continued operation and maintenance of the system that, if done well, will cont nue to 
keep water losses relatively low.  A water system that is llocatively efficient is one 
where each user is charged for the costs they generate.  In an ide l situation, 




is relatively difficult to ascertain.  Thus, typically a water system that is allocatively 
efficient is one where each unit of water is priced at the long term marginal cost of 
production.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, a further measure of efficiency was 
introduced to measure the relative administrative efficiency of the community 
organization.  This measure was introduced based on the definition put forth by 
Weber (1921) on administrative efficiency within direct democracies.  A tendency 
towards efficiency was found when technical experts or other community elites 
exercised a disproportionate level of authority within the community organization that 
may serve to increase the level of efficiency with which administrative tasks are 
performed, but would come at a cost to equity.   
(f) Equity 
Equity78 tends to be a subjective measure of how goods should be distributed 
within a particular society.  As noted in Chapter 2, equitable outcomes can range f om 
absolute equality in the provision of goods or services, to outcomes that are not equal 
in allocation but are considered to be fair.  To arrive at a working definition of equity, 
then, field research was conducted to arrive at a better understanding of what 
community members considered to be fair.  In this regard, the definition was left open 
to be defined locally, where responses within the communities would identify the 
precise levels of equity that were considered to be fair.  For the most part, the field 
                                                
78 Equity is a distinctly different term from equality, where the former entails a subjective measure of 
what is equitable in society. Thus, what can appear to be unequal in one society, could be viewed as 




research revealed that the working definition of equity was that all community 
members had equal access to water supply services. 
D. Methods 
 In order to measure the compatibility of efficiency and equity within 
participatory water management organizations, the research used different techniques 
to measure outcomes of efficiency and equity. It then sought to compare these 
outcomes in participatory organizations that presented variations in levels of 
participation.  Specifically, the research measured technical, allocative, and 
organizational efficiency, as well as allocative and organization l equity, since these 
measures are commonly used when evaluating the efficiency and equity of water 
supply systems (Global Water Partnership 2003).  These measures are presented 
below. 
(a) The Allocative Tradeoff 
The allocative tradeoff argues that outcomes of efficiency and equity are 
incompatible processes, and will inevitably come at a tradeoff to each other.  Thus, 
this part of the research sought to establish outcomes of allocative effici ncy, on the 
one hand, and allocative equity, on the other.  Once established, the levels of 
efficiency and equity could be compared to determine if both werehigh (indicating 
compatibility) or whether one was high and the other was low (indicating  tradeoff).  
The measures of allocative efficiency are given below: 




Price of water, 
marginal cost of water 
Comparing the tariff system to the 
cost of producing one cubic meter 









two are equal.  When price is equal 
to the marginal cost of water, then 




Consumer’s satisfaction with the 
price and quantity of water received 










Cost recovery Cost recovery indicates appropriate 
pricing of water to create optimal 








Subsidies Subsidies to the water system 
indicate pricing of water is not 
adequate to ensure continued 
operation and maintenance of 









Because measurements of allocative efficiency rely primarily on pricing data, the 
level that most of this data was collected was at the supra-municipal level.  This 
meant that a community-by-community breakdown of allocative effici ncy was not 
possible beyond the perceptions of consumers. 
The measures of allocative equity are given in the table below: 




Equity of coverage The percentage of the population 
that is covered by water supply 
services provides an indication of 






Perception of fairness Consumer perception of the 
fairness of the system provides an 









 Because equity is a subjective measure of fairness, the measurements of 




(b) The Organizational Tradeoff 
The organizational tradeoff argues that administrative processes that will tend 
to favor efficiency will, over time, undermine equality within a democratic 
organization.  One area of contribution of this research to debates on efficiency and 
equity of water supply systems is the application of the institutional literature to 
address issues of administration and organization.  These variables were consid red to 
be outcomes of participation, and evidence to this end was gathered based on the 
following: 
 




Outcome of efficiency Outcomes of community 
meetings and the decisions made 
provide insight as to whether the 








Perceptions of technical 
expertise 
Concentration of technical 
expertise will make decision-













Concentration of leaders in 
administrative positions of 
community organization makes 













 Concerns over efficient administration within the community organization are 
expected to lead to diminished equality of participants.  If the opini ns of one group 




(as in the case of elites), then the opinions of others in the group will hold less 
validity and equality is compromised.  Because this is mostly a process-based 
approach and dependent on perceptions, the measures of organizational equity w re 
largely qualitative in nature.  The following table outlines these measures: 




Voice weighting How equally voices and opinions 
are weighed in the community 
organization gives an indication 
of how fair the community 
organization is in its 













Equity in membership Determine the procedures and 
rules in place to ensure equal 











Equality within the 
community/community 
organization? 
Respondents provide perceptions 
of the community organization 
based on levels of participation 
that are broken down by age, 
gender, and wealth to determine 





(c) The Development Model 
The development model argues that participation leads to improved outcomes of 
efficiency and equity vis-à-vis bureaucratic management. The research did not have 
access to timeline data, and so could not address this claim. Instead, what the research 
did was to establish the links between participation and the outcomes of equity and 




accountability, peer monitoring, and preference revelation that, in turn, are linked to 
outcomes of efficiency and equity.   
The participatory structure is said to result in greater effici ncy through 
improved accountability.  Levels of efficiency can also be increased through reducing 
‘hidden action’79 through mechanisms of “peer monitoring” or increased sense of 
“ownership” over the system.  The following table provides an overview of the 
measures used:   
Measure Description Method Used 
Peer 
Monitoring 
Participation is expected to act as a peer 
monitoring mechanism that will result in 
reduced negligence and improve transparency, 
leading to improved efficiency of the system.  
 
Questions to respondents of 
how they monitor the financial 




Hidden action can occur when there is no direct 
oversight of the operation and maintenance of 
the system, and negligent work occurs. 
Participation is expected to reduce hidden action 
through monitoring the technical workers. 
Questions to Respondents of 
how they monitor the operator 
Ownership A sense of ownership over the system is 
expected to lead to greater care in maintaining 
the system 
Questions to respondents of 
their sense of ownership; 
observation of levels of 
maintenance 
 
Participation is also expected to lead to greater equity within a community 
user group through mechanisms of institutional accountability and throug  improving 
access of all members to be able to voice concerns equally.  These were measured in 
the following way: 
                                                
79 ‘Hidden action’ is an aspect of informational asymmetry whereby negligent work goes unnoticed 





Measure Description Method Used 
Voice and 
Inclusion 
Inequitable systems base decisions 
only on the most powerful or most 
heard. Ensuring that all members are 
heard and included in the decision-
making process will mean that the 
allocative decisions reached will 
reflect the mean of all preferences in 
the community 
 
Questions to respondents on how 
meetings were run, whether they 
felt heard, whether everyone had 
an equal voice 
Participant observation of 
community meetings 
Accountability Measuring systems of accountability 
through provide a check on 
distributory policies that have been 
inequitable. 
Questions on how operators and 
board members have been held 
accountable  
Participant observation of 
community meetings 
 
 This chapter presented the methods used during the field research th t was 
conducted across six communities in Bahia, Brazil in April 2009.  Annex 2 presents 
the questions used during field research.  The next section presents th  specific 
findings from the field research that related to questions of efficiency and equity 




Chapter 5: Findings 
This section presents the findings from the field research conducted in six 
communities that are a part of the Central program in Bahia, Brazil.  The research 
aimed to address questions of the extent to which equity and efficiency are mutually 
compatible processes, and to what extent they may generate tradeoffs.  As a result, 
the presentation of this section will first present the findings on allocative efficiency 
and equity, since the literature argues for a tradeoff between these goals.  Next, the 
tradeoff between organizational efficiency and equity will be discussed, followed by a 
presentation of the extent to which goals of both equity and efficiency were achieved.  
All in all, support was found for all three models; outcomes of alloctive equity and 
organizational efficiency were achieved simultaneously, but these both came at a 
tradeoff to their respective forms of efficiency and equity. 
A. The Allocative Tradeoff 
 The allocative tradeoff, understood as the tension between cost recovery and 
sustainability and affordability, was present in the pricing system of the Central water 
supply system.  This was determined using several measures of efficiency to 
determine how financially sustainable and allocatively efficient the Central system is.  
These measures were then contrasted with evidence on coverage rates and tariffs, as 
well as with perceptions of fairness and affordability.  The evidence suggested that 
the system was very fair and considered affordable by all users.  However, the prices 
that Central charges for water are subsidized both implicitly and explicitly, indicating 





Three common measures of allocative efficiency in water supply systems are 
water pricing, customer satisfaction surveys, cost recovery, and subsidies.  A second 
measure of overall efficiency is technical efficiency.  Allocative efficiency, as 
measured by how close the system allocates water according to consumer 
preferences, is measured through consumer preferences and pricingsystems.  Cost 
recovery, also indicates allocative efficiency as measured by how effectively costs of 
production are recouped through tariffs.  Technically efficient sys ems limit system 
losses, as defined by the IWA as “non-revenue water”, and include system leakages 
as well as other losses and unauthorized consumption.80 The water system, as 
measured by these three measures of efficiency, was not found t be completely 
efficient. 
(a) Water pricing and customer satisfaction  
Allocative efficiency is measured by how closely water resources are 
distributed to consumer preferences.  This was measured in two different ways.  First, 
consumers were asked whether they received the water that they desired.  All 
respondents indicated that the amount of water that they were happy with the quantity 
of water that they received (100%; n=86).  When these results were broken down by 
community, the results varied only slightly; although all respondents said that they 
were happy with the quantity of water, respondents in the medium and low 
participation communities were more likely to list complaints over the quality of 
                                                
80 Non-Revenue Water includes real losses, from leakages, as well as apparent losses (unauthorized 




water (n=9), the cost of electricity (n=9), or that water supply did not suffice for uses 
outside of the home (n=2) 81.   
The second measure of allocative efficiency compares the price of water to th  
marginal cost of producing water, or P=MC.  Price is typically compared to marginal 
cost because the price of water (or the tariff) approximates con umer’s willingness to 
pay for one unit of water, and the marginal cost represents the cost to produce that 
same unit of water.  If these are equal, the system is said to be allocatively efficient.  
In practice, water pricing structures often have different rate categories that apply 
different categories by consumption rates, by time periods, and that reflect different 
types of charges (e.g. connection charges, special rates for low income users, etc.).  
The typical goal for a water supplier is (i) to generate rev nues that cover costs; (ii) to 
design costs that are allocatively efficient (to allocate costs for different types of 
users); and (iii) to determine rates that will signal to customers to use water efficiently 
for the overall sustainability of the resource (Hanneman 2006: 2).  Fulfilling each of 
these goals necessitates perfect information, which is often not available, and, in 
practice, many water utilities focus on economic efficiency for their pricing 
strategies, or, when price is equal to marginal cost.82 
For the purposes of this dissertation, price and marginal costs were calculated 
at the supra-municipal level (based on data available at Central’s offices).  This was 
done for two reasons.  First, data are not collected at the community levels for price 
                                                
81 Central’s position is that the water is priced progressively to ensure an adequate minimum 
consumption per household of 10 cubic meters, and that the system is not designed for irrigation 
purposes. 
82 Marginal cost for water utilities differs over the short and the long run. In the short-run, capital costs 
are fixed, and marginal costs come from the operating and management costs.  In the long-term, 
marginal costs accounts for capital depreciation, in addition to operating and management costs.  Thus, 




and marginal costs.  Second, the prices are determined by Central, a d, as the water 
utility, it makes most sense to examine these variables at Central.  The price of water 
was taken from water bills collected in the field that showed th  tariff paid for water 
for different consumption rates.  Central charges a flat fee of R$5,00 for the first 10 
m3 of water (irrespective of actual consumption rates).  Prices aft r the first 10 m3 
follow a progressive block tariff system.  The tariffs are given below: 
Table 6:  Tariff system for water supply under Central 
Volume of water (m3)  Tariff per m3 (R$) Tariff per m3 (US$)83 
Up to 10 0.50 0.27 
11-15 0.68 0.29 
16-20 0.81 0.35 
21-25 0.95 0.41 
26+ 1.12 0.61 
Source: own calculations from water bills 
 
Because of data limitations84, the calculations for the marginal cost of water are close 
approximations.  This was done in the following manner: 
1. Calculating the volume of water produced per year: Central does not keep 
records on the volume of water produced, since individual water pumps cover 
one, or at most a few, communities.  Central did have records for the years 
2003, 2004, and 2005 of the average liters consumed per person per day 
(which were 60, 63 and 55).  In order to approximate the total volume of 
water produced, an average of these three numbers was taken (59.33), 
                                                
83 Exchange rate of USD1 to R$2.32 was used which repres nts the median exchange rate for January 
to June 2009. 
84 Central does not keep records of either the short-term or the long-term marginal costs, although 
financial data on the operating and management costs were available.  Data were also not available for 




multiplied by 365 days (to arrive at annual consumption85) and multiplied by 
the total population served in 2008 (36,355).  The total annual consumption of 
water in 2008 was approximated to be 787,328,117 liters, or 787,328 m386. 
2. Calculating the cost of producing one cubic meter of water: Financial data 
from Central provided the operating and management costs for 2008, which 
were R$ 537,777.  The total volume of water consumed was divided by the 
operating and management costs to derive an approximate cost of producing 
one cubic meter of water, estimated to be R$0.68.  Since more accurate data 
on the volume of water produced, or the marginal cost of production, was not 
available, these calculations approximate the short-term marginal costs.  The 
reason for this is that the gap between short- and long-term marginal costs in 
the water industry is typically quite high, given high capital intensity 
(Hanneman 2006: 3).  Industry standards indicate that prices should never be 
set below short-term marginal costs, since revenues would not cover simple 
operating and management costs.  But there is wide variation in how much 
higher prices are set (ibid).   
The figure below presents the calculations on the price versus the marginal cost of 
water in the Central system. 
                                                
85 This measure is problematic because it only approximates the volume of water consumed and does 
not account for system leakages, or other losses.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that the system losses 
are not high, meaning that these two figures would be fairly close, but this remains a rough 
approximation, at best 




Figure 16: Price versus Marginal Cost of Water in the Central System 













Price per m3 Cost of producing 1 m3 of water
 
  
What is clear from the figure above is that the initial volumes of water are 
priced below the marginal cost of producing water.  However, Central uses a block 
tariff system, whereby consumers pay higher per unit costs the mor  they consume, 
thereby shifting some of the cost burden to those who can afford it.  Interviews with 
Central indicated that the majority of households that partake in the program use 
around ten cubic meters of water per month (86 percent) (Geraldo 2009). This 
highlights an important tension in setting tariffs to remain affordable on the one hand, 
and to price water for improved conservation of water resources.  Block tariff systems 
are typically credited with maximizing objectives of equity and water use efficiency, 
and are weaker in fulfilling goals of revenue collection or cost recovery.  The table 
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Source: Varela-Ortega, 2003. 
  
As seen from the table above, blockrate tariff systems are also expected to 
encourage water use efficiency, and there is some evidence that pricing strategies can 
lead to improved resource conservation87. The evidence from the Central program 
shows that average household water consumption rates are far lower than for many 
water supply and sanitation systems (although some of this might be due to the fact 
that these systems lacked sanitation facilities).  The average consumption of water per 
person per day was estimated at 96 liters. This was based on calculations from water 
bills provided by Central. Similar statistics show that this is on the lower end, 
indicating that the tariff system is linked with lower water consumption. The table 
below shows averages of water consumption for Bahia, and elsewhere in Brazil: 
                                                
87 The evidence for this is not conclusive. As Nayar and James (unpublished) found in their study of 
Indian villages, improved conservation occurred not as a result of pricing strategies, but because of 




Table 8: Water Consumption (liters per person per day) 
State/Region Consumption (liters per person per day) 
Central program (April 2009) 96 
Bahia  122.1 
North Region 134.1 
Northeast Region  114.8 
Southeast Region 173.8 
South Region 134.9 
Federal District  182.9 
Central West Region 145.2 
Brazil  149.6 
USA 575.0 
Source: Own calculations; SNIS 2008, HDR 2006 
 One reason often correlated with improved resource conservation practices 
that the pricing strategies more adequately reflect the value of water.  If this 
relationship were to hold in the Central program, then communities that absorbed the 
full cost of water (including the administrative costs and utilities) would consume 
fewer liters per household per day.  The figure below presents the average liters 
consumed per person per day compared to the average water bill for the community. 
 
Figure 17: Average consumption (liters per person per day) and average water 






































 The figure above shows that this there was no real relationship between those 
communities that paid closer to the full cost of water (as repres nt d by higher bills), 
and the number of liters consumed per person per day in that community.  What the 
figure does seem to indicate, however, is that fewer liters per person were consumed 
in the communities with high participation.  This could be as a result of social 
mobilization campaigns carried out in these communities that focused on techniques 
to reduce water consumption.  These practices, more than pricing strategies, have 
been found more effective in places like India at reducing water consumption rates 
(Nayar and James, Forthcoming). 
In addition, the relationship between the pricing system and water us  
efficiency did not seem to hold when comparing similar data at the state level.  While, 
Bahia’s average consumption (liters per person per day) was 122.1, and the average 
from the sample communities was 96, the tariffs charged by both water supply 
services were similar.  This would seem to indicate that the pric s charged for water 
supply services do not necessarily result in reduced water consumption.  Embasa’s 
tariffs also use a blockrate tariff system that charges a flat fee of R$12,85 for the first 
ten cubic meters of water (as compared to a system wide average of R$11,96 charged 
by Central, inclusive of electricity).  However, unlike Central, Embasa also has a 
“social tariff” that subsidizes low income households.  These households are targeted 
through the federal government’s targeted cash transfer program (Bolsa Familia). The 
social tariff for the first 10 cubic meters is R$6,05.  The majority of the households 
surveyed in this research received cash subsidies under the Bolsa Familia program, 




average household water bill by 50 percent.  Embasa’s tariff structure is presented in 
the table below.   
Table 9:  Tariff structure for water supply (treated), Embasa  








Up to 10 m3 R$ 12,85 p/ month R$6,05 p/ month 
11 - 15 m3 R$ 3,59 p/ m3 R$ 2,65 p/m3 
16 - 20 m3 R$ 3,83 p/ m3 R$ 2,88 p/m3 
21 - 25 m3 R$ 4,28 p/ m3 R$ 4,28 p/m3 
26 - 30 m3 R$ 4,76 p/ m3 R$ 4,76 p/m3 
31 - 40 m3 R$ 5,23 p/ m3 R$ 5,23 p/m3  
41 - 50 m3 R$ 5,71 p/ m3 R$ 5,71 p/m3 
> 50 m3 R$ 6,66 p/ m3 R$ 6,66 p/m3 
Source: EMBASA 2009 
 While some respondents surveyed indicated that they would also like to b  
part of the Embasa program (5%; n=86), the majority of respondents said that the 
Central program was very reliable (95%; n=86), since the program provided 
uninterrupted water service, and Embasa’s service was reported to suffer from 
frequent service outages (n=12). While no precise figures were available for 
Embasa’s service outages to corroborate the frequency of interruptions, a survey 
conducted on the national level indicated that service outages are very high in Brazil: 
of the water supply companies reporting (49 percent of the total), 73 percent reported 
supply outages (SNIS Diagnostico 2008, p 118). 
(b) Cost Recovery 
Cost recovery ratios were calculated from the financial data provided by the 




tariff charges cover the cost of operating and maintaining the wat r supply system.  
Since one of the goals of the Central program is to be financially v ble, this measure 
is especially important.  
Cost recovery ratios were measured based on the sales and receipts from the
financial data provided by Central.  
Table 10: Central’s financial position (2008) 
Item Value 
(R$) 
 Sales          385,055.00  
 Receipts          380,488.00  
 Non-payment               4,567.00  
 Non-payment (%)                        1.2  
 Expenses          438,195.00  
    - Administrative          131,458.00  
    - Operational          306,737.00  
  Non-liquid assets (e.g. pipes, equipment, etc.)          179,982.00  
  Bank account balance           197,463.00  
  Tariff for first 10 m3 of water 88                      5.00  
To calculate the cost recovery ratio of Central, the total expenses (R$438,195) 
(outputs) were divided by the total sales (R$385,055) (inputs).  The ratio for this 
calculation was 0.87872, or 87.9%.  When this calculation was done dividing the total 
expenses by the actual receipts (R$380,488), this ratio dropped to 0.8683, or 86.8%.  
Both of these ratios show that Central does not cover its costs.   
However, two things should be noted.  First, Central’s financial position has 
improved since the first evaluation in 2006.  At that point, non-payment rates had 
increased to 10.64%, due, in large part, to corruption at the association level; users 
paid bills at the association, but the association did not forward the wat r fees to 
                                                
88 This financial data is accurate as of September 2008. At the time of field research, the financial 
analysis for the calendar year 2008 was not yet available. In 2007 and 2008, the tariff for the first 10





Central.  In 2007, Central began requiring direct payment from consumers to Central, 
which has significantly reduced the non-payment rate (to 1.2% in 2008), and has 
raised the actual receipts.  As of the end of 2007, however, Central faced a shortfall of 
R$171,154 in receipts from accumulated non-payment.   
Data from 2008 shows Central to be operating at a deficit (R$438,195 in 
expenses and only R$385,055 in sales for a total operating deficit of R$53,140.  This 
deficit has been cushioned in the short term by a fund that was set up by KfW upon 
exiting in order to bolster the sustainability of the program.  The balance on the bank 
account, as of September 2008, was R$197,46389.  One reason given for the operating 
deficit is that the optimal number of household connections has not yet been attained.  
Since water supply programs are capital intensive, there are economies of scale that 
need to be attained before the system no longer runs at a deficit.  An economic study 
cited by Central staff indicated that the optimal number of connections for Central 
was 8,000 (Geraldo 2009).  At present, the number of connections is 7,426. It is 
presumed that when Central reaches its optimal number, and if non-payment remains 
low, then Central’s expenses will more closely match receipts. 
Second, it is important to note that very few water supply companies cover 
their costs. One study, for example, showed that most water supply companies 
operate at a financial deficit, that has, at least until recently been covered by financial 
backing from governments (Swai, unpublished, see also Oliveira 2008).  The state 
water company, EMBASA, does show a consistent profit in its financial profile, but 
                                                
89 I was not able to determine the original amount of this fund, but similar financial data for 2007 




arguably much of this profit is derived from the fact that it does not provide water to 
“unprofitable” areas, and leaves much of the state without water supply service. 
(c) Subsidies 
One further aspect of allocative efficiency that was measured was the level of 
subsidies in the system.  Systems that are able to recover costs without any subsidies 
are considered to be efficient (and also sustainable).  Several types of subsidies were 
uncovered.  First, in some communities, the local government (prefeitura) paid for 
the electricity costs.  This reduced the average water bill per household significantly; 
households averaged R$10-15 per month for water when electricity and other fees 
were included, whereas bills averaged R$6-8 for those communities wh re the costs 
of electricity were paid for by the local government.  The costof the water bill was 
not related to the level of participation in the community: the communities where the 
local government paid the electricity were both in the high and the low participation 
categories. 
Table 11:  Electricity subsidies 
System by level of participation Electricity paid by 
High   
Beco e Saquinho Community 
Conceição Community 
Lagoa Dionizio Municipal Government 
Medium  
Pau D'Alho Community 
Lagoa Seca Community 
Low  
Bebedouro Municipal Government 
 
A further subsidy to the system is in the pricing structure of Central’s water 
supply.  As the section above showed, the price of producing water for he fi st 10 m3 




for reasons of affordability (Geraldo 2009), creating an implicit subsidy in the system.  
Residents were aware of this problem: 
“I think maintenance is expensive, sometimes I worry that the money we pay 
won’t be enough. We couldn’t do without water. And I’m not sure if we could 
afford to pay more” –Male 37, Beco e Sauquinho 
 
A final subsidy to the program is that the community organizations took over 
the systems after the hardware had been installed, effectively creating a subsidy for 
this.  Water supply hardware is typically quite expensive, and the Central system 
provides meters for each household to measure consumption.  These costs are not 
transferred to consumers, through connection or other types of fees.  Central does 
calculate depreciation of fixed assets, although, given how capital intensive some 
equipment can be (especially pumps), Central staff indicated that the State Rural 
Engineering Company (CERB) often stepped in to provide these, when needed. 
(d) Technical Efficiency 
Technical efficiency of the system is an important measure of the long term 
financial sustainability of the system.  Tariffs set to short-term marginal costs will not 
cover the longer term costs of replacing critical infrastructure that ensures the 
continued delivery of water services.  Since I do not have data to calculate short term, 
versus long-term marginal costs, one measure of how well the syst m does in 
maintaining the water infrastructure can be assessed through water losses.  While it is 
not a perfect measure, in general, the better a water system is maintained over the 
long term, the fewer water losses are present.  High system leakages would increase 




be pumped for the desired amount to reach consumers.  Thus, limited leakages in the 
system ensure that the cost of producing each unit of water is maximized. 
Where historically, water losses was calculated as system leakages, recent 
attempts to standardize industry practice has highlighted various elements of what is 
termed “non-revenue water”.  Non-revenue included system leakages, but also 
accounts for unbilled consumption that also counts as system losses.  The
International Water Association (IWA) defines NRW with the table below: 










































Connections up to 




Unfortunately, comprehensive data on water losses is not collected in the 




most a few, communities, the data would have to be collected at an individual 
community level.  At present, when leaks do occur, the operator does his best to fix 
them, and, when that does not work, Central is called to replace the pipes or other 
faulty equipment.   
In 2008, Central sampled the water losses in one community system to get an 
idea of technical efficiency. The variance in production and consumption rates for 
one water supply system was measured over a period of seven months to get an idea 
of how technically efficient the water systems are.  The results of this showed that the 
volume of water produced was 25,562 m3 and the volume consumed was 22,082 m3, 
indicating losses of 13.61% (Geraldo 2009).  This figure is quite low compared to 
EMBASA where losses were listed as 30 percent (EMBASA 2008).  This also 
compares well to Brazil’s water supply companies in general, where water losses 
were between 20 and 80 percent in 2008 (SNIS Diagnostico 2008). While some of the 
discrepancy may be due to the particular water system measured and relatively crude 
measures (it does not account, for example, of unbilled aspects of non-revenue 
water), the initial assessment of water losses in the Central system is quite low. 
Measuring Equity 
Equity was measured primarily through qualitative measures, since the 
notions of what is considered “equitable” and “fair” is locally determined. In terms of 
allocative equity, the questions focused on what respondents considered to be fair in 
terms of distribution and allocation of water resources.  This also included their 




(a) Defining allocative equity 
To measure outcomes of equity, first questions were asked of respondents as 
to what they considered to be “fair” in terms of distribution and alloc tion.  For most 
respondents, the concept of “fair” was built around two themes: (a) that everyone got 
water (83%; n=86) and (b) that usage was transparent through the use of hydrometers 
(86%; n=86).  Respondents indicated that equity of access was important in notions 
of fairness; many responses indicated that the system was fair because “everyone gets 
water” (78%; n=86). Some respondents indicated that this was particul rly important 
given that unequal allocation had caused problems before (in Beco e Saqiunho, and in 
Bebedouro). Most respondents, irrespective of gender and level of participation, 
indicated that they considered the system to be more fair than before (56%; n=55). 
The other prominent theme that emerged when respondents were asked about 
equity was that the system allowed for households to pay for the amount of water 
they used (64%; n=86), and that the hydrometer ensured transparency in consumption 
and billing.  Several respondents indicated that the system relies on hydrometers (“we 
have hydrometers”; n=14) in response to questions about how distribution and 
allocation issues were addressed.  Several respondents also indicated that everyone 
gets water because they have hydrometers (n=12), or that everyone gets water 
because households pay for what they use (n=15). 
(b) Allocative equity 
Respondents were asked about outcomes of allocative equity through 




indicated that they did not discuss issues of allocation, since this was regulated by 
hydrometers (64%, n=86).  Most respondents said that they believed allocation of 
water to be very fair (73%; n=86).  Of those who said it was very fair, most 
respondents said that this was because the system was regulated by hy rometers 
(n=22).  Hydrometers ensured equitable allocation because consumption is 
transparent, and because the progressive tariff system combined wth measuring 
consumption meant that water was available to everyone.  This was particularly 
evident in Bebedouro, where prior to Central, the municipal government had supplied 
water, and water was only available for half of the community.  When C ntral took 
over the system and installed hydrometers, consumption dropped (as is evidenced by 
a drop in the monthly electricity bills from R$400 per month, to little more than 
R$125 per month), and water is now available for all community members. 
Respondents from these communities noted that Central was more fair in matters of 
distribution (n=8). 
(c) Coverage rates 
One further way that equity was measured was to do a simple accounting of 
the number of households in the community that were covered by the program.  
CENTRAL in Seabra keeps some records on this, and it shows that in the whole 
system, 98 percent of the populations are covered.  Within the communities, there 
were typically only a handful of households that were not a part of the program. A 
few were cut off for non-payment of their water bills, and some had access to private 




Table 13:   Coverage rates of water supply systems (2008) 











High     
Beco e Saquinho 115 115 100% 
Conceição 200 195 98% 
Lagoa Dionizio 442 442 100% 
Medium    
Pau D'Alho 200 158 75% 
Lagoa Seca 220 190 86% 
Low    
Bebedouro 120 119 99% 
 
Rates of non-payment and disconnections were highest in the medium 
participation communities of Pau D’Alho and Lagoa Seca.  These communities were 
facing several months of drought and several consecutive years of low rainfall which 
had made living on agriculture precarious.  Rates of outmigration had increased 
significantly; while there were no figures available, one third (33.3%; n=18) of the 
respondents in Pau D’Alho had a husband or someone in the family who worked 
outside of the community (as a temporary worker, in construction or i ther jobs in 
Salvador).   
The Allocative Tradeoff 
Based on the findings of allocative equity and efficiency, the classic allocative 
tradeoff exists in Central’s water supply system.  The allocative tradeoff for public 
service provision is typically visible in the tension between affordability (or, equity of 
access) and efficiency (or, cost recovery).  Allocative efficin y is attained when 




most.  However, this goal conflicts with the distribution for all consumers, where 
everyone needs water and should have equal access to water. 
Public water utilities typically face budget shortages in the attempt to maintain 
affordability.  However, if public subsidies do not exist for the water system, then the 
issue of sustainability becomes important, and the need to recover costs for adequate 
maintenance becomes a challenge.  Within the Central water supply system, the 
findings indicate that the program is allocatively equitable, as measur d by coverage 
rates, and perceptions of equity.  Everyone in the community who would like to b  a 
part of the water system will have a hydrometer installed and c  opt to join and 
participate in the community organization.  In addition, most respondents said that the 
allocation of the water was fair and that the amounts sufficed for household 
consumption.  
Broad coverage (98% system wide, and between 80 to 100% in the 
communities sampled) indicates that the tariffs are affordable to the majority, if not 
all, households in the system.  Households are disconnected from the sysem for 
cumulative non-payment (three months, and even then, if it is a financial issue, they 
can apply to Central for a monthly installment plan to pay off their d bt).  While non-
payment is not inactive of an inability to pay, it is nevertheless impressively low in 
the system, indicating widespread affordability. 
However, this affordability has come at a cost to allocative effici ncy and cost 
recovery.  Allocative efficiency is typically maximized when water is allocated to 
those consumers who will pay the most for it.  The Central pricing structure includes 




burden to consumers who use the most water (and, by extension, are willing to pay 
for it).  But there are still implicit subsidies in the systems that are in place to ensure 
equal access for all consumers.  These include the pricing structure of Central, but 
also subsidies for hardware, such as pumps, pipes and meters. Thus, allocative equity 




B. The Organizational Tradeoff 
 The organizational tradeoff, as described by Weber (1978), indicates that even 
local level organizations that promote equality can often be undermin d by concerns 
over efficient administration, or by questions pertaining to technical efficiency.  Both 
of these concerns result in a preference being given to those participants who have the 
required time and/or knowledge to the detriment of others in the organizatio .  Thus, 
while the organization may create conditions for a direct democracy with equally 
weighted voices for all, these arrangements, Weber (1978) argues, are often 
undermined and typically short-lived.  This research found that within each of the 
community organizations, some form of elite capture had occurred, indicati g that 
efficient administration tended to win out over concerns of equality.  Technical 
knowledge was also required, although in concentrating the technical experts within 
the maintenance association that remained external to the community organization, 
the tradeoff between technical knowledge and equality was minimized.   
Efficiency in Administration 
Efficiency in administration was measured in three ways.  First, participant 
observation of the meetings revealed the organizational structure and rules and 
procedures for the meetings.  This was done to compare the organizational s ructure 
to the Weber’s description of a “direct democracy”.  Second, respondents w re asked 
about their perceptions of leadership and technical expertise needed within the 
community organization.  If both of these factors are present in the community 
organization then it could expedite decision-making, since both of these groups would 




(a) Organizational rules and procedures 
 An examination of the rules and bylaws of the community associations was 
done to compare them to the types of organizations that Weber (1978) defined as 
being a direct democracy.  For Weber, these types of organizatio s were particular to 
the post-Enlightenment era, since they were fundamentally associations of individuals 
who created rational type organizations that intended to maximize equality.  The 
description of these types of organizations is one where there is: 
(a) Short terms of office, if possible only running between two 
general meetings of the members; (b) Liability recall at any time; 
(c) The principle of rotation or of selection by lot in filling 
offices so that every member takes a turn at some time. This 
makes it possible to avoid the position of power of technically 
trained persons or of those with long experience and command of 
official secrets; (d) A strictly defined mandate for the conduct of 
office laid down by the assembly of members. The sphere of 
competence is thus concretely defined and not of a general 
character; (e) A strict obligation to render and accounting to the 
general assembly; (f) The obligation to subject every unusual 
question which as not been foreseen to the assembly of members 
or to a committee representing them; (g) The distribution of 
powers between a large number of offices each with its own 
particular function; (h) The treatment of office as an avocation 
and not a full time occupation (Weber 1978: 289) 
   
 From an organizational perspective, the community associations in the sites 
visited fulfilled Weber’s basic criteria.  Terms of office for the president, secretary 
and treasurer of the associations were two years, and there were procedures in place 
to recall any member of the positions by majority vote.  No member of the board 
could serve for more than two terms, to ensure the rotation of selection.  Each of the 
positions came with a clear mandate that was outlined in the statute of the 




secretary was responsible for taking minutes of the meetings, a d the treasurer was 
responsible for overseeing the community funds.   All of the community 
organization meetings presented an agenda before community meetings. The 
president would open and close the meeting. Comments were heard trough raising 
hands and addressing the group, and votes were done in the open (raising hands in 
favor).  The majority vote ruled.  Minutes of the meeting were presented at the end, 
and all community members voted in favor of the minutes. The minutes were
recorded in a community book. 
 From an organizational perspective, the community associations were
designed to provide a form of administration whereby decisions could be reached 
(thereby ensuring a level of efficiency) but that the rules and procedures ensured that 
everyone was heard (thereby ensuring a level of equity).  However, Weber noted the 
tension between these two goals, arguing that concerns over efficient administration 
could undermine the delicate balance with equity.  This could either come as a result 
of leaders who tend to dominate positions of administration, or through deference to 
technical experts. 
(b) Efficient leadership 
Respondents were asked about elite capture within their communities through 
questions on leadership (“Are there any community members you would designate as 
a ‘leader’?”), qualifications to run for the board (“Are there anyor certain people who 




questions about how long the current board members have served on the board90. 
These questions were designed to determine if leaders in the community tended to 
dominate board positions in the interest of more efficient administration.  Weber 
(1978) defined these leaders as people: 
(1) whose economic position permits them to hold continuous 
policy-making and administrative positions in an organization 
without (more than nominal) remuneration; (2) who enjoy social 
prestige of whatever derivation is such a manner that they are 
likely to hold office by virtue of the member’s confidence, which 
at first is freely given and then traditionally accorded (Weber 
1978: 290).   
 
In the high participation communities, there were instances of explicit and 
implicit elite capture.  In Beco e Sauquinho, the current president had served in the 
position for eight years, and was also the operator in the community.91 The 
president/operator indicated in the interview that he served in the position of president 
because no one else wanted to.  Interviews with community members indicated mixed 
feelings on this arrangement, however.  On the one hand, several community 
members that were interviewed indicated that the president was in the best position to 
run the community association, and he had all the relevant technical knowledge to be 
able to address issues with the water system: 
 
“[The president] makes all the decisions, and he is the one who knows all about 
the technical matters” –Male, 45, Beco e Sauquinho 
 
                                                
90 The community organization registration documents a d standard procedures indicate that no board 
position can be occupied for more than two terms (each term is two years).  The questions were asked 
to see if these procedures were followed and if anyone from the community could and did serve on the 
board.   
91 This has a clear problem of conflict of interest, since the board determines the wages paid to the 




A few community members, however, indicated their dissatisfaction with these 
arrangements, saying that the president did not really listen to other people’s opinions 
at the association meetings (n=3).  One respondent even argued that the president had 
used his position as operator to retaliate against them:   
“I don’t say anything at the meetings anymore. My husband disagreed with [the 
president] once, and we had our water cut off. I’m sure it was because we 
disagreed with [the president]” – Female, Beco e Sauquinho 
 
This community also had a relatively high number of respondents who were not 
aware how the community association worked (what the terms and responsibilities of 
the officers of the board were, etc.); 72% (n=11) indicated they did not really know 
this information and relied instead on the president to attend to matters of the 
community association.  
The other two high participation communities, Conceição and Lagoa Dionizio, 
also showed patters of elite capture, although it was less explicit.  In Conceição, a key 
informant interview with Central staff revealed that there were a small group of about 
five to eight people in the community with “the profile of leaders”, who were 
merchants, business owners, and self-employed.  Unfortunately, none of these people 
were willing or available to be interviewed and did not participate in the group 
interviews.   
In Lagoa Dionizio, one local leader served as president twice (for eight years 
in total), and was, at the time of interviewing, the vice president on the board.  This 
person was also a local teacher and is active in the community and in the community 
organization.  The respondents indicated that the current vice president was a likely 




think this came at a cost to equality (the number of respondents who indicated that 
everyone participated equally was 64%; n=14).   
In the medium participation communities, the pattern of elite capture also 
held.  Active participation in the community had declined in Pau D’Alho when the 
local leader who had been involved in the community association had fallen ill and 
moved to the capital of the state, Salvador, to seek medical treatment.  Several 
respondents noted that when she left, the association had stopped meeting regularly 
(n=8).  More recently, another community leader had taken over as p esident of the 
association, but meetings were irregular.  Several respondents indicated that it did not 
seem that he really wanted to be president (n=3), but that they reli d on him as a 
community leader because he was a good and honest person (n=4) and because h  
was literate (n=3).   
In Lagoa Seca, the community association also relied on a local leader for the 
community organization.  Respondents indicated that previously, the association 
faced problems of corruption where money was stolen from the assocition 
(respondents declined to say from whom; n=3).  A local teacher has recently assumed 
the presidency, and there is renewed enthusiasm for the community association and 
participation (n=4).  The current president indicated that when he had left to complete 
his studies, community members continued to contact him to resolve local issues in 
the community.  As someone with free time and skills, he felt it his duty to serve on 
the association board. 
In the low participation community, Bebedoro, there was a unique formof 




metering, and water was provided free of charge.  However, those located closer to 
the pump had continuous water service, while those further from the pump s ffered 
from frequent water outages, when the supply did not suffice for all.  The local 
community had divided over issues of water provision with two sides of the 
community barely speaking to each other.  The side that did not receive water made a 
formal request to affiliate with Central, and founded a new community organization.  
People briefly joined the organization and voted to join Central.  Central i oduced 
metering and provided trainings on water conservation and use, and since the 
introduction of the new system, water is available to all residents with little to no 
service outages.   
The community organization officially affiliated with Central does not meet 
anymore, since most community issues are discussed at the old assciation.  Water 
bills assess the tariff for water supply, plus R$1,00 per household for the perator and 
R$1,00 per household for the new association.  Residents did not know this, however, 
and most said that they paid R$2,00 for the operator.  The new association does ot 
meet, although it technically has a board (elections have not been held for some time).  
Since the old association did not address issues of water supply, resond nts were not 
asked about elite capture. 
(c) Technical Knowledge 
 Respondents were also asked questions as to how technical issues with the 
system were resolved.  The intention of these questions was to determine if those wi  
technical expertise were deferred to in matters of administration because of their 




equity, since the voices of the technically proficient were privileged above others in 
the community organization.   
 Respondents were asked the procedures for how technical issues wer 
addressed in the community organization.  The majority of respondents indicated that 
they would call the operator (45%; n=86) or Central (37%; n=86).  In the high 
participation communities, residents indicated that they would first call the operator 
(87%; n=32) and, if the problem was not solved, then they would call Central (74%; 
n=32).  In Beco e Sauquinho, most residents said that they would turn to the president 
with any and all problems (since he was also the operator) and that he would liaise 
with technicians from Central, if needed (88%; n=9). Interviews with respondents in 
Conceição indicated that a high satisfaction with the service in water supply.  The 
community had gotten together to replace the operator once before when his work 
was not performed to a satisfactory level, and everyone interviewed (100%; n=15) 
said they had faith in the current operator to operate and maintain the system well.  
The respondents were all aware of how to call a meeting if there was a problem 
(100%; n=15).  In response to the question of who to call when there were probl ms 
with the water system, most respondents said they would notify the operator, or notify 
Central.  In the words of one respondent: 
“I trust the technicians [to fix the system]” –Female, Conceição 
 
In the medium and low participation communities, residents were molikely 
to call Central directly (67%; n=53) as opposed to talking to the operator first (43%; 




not know who to call in the event of an emergency (n=7 versus n=1 in the high 
participation communities).   
Organizational Equity 
In order to measure equity within the community organizations, respondents 
were asked questions as to how they felt their and/or others’ voices were heard in the 
community organization, and whether they considered the community organizatio  to 
be equitable. Respondents were also asked to participate in a series of mapping 
exercises to link participation patterns with different types of people in the 
community.  In this way, evidence could be gathered as to the extent to which broader 
patterns of inequality might be replicated within the community organizations, 
thereby undermining the equality of voice necessary for a direct democracy. 
(a) Equality of Voice 
The majority (75%; n=48) of respondents indicated that their voice carried the 
same weight as everyone else’s (“same as everyone else”; “we are all/everyone is 
equally poor”; “everyone has equal opportunity”).  Of the remaining answers, one 
person indicated that they were all equal to discuss issues, but that the president was 
the only one who knew the technical information.  Two respondents indicate  that 
they did not participate, one further respondent pointed out that the associ tion did 
not meet very often anymore (“association has been abandoned”) (This was in Pau 
D’Alho).  Three further respondents said that the young don’t participa e very often 
(n=1) and that those who are relatively well off do not, or are not welcome to 




This result varied slightly by level of participation.  In the igh participation 
communities of Conceição and Lagoa Dionizio, respondents said that they considered 
the community organization to weigh all voices equally (74%; n=47).  In Beco e 
Sauquinho, a few respondents complained about the prominent role that their 
president played in the community organization, saying that he had taken over, and 
did not listen to other people’s responses.  In the medium and low participation 
communities, while the majority did indicate that they thought the community 
organization was equitable, there were more complaints about people who did n t 
participate or who did not feel welcome to participate (n=2).  This result did not vary 
by gender.  Men and women answered equally that they felt the syst m to be fair and 
considered all viewpoints.  Results also did not vary by age.   
When asked whether they considered the community organization to be fair, 
the majority of respondents also answered that the system was open to anyone who 
wanted to participate (74%; n=47).  Respondents were asked if there were any rules 
or procedures in place to ensure that everyone was heard equally.  Most people did 
not answer this question. Those that did said that there were no “rules” but that all 
viewpoints were considered (n=5).  However, it is interesting to note here, that in 
communities where literacy was relatively low, those who were not literate did not 
think that they could serve on the board, and claimed that this was a barrier to 
becoming a board member (when, according to the statute, it is not).   
The next way that the level of equity in voicing opinions or desires within the 
community association was measured was to ask respondents whether all opinions 




(79%; n=48) said that all voices were weighted equally within the association (“we 
are all equally poor”; [voices are counted] “same as everyone else”; “everyone has 
equal opportunities”).  Of the remaining respondents, 3 respondents said they did not 
participate (6% of total responses), 3 said that there was no equality (“no rules to 
ensure equality92”; “not equal” and “no voice in association, everything is decided by 
the president”).  Two people indicated that young people and the well off do not 
participate, and one person said that the association has been abandoned.   
In the high participation communities, there were a greater number of 
responses, and most people said that everyone participated on equal footing.  In 
Conceição, 12 interviewees answered the question (75%; n=16), of which 11 said that 
they believed that voices were weighted equally (92%).  One person re ponded that 
they do not participate often in the community association.  In Lagoa Di nisio, 9 
interviewees answered the question (60%; n=15), and all 9 indicated that they 
believed all participants to be treated as equals within the associ tion.  In Beco e 
Saquinho, 9 interviewees also answered the question (60%; n=15), of which 7 said 
they believed that their voices were weighted the same as everyone else’s (78%).  
One participant who responded that voices were accounted for equally, followed up 
by saying that all technical matters were resolved by the president, since he had the 
technical knowledge and training.  Two respondents said they believed that the 
president did not take anyone’s opinion into account.  In the medium particition 
communities, fewer respondents answered the question, and, of those who did, fewer 
                                                
92 The question asked if there were any rules in place to ensure that everyone had an equal voice. This 
person’s response indicated only that there were no formalized rules in place to ensure that everyone 
had an equal chance to participate.  However, the response has been categorized as indicating that there 




believed the association to account for all voices equally.  In Pau D’Alho, only 7 
interviewees responded to the question (30%; n=21), of which 5 said they thought the 
association was equal (71%).  In Lagoa Seca, only 8 interviewees answered the 
question (50%; n=16), of which 5 said they believed the association to weight voices 
equally (63%).  The remaining respondents either said they don’t partici te (1 
response), that the association was abandoned (1 response); that certain groups were 
excluded (the well-off and the young) (2 responses); or that voices are not accounted 
for equally (1 response).  In the low participation community, only 1 interviewee 
responded to the question (6%; n=16), and the respondent said that they do not 
participate. 
There was no distinct pattern by gender in terms of these response: 86 
percent of women (n=22) and 82 percent of men (n=21) said they believed the 
association to weight voices equally.  Women were more likely to say that did not 
participate (2 responses), and men were more likely to point out groups that had been 
excluded (3 responses).   
(b) Equality in Leadership 
Next, respondents were asked questions of the types of people that typic lly 
served on the board of the community organization.  These questions aimed to get at 
whether there tended to be elite capture among these positions, or whether these 
rotated between all association members. A series of questions was asked of 
participants to determine (i) how well informed respondents were about the 




to participate or not participate, (iii) whether they could identify any barriers to 
participation.   
Respondents were asked several questions about their community 
organization, including who the board members were, what the terms and 
responsibilities of each of the positions are, and what the process of recall is.  
Respondents in the high participation communities were more likely to know how the 
organization worked (85%; n=56).  In the medium participation communities, 
respondents often knew the terms and the actual board members, but they were not as 
aware of the responsibilities of each of the positions (“don’t know” – 75%; n=25).  In 
the low participation community, respondents were not aware of how the association 
was organized, who was on the board, or what the process of recall was (73% 
answered “don’t know”; n=15).  However, in this community, there were two 
associations, and respondents from one side of the community actively participated in 
their association.   
Next, community members were asked their reasons for participating, in order 
to gauge the importance of the community association.  Of the respondents who 
indicated that they participated in the community association, most (65%; n=73) said 
that it was important to participate in order to know what is going o  in the 
community.  Many of these associations provided forums for issues that were 
important to the community, such as providing seeds, access to tractrs, or debates 
over agriculture, etc.   
Finally, in order to measure how equitable the association was in terms of 




barriers to participation.  This was approached in two ways.  First, respondents were 
asked whether there were any particular qualifications needed to join the board. This 
question aimed to assess whether certain members were considered to have better 
qualifications to serve on the board, or whether certain knowledge was needed to be 
able to be on the board.  This links to Weber’s theory that any type of organization 
that seeks to minimize Herrschaft (or, is a “direct democracy”), can be easily 
undermined by an emphasis on technical knowledge, or by filling position  of 
authority with honoratores, or community leaders (who might have more time 
available).   
Over half of respondents (51%; n=68) answered that having available time 
was critical to serving on the board (“must have free time”; “I don’t have time”).  
Around 43% of respondents indicated that board members were some form of 
community leader, either exhibiting leadership skills, or trust (25%), or that they were 
willing to take on the positions of responsibility (28%).  Other qualific tions needed 
included some technical knowledge (18%) and literacy (15%).  Of the respondents 
who indicated that literacy was an important criteria to being able to serve on the 
board, 60 percent were illiterate (n=10). The remaining respondents id not indicate 
whether they were literate or not.  Only nine percent of respondents said that anyone 
could serve on the board, but all but one said that while anyone could serve, they have 
not run themselves (because of lack of time).   
In the high and medium participation communities, the majority of responses 
centered around the issue of free time as necessary to serve on the board positions.  In 




followed by desire (25%; n=16).  In Conceição, free time (60%) was followed by the 
response that anyone could serve (who had the desire to take on th  responsibility, or 
had free time 20%; n=16).  In Lagoa Dionisio, 55 percent of respondents said that 
community leaders typically took up the responsibilities of serving o  the board 
(n=9).  The medium participation communities (Pau D’Alho and Lagoa Sec ), most 
respondents also indicated that free time was essential to serving on the board (73 and 
75 percent, respectively; n=15 and n=12).  In the low participation community 
(Bebedouro), the responses were fairly evenly split between having free time, and that 
local leaders typically took over board positions (36 and 45 percent, respectively; 
n=11).  Of the people who said that anyone can serve, all were located in high 
participation communities (Beco e Sauquinho and Conceição).  
Responses showed some variation by gender.  About 39 percent of women 
said that existing leaders in the community tended to assume board p sitions, 33 
percent of women answered that those who served on the board needed free time, and 
28 percent said that board members had some sort of qualification (technical 
knowledge) (n=36). Among men, 54 percent said that assuming board positions 
necessitated free time, and 37 percent said that community leaders typically took on 
positions on the board (they have “desire to serve” are “trusted community leaders” 
are “good representatives”) (n=35). 
(c) Community Mapping 
Community mapping exercises were done both with individuals during their 
interviews, as well as during the group interviews.  Respondents were asked to place 




participation, to active participation/leadership.  In addition, respondents were asked 
to identify whether these people were male or female, rich or po , and old or young.  
This exercise was designed to get at types of divisions within the community, and to 
see whether these tended to be replicated within the participatory organizations.  As 
predicted, the communities that were classified as “high” participa ion communities 
(Beco e Sauquino, Conceição, and Lagoa Dionisio) saw more respondents rank 
themselves and other community members as “active” participants. In Beco e 
Sauquinho, 69 percent of respondents answered that they considered themselves to be 
active participants in the community association (n=13).  In Conceição and in Lagoa 
Dionisio, 50 percent said that they were active participants, and the remaining 50 
percent said that they ranked their participation as “medium” (n=14 and n=10, 
respectively). 
The medium participation communities (Pau D’Alho and Lagoa Seca), 
respondents were less likely to rank themselves as active participants.  In Pau 
D’Alho, 44 percent of respondents said they did not participate at all, or their 
participation was low, 25 percent ranked themselves as “medium” on the scal  of 
participation, and 25 percent said they actively participated (n=16).  In Lagoa Seca, 
73 of respondents said that they actively participated in community associ tion 
meetings, but 100 percent of respondents said that the young people in the community 
did not participate at all (n=15).   
In the low participation community (Bebedouro), there are two community 




association draws participants mainly from one side of the community93.  The second 
association was founded to be able to affiliate with the Central program, and 
technically has a president, treasurer, secretary.  However, the association does not 
seem to meet anymore.  In the words of one respondent:    
“Not many people are affiliated with the new association, and we don’t have 
the need to talk about water anymore. So a lot of people are members at the 
old association” Male, 45, Bebedouro (Side B) 
 
When respondents were asked about their participation in the community 
association, they typically responded regarding their involvement with the “old” 
association, since that was where community issues were typicall  discusses.  Of 
respondents from Side A of the community (that used to get water, and opposed the 
affiliation with Central), 44 percent ranked themselves as active participants of the 
community association (n=9).  Of the respondents from Side B, only 29 percent 
described themselves as active participants in the old association (n=7).  One 
respondent was on the board of the “new” association, and so described themselves a  
not participating at all in the “old” association, but as an active participant of the 
“new” association.  The remaining respondents described themselves as never 
participating, or said that they could not answer the question because they did not 
attend community meetings.   
                                                
93 This community was served with water by the local government (prefeitura) prior to the Central 
program.  However, water only reached the houses that were closest to the pump (about half the 
community).  The half of the community that wasn’t receiving water complained.  Usage was not 
monitored, so electricity rates were very high, andthe local government asked Central to take over the 
system.  The side of the community not receiving water opened an association and affiliated with 
Central.  Since Central introduced hydrometers, the water usage per household has fallen, as evidenced 
by the fact that electricity bills have fallen, and ow the water suffices for the whole community.  
However, the “new” association does not meet (despit  collecting fees from each household). 




(d) Wealth mapping 
Respondents were asked to map other participants in the community 
associations on a continuum from no/low participation to active participation or 
leadership position according to their wealth status.  The goal of this exercise was to 
ascertain if there were major differences by wealth in terms of who was considered to 
actively participate or even take on leadership positions.  Most partici nts did not 
delineate between the rich and poor in the exercise (98%; n=83), saying that everyone 
was equal in terms of income and wealth (“everyone is equally poor”).  These 
responses were further supported in questions posed later in the interviews that asked 
participants whether voices were weighted equally in the community association (see 
section on equity).   
Two respondents from Lagoa Seca answered that wealthy, or better off, 
members of the community did not participate much in the community association at 
all.  One of those respondents answered that, because he was perceived as better off 
in the community, he did not feel welcome to participate in the community 
association because he was not “in need”: 
“ I am not happy with Central, the water quality is terrible- too salty.... I 
pay an average of R$8,00 for water, but I spend another R$12,00 [every 
month] buying drinking water, because I can’t drink Central’s water. 
But what to do? I don’t participate in the association because I feel 
unwelcome. People regard me as someone who is not “in need”, and I 
should leave matters in the hands of the ones who do have “needs” 
[medical needs, improving schools, seeds, fields, crops, etc.].  Everyone 
is pro-Central anyway, so my opinion wouldn’t matter to anyone” –




(e) Age mapping 
Respondents were also asked to differentiate other community members by 
age in the continuum of participation.  Irrespective of levels of participa ion in the 
communities (high, medium, low), young people did not seem to participate 
anywhere. In all six communities, young people were rated as never participating.  In 
addition, those respondents who rated themselves as never participating were 
typically young (all were under 24).  The most active participants were usually the 
elderly, and most participants made a distinction between men in the community and 
elderly men, as well as women and elderly women.  Where the elderly (both men and 
women) were explicitly mentioned, they were always ranked as active participants, or 
holding leadership active participants, whereas 40 percent of respondents said that 
man were classified in the “medium” participation category (n=10).   
Interestingly, however, four respondents also classified their husbands as 
active participants along with themselves (but two classified “men” separately in the 
medium participation category, and the other two did not classify “men” separately).  
In all three of these communities, many male respondents said th t they did not 
actively participate because their wives or other females residing in the household 
(mother, mother-in-law, etc.) were more involved with the community association, 
and that only one person per household really needed to participate.  In Pau D’Alho, 
75 percent of respondents ranked women as active participants. What was different 
here than in the two previous communities, is that 81 percent of respondents ranked 
males (named either as “men”, “husband”, “elderly men”, “son”, etc.) as not 




In Lagoa Seca, males participated more actively in the assocition than 
women did: 87 percent of respondents ranked males (“males”, “self”, “elderly men”, 
“husband”, etc.) as active participants at the community association meetings (n=15).  
By contrast, 93 percent of respondents said that women did not participate at all, or 
rarely/occasionally participated in the community meetings (n=15).  One third of 
respondents differentiated “elderly women”, and ranked this group as participating 
about half the time (medium participation).  The reason given for the gender 
discrepancy in this community was that the association typically dealt with 
community issues pertaining to agriculture- such as seeds, fertilizer, tractors, etc.- that 
was usually handled by men. 
In the remaining communities, there was no real discernable pattern in terms 
of gender and participation.  In Beco e Sauquinho, men and women were both ranked
as active participants. One explanation for this could be that the curr nt president of 
the association charges each member of the association, rather than one fee per 
household, so membership is based on an individual rather than household level.  In 
Bebedouro, the largest division was between the two sides of the community 
(geographic). Even between these two sides, there were no discernable divisions 
between males and females in terms of participation. Men and women ranked 
themselves and other as not participating, as participating sometimes, and as actively 
participating.   
The Tradeoff 
The community organizations sampled exhibited signs of a tradeoff b tween 




of Weber’s argument.  On the latter point, all of the communities had local leaders 
who were active on the board, often rotating between positions (such as president and 
vice-president).  However, in all but two communities sampled, most community 
members said that they felt their voices were all weighted equally, indicating that 
most people did not think this pattern was inappropriate.   
The communities sampled also showed that the equality of the organizatio s 
was undermined by technical knowledge.  Weber argued that when tasks became 
technically complex, a certain level of technical knowledge would be required, and 
those possessing that knowledge would also have voices that would be weighted more 
heavily than those without.  This tradeoff, however, was not as clear ut in the 
communities sampled.  The water systems did, indeed, require a certain minimal 
technical knowledge for the required operation and maintenance of the syst ms.  
Most people, outside of the operator, did not receive this training.  However, since the 
operator was paid by the community members, he was called on to perform the 
operation and maintenance of the systems, and did not participate as th  operator in 
the community association meetings. 
What was more interesting was that the maintenance of the systm was 
performed by Central, and they had a number of technical staff to replace pipes, 
pumps, hydrometers, or anything else that was needed.  Because of this, n the one 
hand, the technical tasks needed to maintain the minimal level of operation and 
maintenance of the system were done efficiently, but this efficiency did not come at a 
direct cost to the equity in the community organization, since the tecnical staff was 




On the other hand, this meant that the community no longer debated or 
discussed technical issues with the water supply system. Since they do not discuss the 
issues, the community members were also not typically knowledgeable of the 
technical issues or whether they were being performed adequately.94  This could be 
problematic, because shoddy maintenance can often take years to show up as an 
issue; pumps that are not well maintained, for example, may need to be replaced 
before the expected time for replacement, and this cost could, in theory, need to be 
borne by the communities, and would result in higher tariffs or other assessments.   
 
                                                
94 Most had faith in the Central technicians, saying that the system worked well, so they weren’t 




C. The ‘Development Model’ 
While tradeoffs between equity and efficiency were present in the
communities surveyed, outcomes of efficiency and equity were also ttained 
simultaneously.  Where allocative equity was achieved at a cost to allocative 
efficiency, organizational equity was sacrificed for improved effici ncy.  Thus, 
outcomes of both allocative equity and organizational efficiency were achieved.   
The final step of the research was then to link these outcomes with 
participatory forms of administration.  According to the development model, 
participation is the key input variable to attain outcomes of efficincy and equity.  
Thus, variations in participation should also reflect variations in outcomes of 
efficiency and equity. 
Defining Participation 
 Chapter 2 traced the emergence of participation, and showed how its 
conceptualization is varied and multi-dimensional in origin.  However, th adoption 
of participation and the participatory approach within public policy discussion  has 
limited the scope for participation to be simply an exercise of “v ice” (much as 
within Hirshman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty), or the “influence” of stakeholders in 
decision-making over resources that directly affect them (such as defined by the 
World Bank 1996).  The discussion as to whether this conceptualization of 





 Interviews with respondents both within the communities and at the municipal 
level (with CENTRAL staff) indicated that this slightly narrower conceptualization of 
participation was fairly accurate.  Communities that were described by CENTRAL 
staff or self-described as having “high” levels of participation, indicated that this 
measure was primarily driven by the fact that members “actively contributed” (84%; 
n=73), or that many different members “contributed to discussions” and “helped to 
decide outcomes” (15%; n=73).  Communities that were defined as having “low” 
participation (both by communities or CENTRAL staff) described indicated that this 
was due to “low attendance of meetings” (67%; n=68), and/or that “people don’t talk” 
(55%; n=68). Very little was said about challenging unequal power relations, more 
control over setting rules and tariffs, or setting alternative goals.  Instead, community 
organizations and participation were described mainly as vehicles for implementing 
water supply programs (or providing legitimacy), and as spaces for sharing 
information.   
Linking Participation and Efficiency 
In addition to measuring outcomes of efficiency, respondents were ask d 
questions that aimed to measure the links between participation and efficiency.  The 
development model argues that participation leads to improved efficiency through (i) 
reducing informational asymmetries; (ii) improving accountability; and (iii) 
increasing ownership over the system.  In other words, the community is better able 
to monitor if there is negligence in the operation and maintenance of th water system 
through mechanisms of peer monitoring, and to hold local community leaders 




respondents were asked what the recourse for action was if there is negligence in the 
operation or the maintenance of the water system, and by what mechanisms they held 
the board accountable. 
The majority of respondents (68%; n=79) answered in some way or another 
that since the system seemed to be working well, and there was enough water for 
everyone, they were not worried about it (“system works well” (n=17), “the operator 
looks after the system, so I’m not concerned” (n=8), or “we pay Central directly so 
we aren’t involved in monitoring” (n=7)).  Several respondents replied in the 
theoretical, arguing that they were not concerned that negligence xisted, but if they 
suspected it, they would call for a meeting (n=5), talk to the operator directly (n=5), 
and/or call Central (n=6).   
Respondents from the high and medium participation communities were more 
likely to say that they didn’t worry about negligence, since they trusted that the 
operator and/or central was doing a good job (67% of responses; n=25).  Respond nts 
from the low participation communities exhibited more distrust of Central, saying 
they weren’t sure where the funds were going (n=3), or that they were overpaying 
Central (n=2).  Women were less likely to know about community monitori g 
systems; 57% of female respondents replied DK/NR, whereas only 32% of men did.   
In addition to reducing informational asymmetries, participatory institutions 
are intended to provide users with a greater ownership over the system.  This is also 




maintenance of the system, and care for the system. Not one respondent (0%) replied 
that the Central system gave them more ownership over the system.95\ 
Unfortunately, since the outcomes of efficiency were measured on the supra-
municipal level, it was not possible to link the varying levels of participation that the 
communities exhibited with variations in outcomes of efficiency. 
Linking Participation and Equity 
Participation is expected to improve mechanisms of accountability, thereby 
providing a check on distribution policies.  In an attempt to measure this linkage, 
respondents were asked by what mechanisms the community monitored the operator 
and/or central to ensure equitable distribution.  Most people replied that they did not 
discuss distribution and allocation, since the ten cubic meters of water and costs of 
maintenance and delivery were set by Central.  In the words of one respondent:  
“Distribution is no longer a problem since Central, we don’t even talk about 
that. Before Central it was a huge problem, a lot of fights in the community” 
–Male, Lagoa Dionizio 
 
Respondents did not equate discussions over distribution and allocation as 
critical to voice, and most respondents who indicated that Central was the primary 
decision-maker for allocation and distribution still said that they felt they had about 
an equal of a voice as everyone else (67%; n=14).  This response varied only in 
Bebedouro, where a few respondents indicated that contradicting the 
president/operator could result in water being shut off. 
                                                
95 Seems this was a problem of translation.  People seemed a bit indignant, and seemed to think that the 




Respondents were then asked to indicate whether they thought that 
participation had improved their sense of empowerment and social capital within the 
community.  On the former, most respondents replied that they did not feel that they 
were more empowered as a result of the community association.  This question may 
have been confusing to the respondents, since in five of the six communities, the 
community association had pre-existed the Central program, and the association 
addressed topics that were relevant to the community, not only water(for example, 
seeds, tractors, community needs, etc.).   
However, when asked whether they would take water from the local 
government if it were offered for free, many respondents (26%; n=67) said that they 
would rather pay for the water than rely on the local government (prefeitura), 
indicating that in this way they had more power, or control, over the water resources.  
Within the community association, the participatory organization did not seem to 
change power relations; when respondents were asked whether board members were 
required to have any qualifications, one common theme was that they required 
leadership skills (15%; n=68).  In other words, the community organization tended to 
replicate existing social relations within the community, with loca  leaders taking 
board positions in the association.  This was further evidenced by the fact that young 
people were typically absent from association meetings. 
On the issue of social capital, respondents were asked whether participation 
had resulted in people having been brought together in ways they might not have been 
before.  Most respondents seemed confused by the question, and answered “I don’t 




The role of participation 
The communities surveyed exhibited various levels of participation, from high 
to medium, to low.  This research sought to examine whether those levels of 
participation were linked to varying outcomes of efficiency and equity.  In the end, 
there is no real conclusive evidence on this.  The indicators on equity were largely 
gathered through community interviews, but much of the financial datand other 
indicators used for efficiency were calculated at the supra-municipal level, which 
provides a general outcome for all communities affiliated with Central, but doesn’t 
allow for a breakdown of the results, by community.   
Participant observation in the communities, however, didn’t indicate 
significant differences in outcomes of equity and efficiency.  Much of the decision-
making for the water supply system does not occur on the community level, but rather 
on the supra-municipal level, and this removes the link between the community 
organization and some outcomes of efficiency and equity.  For example, tariffs and 
rates are determined by Central, and decisions over maintenance of th  system are 
also taken by Central.  Thus, communities do not have to work together to d termine 
the cost of water, or contribute time and labor for maintenance.96  In this, Central acts 
as a water supply company, albeit without a profit motive. 
However, while setting rates and providing technical expertise on the supra-
municipal level ensured the efficient administration of the water supply system (from 
a technical perspective, not from a cost recovery perspective), the role of participation 
in ensuring reliable water supply that fulfilled goals of efficiency, equity and 
                                                
96 This is different than, say, in many water user associations in the world (especially around irrigation) 




sustainability was limited.  On the one hand, this ensures the continued organizational 
sustainability of the water supply system, since varied levels of participation did not 
directly impact the level of service for water consumers.  On the o her hand, however, 
this undermined the role of the community to truly participate in their water 
provision.  In essence, the relationship between Central and the communities was one 
of a water supply company with local consumers. 
Higher levels of participation did seem to increase satisfaction with the water 
system, and provided residents with a forum to address issues of potential conflict 
over water distribution.  In Lagoa Dionizio, for example, respondents were highly 
satisfied with the water system and with Central (79%; n=14).  Much of this was 
because the previous water system had not supplied all residents with water. This 
uneven distribution had caused conflicts and grievances in the community.  In he
words of one respondent:  
“Before Central, we all used water from the same well, but it didn’t reach 
all the houses, and that caused a lot of problems. Central is 100% better” 
–Female, 42, Lagoa Dionizio 
 
Where participation did seem to be important was in addressing broader 
systems of patronage and water provision in the region.  Paying for water gave 
community members a sense of voice and entitlement vis-à-vis their water services 
that did not exist when the water was provided free of charge.  As one respondent 
noted: 
“I don’t trust them [politicians] anymore when they offer free water. They 
come, and they promise everything and then we are left with nothing. At 
least when I pay for it, I can demand some service, and I know it will 





Several respondents noted that water is often used as a political tool during 
elections (n=5), where political candidates offered water free of charge in exchange 
for votes.  Once elected, the water supply systems typically stop working because of 
lack of funds for operation and maintenance of the system.  Under the Central system,
however, respondents felt that paying for water gave them entitlement to continued 
service (23%; n=86), since they could hold the water supply company accountable.  
While this did not necessitate participation, per se, the participatory organization did 
act as an information sharing arena in which the community members wh e news of 
local political leaders offering water was communicated, and the community 
discussed strategies for response and weighed the options together.  In Lagoa Seca, 
for example, community members discussed a recent visit by a local p litician, and 
his promises to deliver free water were discussed openly.   
D. Conclusions 
 This chapter presented findings from field research conducted in April 2009 
on outcomes of equity and efficiency, as well as patterns of partici tion.  Overall, 
the evidence collected across six communities shows partial support for all of the 
models investigated.  Specifically, the field research collected evidence on allocative 
efficiency and equity, and found there to be a tradeoff between the two, where 
explicit and implicit subsidies to the water supply system ensurd allocative equity, 
but came at a cost to allocative efficiency.  In addition, the field r search indicated 
that the administration of community organizations had been deferred to technical 




undermined equality of membership.  In other words, when the opinions of technical 
specialists and community leaders were weighted more than other voic s, equality 
was undermined. Thus, a tradeoff existed between allocative efficiency and equity in 
favor of equity, and also between organizational efficiency and equity in favor of 
efficiency.   
 The field research also found evidence for the co-existence of efficiency and 
equity:  data collected indicated that outcomes of allocative equity and administrative 
efficiency were achieved simultaneously. This provided some partial evidence for the 
development model, which argues that participation leads to improved outcomes of 
efficiency and equity simultaneously.  With respect to participation, the research 
attempted to discern patterns of equity and efficiency that resulted from varied levels 
of participation, but the evidence on this was inconclusive.  The next chap er explores 





Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications  
 This dissertation investigated the compatibility of outcomes of efficiency and 
equity within participatory water management institutions in Bahia, Br zil.  Overall, 
the research found mixed support for the hypotheses investigated.  The next section 
summarizes the findings and conclusions from this research. This is t en followed by 
a section on the implications of the research and the broader contributions of this 
study. 
A. Summary of Findings and Conclusions: Efficiency, Equity and 
Participation 
The first step of this research was to measure outcomes of efficiency and equity to 
determine the extent to which these two outcomes are compatible proc sses.  The 
findings from the field research indicate that certain types of efficiency can co-exist 
with certain types of equity, but that each of these generates tradeoffs with other types 
of efficiency and equity.  Specifically, the research found that explicit and implicit 
subsidies to the water supply systems led to outcomes of allocative equity in the sites 
visited, but that these generated tradeoffs with allocative efficiency.  In each of the 
sites visited, findings from the research also indicated that the community 
organizations were relatively efficient in their administrative practices, but that this 
efficiency came at a cost to equality of membership and voice in the community 
organization.  Given that outcomes of efficiency and equity did result in tradeoffs 
with other kinds of efficiency and equity in the sites visited, the compatibility of these 




on participation in water management that argued for the compatibility of all 
outcomes of efficiency and equity.  However, the research did show that allocative 
equity was compatible with organizational efficiency, indicating at least some level of 
compatibility of outcomes 
The next step of the research was to link participation with outcomes of 
efficiency and equity.  Specifically, the research aimed to investigate the hypothesis 
that participation introduces mechanisms of accountability, among others, at result 
in outcomes of both efficiency and equity.  Here the findings of the research were less 
clear.  First, the research hoped to capture variations in efficiency and equity that was 
linked to patterns of participation on the community level.  Unfortunately, only 
municipal level data were available on allocative efficiency and equity, making it 
difficult to link any variation with differences in participation. And while community-
level data were available for organizational efficiency and equity, there was no clear 
pattern linking variations in participation with outcomes of efficiency and equity.  
Second, the research attempted to link participation with evidence of intermediate 
mechanisms that led to outcomes of efficiency and equity, especially on 
accountability.  Here there was also no clear pattern linking variations in levels of 
participation with consistent variations in accountability, or other intermediate 
mechanisms.  Part of this is likely due to the small sample of communities visited; 
with only six communities it was difficult to ascertain patterns in participation that 
were not immediately attributed to local level characteristics or specific histories of 




accountability introduced through participation were critical to outcomes of both 
efficiency and equity was not found to be substantiated.   
B. Implications of the Research 
The conclusions from this research have several broader implications for 
water management. The following section outlines each of these in greater d tail. 
(a) Self-governance and subsidies 
The broader implications of these findings on water services are unclear.  Much of 
the research on water management shows that most water supply comanies sacrifice 
a certain level of allocative efficiency to ensure broader coverage.  While issues of 
resource sustainability and minimizing losses are important within broader debates on 
efficiency, restricting access to critical resources is politically unpopular.  Thus, 
policies continue to favor equity over efficiency in questions of allocti n.  While, at 
present, significant political support might sustain the Central program, the 
dependence on state financing to replace infrastructure and assistin technical 
trainings comes at a cost to some independence. Scholars critical of how participation 
has been co-opted within development argue that the dependence on state financing 
shapes the role of participants to be little more than the implementers of a state-driven 
program (Mohan and Stokke 2003) or the consumers of a state service (Darcy 1993).  
Here the emphasis of participation as challenging broader and potentially unequal 
power relations is lost.   
If the relationship between allocative efficiency and equity is one of a tradeoff, as 




independence vis-à-vis the state is to raise tariffs to cover costs of operation and 
maintenance.  This would then provide the program with enough financial 
independence to be able to, in theory, establish fully self-governing water systems.  
However, raising the cost of water will negatively affect precisely the population that 
has been ignored under state development programs; since most of the beneficiaries 
of the Central program live on little more than R$450 per month for a family, raising 
the tariffs for water supply would price water provision outside of the reach of many 
consumers.   
(b) Elite capture and water services 
The impact of elite capture on water services was also unclear.  In some sites, 
local leaders used their power to mediate access to water, wheeas in other sites, 
leaders continued to serve on the board community organizations because they were 
perceived as the most capable.  If this relationship were to hold on a broader level, 
then it is important to note that, true to Weber’s prediction, equality is easily 
undermined even within local level organizations.   Where Weber’s insights into elite 
capture indicate that when one group or person’s voice is privileged over others, then 
equality is undermined, there is no consistent pattern in the findings of this research 
to indicate that equality was necessarily linked to continued access to water supply 
services.  Given that water is critical to human life, any inequality of access, even 
through elite capture, could have critical consequences.  The appeal of the 
participatory approach to devolve decision-making to the local level is couched in the 




form, may operate in a way to maximize the administrative effici ncy, which could 
come at a cost of access for some.  
(c) Participation and Sustainability 
This research also examined the role of participation in six community-managed 
water supply systems. Interviews with Central staff and state officials continuously 
underscored the need for participation in the water supply schemes as critical to its 
survival.  However, in the six communities surveyed, participation was linked only 
loosely to outcomes of efficiency and equity.  In fact, since much of t e operation and 
maintenance for the water supply systems was done on the supra-municipal level, the 
role of participation did not seem to be critical to the sustainability of the water 
supply system.  This was evidenced by the fact that water was delivered with the 
same reliability in communities were participation levels were low as in those where 
participation levels were high.   
 Where participation did seem to make a difference was in addressing broader 
issues of patronage and inequality.  Water is a popular political commodity in the 
semi-arid region, and water is often promised free of charge in exchange for votes 
and other political favors.  A large majority of respondents interviewed for this 
research indicated that, if promised water free of charge, they would turn it down, 
because paying for water gave them certain rights.  Where politicians had come to 
communities with the promise of free water, information sharing at the community 
meetings allowed for community members to compare promises, discuss, and vote 




 While information-sharing may not rank high in theories of participation and 
empowerment, water supplied through the Central system provided a critical 
alternative to the politics of water in the region.  The Central program’s mission is to 
provide water supply to rural communities, and operates as a non-profit association of 
communities.  While the participatory link between the supra-municipal org nization 
and local communities may not be extremely strong, the a-political orientation of 
Central means that water provision is open to all qualified communities.  These 
communities then have rights for service over water, and are supplied clean water on 
a regular basis. In this way, water is removed as a political commodity, to be traded 
for votes and favors, and is supplied regularly and indefinitely. Thus, participation in 
the Central program seems to change the playing field a little for impoverished 
communities living in broader systems of political patronage.  
 This research indicated preliminarily that the participatory community-based 
institution could provide some counterbalance to broader systems of the politicization 
of water resources.  This would be an important link to establish in future research 
programs, particularly since these broader issues of equity would add an a ditional 
dimension to the debates over compatibility of efficiency and equity within water 
resources management.  
(d) Scaling up and broader issues of equity 
 Where this research looked primarily at outcomes of efficiency and equity 
within communities, broader issues of equity in water supply remain.  Many rural 
communities in the semi-arid region continue to suffer from the lack of water 




example of water supply that is participatory and sustainable, the scope for expanding 
the program remains dubious.  First of all, the Central program continues to operate 
because of significant implicit and explicit subsidies, without which it would not be 
able to recover the basic costs of operation and maintenance of the water system.  At 
present, it is estimated that when the Central program reaches a total of 8,000 
connections it will have attained economies of scale. But it is unclear whether 
expanding beyond 8,000 connections is financially feasible. It may be that, given the 
Government of Brazil’s commitment to expanding water supply and sanitation 
services, subsidies will continue to be an acceptable way to provide water services. 
 Second, at present there are only limited regulations on the federal and state 
level for the distribution of groundwater.  In addition, there are only a limited number 
of studies as to the amount of groundwater available in the semi-arid region.  Given 
the intricate hydrological linkages between groundwater sources, and between ground 
and surface water, the expansion of water supply systems that draw on groundwater 
sources is precarious.  This brings up broader issues of equity in the State of Bahia, 
where those communities who are currently provided with groundwater resourc  
may be using these to the detriment of future resources, thereby severely limiting the 
ability of communities not yet provided water supply services to use these resources. 
 Finally, it is unclear that the Central program could be expanded to all types 
of communities.  When the program was initially implemented, the number of 
communities wanting to join the program outweighed the spaces available.  In the 
second district where the program was rolled out (Jacobina) the program was 




The community experiences a lot of in and out migration, and high variability in 
income (since income is dependent on finding emeralds in the mines).  In this 
community, rates of non-payment outweigh rates of payment, hydrometers were 
defaced, and high rates of migration have meant little continuity in he community 
organization.  While the Central program has, overall, enjoyed quitea bit of support 
and enthusiasm from the communities affiliated with the program, part of this may be 
a function of hand-picking the communities to partake in the program.  Global 
experiences have generated quite a bit of debate as to the “pre-conditions” necessary 
for community participation to succeed, and one success factor may be the 
predisposition for working together and relative levels of organization needed to have 
applied for the program to begin with. 
C. Contributions of this study 
 This research contributes to debates in three broad areas. First, it speaks back 
to debates within water management, specifically to the challenges of governance and 
institution building.  The Human Development Report (2006) argues that the primary 
challenge in addressing a global water crisis is not scarcity, but poverty, power and 
inequality, and that these are best addressed through appropriate management 
solutions.  The widespread enthusiasm over the participatory approach to provide 
equitable water management solutions without loss to efficiency was found to be only 
partially true.  However, depending on the types of efficiency and equity gains 
sought, there is scope for both of these goals to be achieved simultaneo sly.  These 
insights inform alternative provision of water services to carefully assess the goals for 




water continues to intensify, the role of participatory institutions i  water 
management may grow, and a careful understanding of outcomes of efficiency and 
equity could prove instrumental in staving off potential conflicts around water 
resources.  
Second, this study contributes to theoretical debates within the Sociologi al 
literature on the compatibility of efficiency and equity within participatory 
institutions. Specifically, this dissertation examined Weber’s insights on whether 
institutional processes that are originally designed to ensure equity tend to be 
displaced over time by concerns over efficiency.  The findings from this research 
found Weber’s predictions to be substantiated, thereby contributing to research done 
in this area.  In addition, the application of Weber’s theory to participa ory water 
resources management is a unique contribution of this work, given the relative lack of 
sociological literature on the micro-level.  
Finally, this study contributes to broader debates about the compatibility of 
economic growth (efficiency) and inequality in Latin America.  Indeed, much of this 
literature has pointed to the relative dearth of institutional practices hat can achieve 
both equity and economic efficiency (Fajnzylber 1990), and these concerns remain of 
crucial importance in the region today. While this dissertation was focused primarily 
on the micro-level, findings from the research indicated that within the communities 
surveyed, the participatory institution lent itself well to addressing broader issues of 
inequality and political patronage.  This is particularly important given that Bahia’s 




as one of the most unequal countries in the world.97 Where the participatory approach 
does not solve the endemic problem of poverty and inequality, the reliable provision 
of water supply services does provide improved standards of living for the targ ted 
populations, and allows them some form of voice over service provision.  In addition, 
the provision of services is linked to improved levels of economic growth (World 
Bank 2005) meaning that the expanded provision of water supply within an 
institutional form that gives a certain level of voice and accountability could, in fact, 
lead to broader levels of efficiency and equity gains. 
                                                
97 In 2000 the gini coefficient for Bahia was 0.61 (Verner 2004) and the corresponding figure for 
Brazil in 2002 was 0.6 (World Bank 2003). Poverty in Bahia, however, was at 43% in 2003 (Verner 




Annex 1: Simplified Water Supply Systems 
This annex provides a technical overview of the simplified water supply 
systems installed under the Central program.  The following section provides a step 
by step overview of the water system, and supplies photographs of the pumps, 
hydrometers and other technical details.  All photos were taken duri g the field 
research. 
Simplified water supply systems are designed for ease of operation and 
maintenance.  These consist typically of a pump that extracts groundwater to a 
storage facility, such as a water tank.  The photos below show pumps installed under 
the Central program to pump groundwater out of the ground:  






In some systems, the water is pumped directly to the pumphouse to be treated.  
In others, it is stored in a larger concrete water storage tank, such as the one pictured 
below. Under this scenario, the operator is responsible for turning the pump on and 
off, depending on the levels of water in the storage tank.      
Water storage tank 
 
 
If the water is pumped based on use, then it is immediately treated with a 
simple mixture of hydrochloride to kill bacteria and other contaminants.  The photos 
below show a pump with an adjacent pump house. The pump house is where the 
water is treated. 






Inside the pump house, water is mixed with hydrochloride and sodium.  The operator 
is in charge of making sure the water is treated.  This process is pictured below: 




From the pump house, the water is distributed through underground pipes to 
the individual houses.  The Central program installed hydrometers in f ont of each 
house to measure the individual consumption of the households.  The photo below 




In some communities, the water is pumped to individual wells for 





Water piped to a personal well Water piped into the house 
 
The operator is responsible for reading the hydrometer of each household and 
reporting the units consumed to Central.  Central then generates a bill for each 
household at the end of the month that charges a base fee of R$5,00 for water, and 
then a progressive tariff rate after that.  The bills clearly show the breakdown of 
charges.  If the household wishes to contest the charges, they can speak either to the 









Interview Guide 1:  Key Informant Interviews (General) 
 
1. What can you tell me about Community X? 
a. What is the average income in the community? What do people do for 
a living? How many people live here? How many houses are there?  
b. What are some of the community dynamics (i.e. lots of migration, 
fights within the community, do people get along, are there main 
families in the communities, etc.)? 
c. What is the layout of the water supply system? Is the pump far away? 
Is the village spread out? Does that affect performance? Do you pay 
electricity costs? Have you always paid them? 
2. How long has the CENTRAL program operated in the community? 
3. What did residents do for water supply before the CENTRAL program? 
4. How well do you think the community association has performed since 
CENTRAL? Why? 
d. If people have stopped joining the community association, why? 
e. If there has always been strong participation, why? 
f. If the participation is linked to farinha cooperatives, do you think that 
there would be the same participation in this community without it? 
5. Have there been any problems/issues with the operation of the system (i.e. has 
the operator not done his job well at times)? If so, how did the community 
address this issue? If not, why not? 
6. What can you tell me about the community association board (president, 
secretary, treasurer)? How many terms have they served? Have there been 
other people in the community who have served? If so, why? If not, why not? 
7. What kinds of training programs has CENTRAL provided for the operation of 
the system? Can anyone be operator? Have there been different operators? 
Have many people attended the training programs? 
Participation :  These questions get at issues of governance through participatory 
institutions. 
 
8. Who participates? Map out participants in the community organization 
according to age/wealth/gender.   
9. How are preferences expressed?  
10. How are differences in preferences reconciled? 
11. How is the community organization involved in monitoring and evaluating the 
operation and maintenance of the water supply system? 
 
Efficiency:  The following questions will be triangulated with data on the water 





A. Technical efficiency: 
 
12. How much water is lost from the pump to each of the houses? Are there 
leaks in the pipes? Is water lost elsewhere in the system? 
13. How often is the water system maintained? Is this preventative 
maintenance?  
14. How often does the operator look after the water system? Is this adequate? 
15. How has the community contributed local knowledge that has improved 
the water system (i.e. location of pump, water source, etc.)? (hidden 
information) 
16. Have community members contributed local knowledge within the 
community organization that helped with the installation, operation and/or 
maintenance of the water system? (hidden information) 
17. What does the community organization do if there is negligence in the 
operation and maintenance of the water system? (hidden action) 
18. Does your participation in community meetings give you a greater sense
of ownership over the water system? (hidden action) 
19. How does the community ensure that the board collects and uses the fees 
for the operation and maintenance of the water system? (accountability) 
 
B. Allocative efficiency 
 
20. Do the fees collected for water services cover the costs of operating and 
maintaining the system? 
21. Who pays the costs for electricity? Are there any subsidies in the water 
system? 
22. Do you get the amount of water that you would like? How close is the amount 
of water delivered to you to the amount that you would like? 
 
Equity :  The following questions will be triangulated with data collected at Central 
on allocation to  
 
23. How does the community ensure that water will be distributed fairly? 
(accountability) 
24. Has participation in the community organization meant that everyone has an 
equal voice in decisions over distributing water? 
25. Is the CENTRAL system more or less fair in the way that water is allocated 
compared to what existed before? 
26. How much influence do you think you have in the decision-making in the 
process of participation or in the outcomes of the community meetings? 
(empowerment) 
27. Has the community organization brought together people who might not 
otherwise have worked together? Are these new networks an asset to the 
community? (social capital) 





Effectiveness in Participation:  The development model argues that successful 
participation comes as a result of specific training to overcome three gaps: 
 
A. Capacity gap:  Successful participation occurs when participants have 
been trained in the process of governance. 
 
29. What kind of training did you receive to understand how participating in the 
community organization would work? Was this training adequate? 
 
B. Incentive gap:  Benefits from participation must outweigh the costs of 
participating. Costs include opportunity costs, psychic costs (of 
participating), and costs of retribution from dominant classes. 
 
30. Is it worth your time to participate in the community organization?  Why or 
why not? 
31. Are there people who have difficulty speaking up at the community meetings? 
32. Has anyone ever had problems because of what they said at a meeting?   
 
C. Power gap:  asymmetric power relations are likely to be internalized and 
perpetuated within participatory organizations. Collective decision-making 
is expected to overcome these differences. 
 
33. What kinds of rules exist at the community organization to ensure that every 
member can speak equally? 
34. Are people who are poor or not as involved in the community able to 
participate on equal footing at the community meetings? 
35. Does everyone in the meeting consider all of the suggestions or statements 
made equally? 
36. Has the community organization created certain rules to make sure that the 
process of making decisions over water distribution will be fair? 
37. How do people participate? Do they present reasons for their statements? 
38. Was there any process of social mobilization that encouraged people to 




A. Elite Capture:   
 
39. Are there certain qualifications or certain people who are more qualified to 
run for board positions in the community?  
40. When was the board first elected? Are there board members that have served 
for some time? Why? 
41. Are there any community members you would designate as leaders in the 
community? 
42. What would you say the structure of power is in the community (e.g. 





B. Technical Expertise: 
 
43. Are there any advisers to the community who help in the case of technical 
issues with the water supply system? 
44. How are technical issues presented to the community (e.g. are they voted 
on)? 
45. Is technical expertise taken into account when deciding on technical issues? 
46. How are technical issues resolved if they conflict with other priorities in the 
community? 
 
Other questions:  
 
47. What is this community’s relationship to the municipal government? Has the 
municipality ever offered water for free? What, in your opinion, are the key 




Interview Guide 2: Individual and Focus Group Interviews 
Community Mapping: 
1. Tell me a little bit about your community. What is the history of your 
community? How long have you all lived here? Your families? 
2. Where do you talk about the water system (i.e. community organization)? Is 
this only to talk about water or do you talk about other issues there as well?  
When was the association founded? For what purpose? Has this changed over 
time?  
Participation 
3. Tell me a little bit more about the community organization.  What are the 
meetings like? Are most people members? Does everyone attend the 
meetings? Are there some people who talk more than others? Why/why not?  
4. If we drew a scale of no participation to leadership positions (See Figure 1 fo  
an example), where would you put yourself? Your neighbor? Who are other 
people in the community and where do they fall? How old is this person? Is 
he/she wealthy? Why does this person not participate etc.?  
5. Who are the board members (president, treasurer, secretary)?  
a. Why were they voted in (i.e. because they had the time for it/because 
they are more qualified??)?  
b. Can anyone be a board member? Have any of you run for the board?  
c. Is there a certain type of person who should/could be on the board? Is 
there a type of person who could not be on the board? Why/why not?  
6. What are the terms of office for each of the positions? 
7. If one of the board members does not fulfill their functions, what is the 
process of recall? 
8. What restrictions exist for terms of office? Is everyone required to serve? 
9. What is the mandate for each of the positions? 
10. What is the process by which the board notifies the members of 
decisions/discussions (e.g. minutes)? 
11. Is it necessary to have certain technical knowledge of the water system to act 
as a board member? 
12. What kind of training did you receive to participate in the community 
meetings? What kind of training did you receive to understand the water 
system?  
13. How are preferences expressed?  




15. How is the community organization involved in monitoring and evaluating the 
operation and maintenance of the water supply system? 
 
 



























Efficiency: Let’s talk a little bit about how well your water system delivers water to 
you.   
 
16. What does the community organization do if there is negligence in the 
operation and maintenance of the water system? (hidden action) 
17. Does your participation in community meetings give you a greater sense of 
ownership over the water system? (hidden action) 
18. How does the community ensure that the board collects and uses the fees for 
the operation and maintenance of the water system? (accountability) 
19. Do you get the amount of water that you would like? How close is the amount 
of water delivered to you to the amount that you would like? (allocative 
efficiency) 
Equity :  Let’s talk a little bit about how fair you think the water system is. 
20. How does the community ensure that water will be distributed fairly? 
(accountability) 
21. Has participation in the community organization meant that everyone has an 
equal voice in decisions over distributing water? 
22. Is the CENTRAL system more or less fair in the way that water is allocated 
compared to what existed before? 
23. How much influence do you think you have in the decision-making in the 
process of participation or in the outcomes of the community meetings? 
(empowerment) 
24. Has the community organization brought together people who might not 
otherwise have worked together? Are these new networks an asset to the 
community? (social capital) 
25. Has the community organization made an effort to assist the poor?  
 
Effectiveness in Participation:  Let’s talk a little bit about how the CENTRAL 
system was implemented.   
 
26. What kind of training did you receive to understand how participating in the 
community organization would work? Was this training adequate? (capacity 
gap) 
27. Is it worth your time to participate in the community organization?  Why or 
why not? (incentive gap) 
28. Are there people who have difficulty speaking up at the community meetings? 




30. What kinds of rules exist at the community organization to ensure that every 
member can speak equally? 
31. Are people who are poor or not as involved in the community able to 
participate on equal footing at the community meetings? 
32. Does everyone in the meeting consider all of the suggestions or statements 
made equally? 
33. Has the community organization created certain rules to make sure that the 
process of making decisions over water distribution will be fair? 
34. How do people participate? Do they present reasons for their statements? 
35. Was there any process of social mobilization that encouraged people to 
participate and provided trainings for this? 
Technical issues: Sometimes problems come up in the water system that can be fixed 
with help from CERB or other technical experts.  Could you tell me a little bit about 
how this process happened in your community? 
 
36. Are there any advisers to the community who help in the case of technical 
issues with the water supply system? 
37. How are technical issues presented to the community (e.g. are they voted on)? 
38. Is technical expertise taken into account when deciding on technical issues? 
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